
It was very clear with the results of the 2008 presidential election that Americans wanted a significant departure from 8 years of Republican foreign policy with the victory of Barrack Obama. Pennsylvania proved not to be the battleground state that many believed it was as Obama beat McCain, 55% to 44% in the state popular vote. But how much has there been since Obama assumed the presidency in the January 2009? And, more importantly, how much change can we realistically expect with the unfolding and evolving Obama Doctrine?
In his first several months as president, Barack Obama concentrated much of his time and energy on addressing the declining economy. On foreign policy, Obama has resisted the temptation to depart from George W. Bush, although he has altered the tone of America’s strategic foreign policy objectives. On the whole, Obama appears to be shifting the tone away from Bush-style unilateralism, hegemony, and preventive force toward a renewed emphasis on multilateralism, cooperation, and diplomacy. For example, the U.S. war against al-Qaeda will continue, however, without the bullying that seemed to alienate America’s allies. Even though Obama has set a schedule for American withdrawal from Iraq, it will take roughly 16 months and will also leave a sizable contingent force of American soldiers. In Afghanistan, Obama has announced his intention to escalate the American military presence by sending more troops and authorizing military strikes inside Pakistan. Challenges such as these has force Obama to confront a mixed set of expectations. Perhaps the most far-reaching expectation is that Obama would overturn a number of foreign policy objectives set by the Bush administration. Whereas Bush often was portrayed as a unilateralist “cowboy,” constantly confronting perceived enemies and ignoring allies, there are high hopes that Obama would remake America into a nation that uses military power as a last resort.
The primary strategic objective of the Obama Administration will be to rebuild American alliances with traditional security partners, namely the European Union, and to respect the importance of key international organizations, such as the United Nations. Obama has promised a new era of international cooperation in order to combat terrorism and nuclear weapons, global warming, poverty, genocide, and disease. Obama has placed a significant amount of attention on making strategic engagement a guiding principle in his strategic doctrine. America's global image has been at an all-time low for quite some time. But the United States' poor image abroad has not been the result of a marketing failure, and, thus, better public diplomacy will not lead to victory in the "Battle of Ideas." Anti-Americanism thrives, not because others misunderstand the United States, but because they perceive its aims and tactics all too well. The Bush Administration's greatest foreign policy failures, namely the preventive invasion of Iraq, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, rendition and torture at Guantánamo Bay, and denials of global warming, can be overcome with better international diplomacy and improvements in trans Atlantic relations.
Among the most significant changes may involve Iran. Although the Bush Administration initiated talks with Iranian diplomats, President Obama supports tough and direct diplomacy with Iran without preconditions. The Obama Administration has asked Iran to abandon its nuclear program and support for terrorism in exchange for Iranian membership in the World Trade Organization, foreign direct investment, and a path toward normalization. To accomplish this goal, Obama intends to work closely with the European Union as a way of promoting a multilateral solution to eliminating Iran’s WMD capabilities. However, the Obama Administration’s strategy of refocusing U.S. foreign policy on diplomacy demands that the U.S. strengthen its military. The problem is that military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have drained America’s hard power.
But when it comes to Obama’s emphasis on the benefits of soft power (diplomacy, image, persuasion, and multilateral cooperation), the outlook is quite positive. By sheer fact that Obama is now president- and more importantly Bush is not- anti-Americanism could be on the decline. In the 1990s, American soft power was based on more than goodwill; it was based on economic and ideological hegemony. There was only one widely accepted path to prosperity--deregulated, American-style capitalism. And there was one central destination for a poor country seeking the investment and aid it needed to travel down that path: Washington. The U.S. and its allies could appeal to the global community by offering large economic incentives to get countries to do what we wanted.
The problem is that American-style capitalism is not as appealing today as it was before this current global economic downturn. The financial meltdown also means that for the foreseeable future, the U.S. and its European allies will have less money to offer countries they want to influence. Finding the money to construct a new Marshall Plan for Iraq and Afghanistan is much more difficult today than it was just a few years ago. Besides, China seems willing to supply money to developing nation-states with fewer requirements and stipulations.
The most obvious commitment Obama wants to liquidate, of course, is the war in Iraq. But how can the U.S. draw down its troop levels without letting Iraq spiral out of control? The answer, at least in part, is to end another conflict: America's proxy war with Iran. Since Iran is the other big foreign power with influence in Baghdad, the U.S. needs its help to prevent Iraq from sliding back into anarchy as we withdraw. A better relationship with Iran might also make it easier to achieve calm--if not peace--between Israel and its two nonstate foes Hizballah and Hamas, since Tehran arms and bankrolls both terrorist groups. Getting Iran's help in Iraq--and persuading it to give up its quest for a nuclear bomb--will require abandoning our efforts at regime change, muting our human-rights concerns and accepting an Iranian sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. Obama's opponents will probably depict that kind of deal as defeatist, an admission of the limits of American power in the Middle East. But those limits already exist; the U.S. just hasn't acknowledged them. How much change can we really believe in?