Not enough tea in China means, of course, there aren't sufficient resources.
Time to regroup. I read Walter Pincus’ article about why U.S. State Department Counterterrorism efforts failed in Malli. That’s an interesting spin on the story.
Mali government and Mali Army failed to protect its citizens from insurgent attacks from the the al Qaeda, and somehow that ends up being a failure of U.S. State Department policy and programs. Which begs the question, what is U.S. foreign policy? What are our aims and where is the focus?
Al Qaeda is a symbol for Islamic terror that is created by a band of radical Muslims intent on executing Jihad and routing out anyone who is not an extreme Islamic like them. The free world treat it as a disease that infects certain parts of the world and attempt to remove it by swatting it with military action, accompanied by committing resources to the impoverished people and communities that host the disease.
The problem is, the disease is a pandemic, that cannot be treated on a case by case basis. In the broadest category, terrorism is found at the intersection of poverty and intellectual deficiency manifest in religion, particularly extreme religion, and Islamic specifically.
Treatment and prevention begins with ending poverty and inoculating with education. Attacking terrorists in concert with treatment and prevention is the solution. At what cost?
If it is determine that the cost is too great to address the problem completely, then isolating the problem becomes a consideration.
“Mali insurgency followed 10 years of U.S. counterterrorism programs
By Walter Pincus, Published: January 16
What went wrong with the counterterrorism efforts the State and Defense departments ran in Mali for 10 years?
French troops are moving against Islamist fighters who’ve traveled south from northern Mali. The White House or Congress, or both, should examine why the U.S. programs targeting the groups failed.
Islamist extremists grab more territory in Mali: French military forces step up their campaign, launching airstrikes for the first time in the central part of the country.
It’s worth understanding, since the United States is trying similar efforts in other nations.
In November 2002, the State Department announced that officials from its Office of Counterterrorism had visited Mali and other West African countries to brief governments on the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI), which was “designed to protect borders . . . combat terrorism, and enhance regional cooperation and stability.”
Despite those big goals, State funded PSI with only $7.75 million, the first $6.65 million coming in 2004. With that money, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) sent U.S. Special Forces training units to work with the Mali military. The fear was that Islamic fighters driven from Afghanistan would settle in northern Mali. Air Force Maj. Gen. Jeffrey B. Kohler, then head of planning at EUCOM, said, “We’re helping to teach them [the Malian military] how to control this area themselves so they can keep it from being used by terrorists.”
In 2005, PSI was replaced by the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), a partnership of State, Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) meant to focus on improving individual country and regional capabilities in northwest Africa.
According to a Government Accountability Office study, Mali got roughly $37 million in TSCTP funds from 2005 through 2008. More than half went to Defense projects. But GAO reported that there were bureaucratic differences over the programs and funding problems. “USAID received funds for its TSCTP activities in Mali in 2005 and 2007, but not in 2006,” for example. “Because it received no funds for 2006, the mission suspended a peace-building program in northern Mali,” the area with the greatest threat.”