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Flaws in WaPo published Afghan study
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The Washington Post has published an interesting review of the situation in Afghanistan. Journalist Peter Bergen, best known for interviewing Usama bin Laden, and Katherine Tiedemann of the New American Foundation produced a collage of graphs and charts overlain on a regional map. (view it here) The piece offers some troubling conclusions. But there are some factual discrepancies, sourcing issues, and statistical problems that need to be addressed in reaching those conclusions. The New American Foundation has provided a web page with the metrics behind the charts and graphs. (view it here)
The article states that “Still, the country is less secure as seen in the exponential increase in the number of Taliban and al Qaeda suicide attacks and the steady rise in US casualties”. To support this argument the article graphs suicide attacks. Confusingly, the graph shows quite the opposite of what the authors tell us.
The supporting data web page linked above shows few suicide attacks up until 2005. The number of suicide attacks spiked in 2007 to 140 which coincides with the surge in Iraq and lends credence to the theory that the surge pushed many al Qaeda terrorists out of Iraq and back to Afghanistan. In 2008 the suicide bombing rate in Afghanistan dropped to 84 incidents marking a steep 40% decline last year which outpaced the increase from 2006-2007. The dramatic drop of this metric works against the conclusion put forth by the authors. It is evidence of a decrease in Taliban/ Al Qaeda activity.
However the conclusion put forth by the authors was based on the US casualty rate as well as suicide bombing rates – in and of itself a shoddy methodology for concluding success or failure of the war. The juxtaposition of the suicide bombing rate with the casualty rate creates an unfortunate impression that one is tied to the other. Although there is an element of truth to that it doesn't tell the entire story.
The increase in US casualties has more to do with an increased number of US soldiers in theater than it does an increase of enemy strength. Evaluating the number of US forces in theater, as put forth in the study, versus US casualties (total troops divided by fatalities) shows that the rate of fatalities in 2002 and 2005 was higher than it was last year. And last year was a relatively modest uptick from 2007 and 2006. In short, more people mean more targets. More targets mean more opportunities for setting off IEDs or suicide bombings. It doesn't necessarily correspond to an increase in enemy strength or efficiency.
In fact, those numbers support the conclusion that the Taliban and al Qaeda became more efficient at attacking US forces in 2006 through 2007, at which time enemy forces peaked and began weakening as US forces pushed deeper into Pashtun populated regions. Which leads to another questionable conclusion from this study.
The authors conclude that “more and more Pashtuns see the Taliban as the best defenders of their rights”. But, the Taliban was comprised primarily of Pashtuns in the first place. The authors of the study note that there are nearly twice as many Pashtuns on the Pakistan side of the border. The Taliban was created by the Pakistani government in the mid 90's to counter the Afghan mujahideen who ruled after toppling the Communist regime. The Pakistan government used the Pashtuns because of tribal and ethnics ties in Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban was as much an internal ethnic civil war as a politico-religious one. Loosing Pashtun support was never an issue, they always supported the Taliban. The study statement creates a false impression.
The study data does provide some valuable incites. Whereas suicide bombings dropped dramatically in Afghanistan during 2008, they increased somewhat in Pakistan. This speaks to state of mind for the Taliban and al Qaeda. In the past they stayed away from antagonizing the Pakistani government to a certain extent so as not to threaten their last safe haven. They fact that they are attacking more in Pakistan without a corresponding increase in Pakistani troop strength is a good indicator that they feel pressed to create breathing room in Pakistan because of pressure in Afghanistan.
Sourcing for the study is questionable. For instance, US casualties were obtained via a CNN running count. It seems to be a well kept tally but why not use the military's count found at a DoD website (PDF)? It might be because the military numbers are broken down in a way that would impact the conclusions drawn by the authors of this study.
For instance, the CNN count lumps all casualties in the region together, without a breakdown. The CNN number reads 646 American fatalities as of this writing. The military document is closely aligned, but being a few days older it has fewer fatalities at 644. But it also shows that of those fatalities 67 , a full 10% occurred far from the fighting in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, 155 of those remaining casualties were from non-hostile causes like health problems and vehicle accidents. A more focused study would have used hostile action derived fatalities as an indicator of combat tempo in Afghanistan, not heart attacks and vehicle rollovers in the Horn of Africa.
The actual number of fatalities due to hostile action in Afghanistan and supporting theaters is 425 (as of this writing) which is a 34% decrease from the number used by the study. When compared to the total troop strength for US forces, it becomes clear that despite consistent media reporting of a “resurgent Taliban” since 2006, there is little supporting evidence. Combat rates before 2005 were so low as to be comparable to peace time training fatality rates, not realistic levels for sustained combat operations. For instance, in all of 2003, only 17 US fatalities were caused by hostile action. Those numbers reflect a hold and consolidate strategy in an area far from enemy strongholds.
In 2005, the rate jumped up as US forces became more aggressive. Since then, the rate has been fairly consistent with a small up-tick in 2008. When you look deeper into the numbers there is no indication of a sustained resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, but quite the opposite as US forces expand to the border regions.
For more context, since critics like to point out how the Soviets were driven out of Afghanistan (and thus ultimately we can't win) you should know that the Soviets suffered about 14,000 fatalities during the ten year invasion of Afghanistan. Thats about as many per month as we have lost per year.
The situation for US forces is far from dire. We still enjoy the support of most native Afghans. Although, there are still tough losses ahead as US forces push the Taliban all the way out of the country. The real question is not if we will win in Afghanistan as the Berger Tiedemann study suggests but rather “what will Pakistan leaders do when the surge of US forces pushes the Taliban and al Qaeda remnants fully into their laps?”
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Found at Instapundit blog.
