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Men of Honor?
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The protocol goes something like this: in the U.S. military, senior officers (and their civilian counterparts) provide advice and counsel to our elected leaders. During the discussion and formulation stages, military officials are free to disagree with the politicians and suggest alternative courses of action. But once the policy is set, leaders of the armed forces fall in line behind the commander-in-chief, except for the most extraordinary circumstances.
Those "conditions" include orders that are illegal or immoral. Under those circumstances, senior officers--indeed, all military members--have an obligation to ignore such commands. It's a lesson taught in the earliest days of basic training, and in various commissioning programs.
But "extraordinary circumstances" also cover events that are more complex and sometimes fall in gray areas in terms of practicality or legality. An example would be a policy or directive that military leaders consider dangerous to American security, the nation's military, or both. Under those conditions, senior officers and civilians may resign or request early retirement.
This practice serves two purposes; first it gives the military official an "exit," removing them from the position of endorsing or executing a policy they cannot abide; and secondly, it gives the president a chance to fill the post with someone more supportive.
Given those rules, we were expecting the resignation of at least one senior military official last week, after President Obama announced his new plan on missile defense for Western Europe. Canceling plans for interceptor missiles in Poland (and a tracking radar in the Czech Republic), Mr. Obama committed the U.S. to a policy that is both misguided and dangerous.
Consider this: With last week's decision, Mr. Obama achieved a trifecta of stunning security blunders. First, he betrayed some our most loyal--and important--allies in eastern Europe, countries that have stood with America on issues ranging from Iraq to terrorist detention. But such support apparently means little to the commander-in-chief; for his second mistake, President Obama puts appeasement of Russian ahead of supporting our allies, raising new fears about our commitment to the region's fledgling democracies.
By placating Moscow, Obama is hoping for assistance on such issues as Iran and North Korea. But the Russians have been unhelpful with Tehran, and offered little meaningful assistance in the Six-Party Talks, aimed at ending Pyongyang's nuclear program.
Mr. Obama's third mistake is both strategic and operational. By shifting to sea-based missile defenses in Europe, the President is denying the same level of protection afforded to the Pacific Region. Moreover, the revised strategy leaves the administration vulnerable to the same pressures that prompted cancellation of those land-based systems in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Consider these rather inconvenient facts. To be most effective, U.S. ballistic missile defense ships, equipped with SM-3 Block IV interceptors, should be positioned in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea, among other locations. Gee, don't suppose Moscow will protest semi-permanent presence of Aegis cruisers and destroyers in waters that touch their shores? Or, the potential basing of land-based SM-3s and THAAD batteries at bases in Germany and Turkey?
And, never mind that the revised scheme will still lack the over-lapping, redundant coverage found in the Pacific, where U.S. territory (and that of our allies) is protected by a combination of land and sea-based systems, including sea-based SM-3s; long-range, ground-based interceptor missiles (based in Alaska and California) and THAAD batteries for point defense, linked together with a sophisticated sensor and command-and-control network.
Given those disturbing realities, you'd think that Defense Secretary Robert Gates or a member of the JCS would step down in protest. But Mr. Gates and senior military officers have offered support for the plan. In a press conference following the president's announcement, Dr. Gates said the revised system offers the best approach for protecting the "short and medium-range missiles from Iran," that currently posed the greatest threat.
That assessment, for what it's worth, is based on a recent intelligence study. Of course, that raises a rather obvious question; is there any reason to believe that the missile analysis is any better--or less political--than the infamous 2007 assessment on Tehran's nuclear program which claimed (famously) that Iran had temporarily abandoned its weaponization efforts. Subsequent events have largely disproved that thesis; a recent International Atomic Energy Agency report indicates that Tehran could have a bomb within a year. You don't achieve that sort of progress by taking an extended break in the middle of the development cycle.
Secretary Gates and the JCS also tout the "early deployment" of sea-based missile defenses, the integration of additional sensors and (of course) the projected costs savings. But those arguments are something of red herrings; the Aegis/SM-3 combination always figured in regional missile defense plans. They are now moving to the forefront because sea-based defenses are literally our only option until land-based SM-3s become available more than a decade from now. In fact, the installation plan for that system is about 2-3 years later than the projected GBI deployment.
In other words, the Obama plan will actually delay installation of a more comprehensive shield, one that will still lack the GBI element. True, the SM-3/THAAD combination is cheaper than the GBI system, but those missiles won't approach the latter system's capabilities until sometime after 2020 (emphasis ours).
This represents missile defense on the cheap, offering rudimentary capabilities against a growing Iranian threat, while delaying introduction of other systems desperately needed to provide over-lapping coverage. It is also a glaring example of geopolitical timidity, short-changing the defense of our allies in hopes of currying favor from a hostile regime--to help us in deterring another hostile regime.
It's no surprise that President Obama, a long-time opponent of missile defense, would favor such an approach. More disturbing is the fact that senior military leaders are going along with the plan, despite its obvious flaws. If there was ever an opportunity for a uniformed officer to take a principled stand on a security issue of vital importance, this one was it. The refusal of senior officers (and civilians) to take such a stand speaks volumes about our current crop of military leaders.
Sometimes, the honorable course of action means stepping down and taking the fight to another arena, rather than offering blind support to a feckless--and reckless--policy.
