RSS
Home
Enabling Pyongyang
Print
Email
RSS
Subscribe
Take a look at any ballistic missile program in a rogue state or the Third World, and you'll inevitably find North Koreans at work.
Over the past 20 years, Pyongyang has emerged as the world's leading exporter of short and medium-range missiles and associated technology. From the Middle East to the Asian Sub-continent, Kim Jong-il's scientists, engineers and technicians have played a critical role in developing the Shahab-3 (the only Iranian missile capable of striking Israel) and Pakistan's Ghauri. In fact, both missiles are virtual clones of the Nodong, developed by Pyongyang in the early 1990s.
The North's emergence as a missile proliferator is more remarkable when you consider that the DPRK didn't acquire its first battlefield rockets until 1969, when it purchased the FROG-7 system from Russia. FROG is actually an acronym (Free Rocket Over Ground) and its accuracy was severely limited. Pyongyang didn't get its first guided missiles (early model SCUDs) in the mid-1970s, and serious efforts to reverse-engineer the system didn't begin until the early 1980s. Over the past 25 years, North Korea has advanced from a country that had to import its missile technology, to one that actively markets a variety of systems around the world.
But how has North Korea managed to sustain its missile development efforts? Afterall, the country is virtually bankrupt; it has no viable exports (other than weaponry) and at least one million of its citizens have starved to death since 1995. But Pyongyang has found the resources to continue its missile programs, with timely financial assistance from such partners as Iran, Pakistan and even Libya.
However, Kim Jong-il has other enablers that are often ignored. North Korea has obtained missile engines and other components from China, and Russia remains a supplier of critical technologies. In a study published this week by The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, David Wright and Theodore Postol conclude that the second stage of the TD-2 "is identical" to the single-stage SS-N-6, a submarine-launched ballistic missile first deployed by the Soviet Union in 1968.
By current standards, the liquid-fueled SS-N-6 (Russian designation: R-27) is obsolete. But it offers a number of advantages over the SCUD, which provides the technological base for the Tapeodong-2. Made from an aluminum alloy, the SS-N-6 has a relatively light weight and utilizes propellants that provide greater thrust . Designed to fit in a submarine, the R-27 airframe is relatively compact, and it's optimized for carrying a nuclear warhead.
Still, it is worth noting that Wright and Postol's assessment merely confirms long-standing intelligence reports. Rumors about Pyongyang's attempts to acquire the SS-N-6 began circulating in the early 1990s, when security officials blocked the departure of 20 Russian missile specialists, bound for North Korea. But the DPRK still managed to acquire a limited number of R-27s, and (apparently) the capability to manufacture them. Kim Jong-il's missile engineers converted the sub-launched weapon into a mobile, land-based, intermediate-range missile, dubbed the BM-25.
In 2005, German intelligence reported that North Korea had exported a small number of the missiles to Iran, expanding Tehran's ability to strike Israel, and target portions of southern Europe as well. The BM-25 has not entered operational service with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and there is some speculation the missile will be used as a technology source, to develop longer-ranged missiles, tipped with nuclear warheads.
On the other hand, Wright and Postol aren't convinced that North Korea--let alone Iran--has mastered the more advanced technology associated with the SS-N-6. If that theory proves true, it would limit their ability to produce medium and long-range range missiles. It would also suggest that the the sub-launched missiles were acquired (at least in part) as a source for needed components.
However, one fact is clear. A significant number of SS-N-6s (along with rocket scientists and engineers) lett Russia in the 1990s, and subsequently made their way to North Korea. Moscow's role in abeitting (or trying to block) the export has been a subject for debate. But it seems evident that Russia could have done more to stop the transfer, and has made no effort to halt further transfers of SS-N-6 technology.
Which brings us to the current generation of Russian leaders, scheduled to meet with President Obama in Moscow this week. Arms control will be a major topic of discussion, with emphasis on further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals. But those stockpiles have been steadily downsized since the end of the Cold War, and some experts have cautioned that further cuts could actually harm America's nuclear deterrence, particularly if our strategic forces don't receive needed modernizations.
Meanwhile, there are legitimate questions about other missile systems and components that could make their way from Russian design bureaus to rogue states. But there's no indication those issues will be on the agenda when Mr. Obama meets with his Russian counterparts. And that's unfortunate, given the steady progress of the DPRK and Iran in developing long-range missiles.
According to recent intelligence estimates, North Korea's TD-2 is already capable of targeting U.S. territories in the Pacific and could reach portions of the homeland, using a scaled-down chemical or biological warhead. The Iranian progam may produce a crude ICBM--based on the same DPRK design--by the middle of the next decade. By that time, both missiles will carry nuclear warheads.
You don't need to be an arms control wonk to understand that existing U.S. and Russian arsenals don't pose much of a threat to global security. Meanwhile, legitimate challenges--like North Korea's acquisition of the SS-N-6--receive scant attention, continuing the practice of previous administrations. In the rush to hammer out a new arms agreement between Washington and Moscow, issues like the SS-N-6 transfer get pushed on the bank burner. In that environment, we can only wonder what other technologies are making their way to Pyongyang.
Related Articles:
Add a Comment
The protocol goes something like this: in the U.S. military, senior officers (and their civilian counterparts) provide advice and counsel to our …
Military recruiting has always been tough duty. Even in the middle of a recession, with near-double-digit unemployment, it's often difficult to find …
