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The Apaches of the 1-101st Aviation Regiment: Expect No Mercy
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An AH-64D Apache from the 1-101 Avn. Regt. in Afghanistan (US Army Photo)
Unique amongst the United States Army’s 10 active duty combat divisions is the elite 101st Airborne Division. Known as the “Screaming Eagles”, the division is the Army’s sole Air Assault formation. Unlike a heavy mechanized force such as the 1st Armored Division or 3rd Infantry Division, which are equipped with main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery pieces, the 101st Airborne is a light infantry force dependent upon helicopter-borne air mobility.
Because of the unit’s dependency on airpower for both mobility and protection, the 101st Airborne uniquely incorporates two Combat Aviation Brigades, the 101st Combat Aviation Brigade and the 159th Combat Aviation Brigade. These two Combat Aviation Brigades not only provide the division with incredible tactical mobility on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, but also provide the division’s light infantry forces with considerable aerial firepower in the form of the Boeing AH-64D Apache attack helicopter.
“The mission of the ’64 is to find, fix, and destroy the enemy “, states Lt. Col. Scott Hasken, commander of the 1st Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment (1-101 Avn. Regt.). Originally designed in the early 1980s to combat the Soviet Red Army in Europe during the Cold War, the Apache is “designed to destroy tanks, day or night”, Hasken explained. He added that the focus today has shifted from the conventional linear battlefields expected during the Cold War-era to the present day “non linear” counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Hasken notes, however, that the change came only after the September 11th attacks on New York City and Washington DC in 2001.
Since those dark days, the Army, Hasken said, has had to fundamentally alter the way it utilizes airpower. “Army Aviation has changed to the same relation to the infantry that the Marine Corps is built around, to support the ground forces”, Hasken explained. He added, “This fight has necessitated this change to our approach to air support”.
During the Cold War, the Army’s doctrine called for ‘directed’ or ‘deep’ attacks by massed formations of attack helicopters on enemy armored forces well behind the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT). During the first Gulf War, this approach proved to be spectacularly successful. After an intense six-week air campaign, US forces routed Iraqi ground troops in less than four days of ground combat, all but annihilating the enemy forces.
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A 1-101 Avn. Regt. Apache hovers low over its airfield in Afghanistan. (US Army Photo)
Captain Preston Pysh, Commander of Alpha Company, 1-101st Avn. Regt., explained that during the opening days of the current war in Iraq, Army aviation units relied on those same traditional tactics. The initial phase of the war was largely successful as the United States occupied Baghdad in a matter of days. However, despite the overall success of US forces, signs that a new non-linear war was brewing were apparent even at those early stages, he said.
Pysh explained that during those initial few days, a battalion from the 11th Avn. Regt. “had attempted a deep attack with ‘64s. It didn’t go well”. Nearly every single Apache that had joined the ill-fated attack on the Iraqi Republican Guard’s Medina Division had been damaged. One of the aircraft participating in the assault was shot down over hostile territory. The Iraqi forces had used cell phones and their electrical grid to warn the Medina Division of the impending attack, ushering in a new era of asymmetrical warfare. The result was a disaster for the Apaches of the 11th Avn. Regt. In other areas, such as Fallujah, there were stiff pockets of resistance by irregular fighters.
As the Iraq war devolved into a long drawn out insurgency, it became readily apparent that “there’s no forward line of troops” and little to be gained by launching directed attacks using massed helicopter formations, Pysh said. Pysh sarcastically mentioned Operation Swarmer, “the largest air assault in modern warfare that got five guys”. In actuality, the number of people detained during Operation Swarmer was around 50, which was a low number considering the scale of the operation. In order to quell the growing threat, Hasken explained that the Army “went back to Vietnam-era tactics”.
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An Apache hovers over a runway at its base in Afghanistan. This Apache belongs to the 1-101 Avn. Regt.. (US Army Photo)
Currently, the focus has shifted from directed attacks to directly supporting the ground forces. No longer, Hasken said, are Apache battalions launching 20 out of 24 aircraft in support of an air assault, instead smaller numbers of aircraft are being kept aloft to perform reconnaissance, convoy escort, and security missions. Much greater emphasis is being placed on the close air support role, and most importantly, operational control of aviation forces has moved from the Division level to the Brigade level, Hasken said. During the battalion’s last deployment, the unit fell under the operational control of the 101st Airborne’s 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), Hasken added, illustrating the point.
Pysh said that while the 101st Airborne has “task organized its aviation assets to the Brigade level”, the new practice has not yet been fully implemented through out the Army. As an example, Pysh said, “The 82nd Airborne still did it the old way the last time I was deployed”. Despite the uneven implementation of the new scheme by some Army headquarters, the general trend in both Iraq and Afghanistan is that Army aviation forces are directly supporting ever-smaller combat units.
Pysh explained that Army aviation takes the concept of close air support “a step further” by essentially using their aviation assets as another maneuver element. Instead of responding to requests for air support from higher divisional or brigade level headquarters, individual battalion, company, and platoon commanders are working directly with the gunships to accomplish their respective missions. Sometimes, Pysh said, Apaches pilots are finding themselves “checking over a hill for a Sergeant, an E-6 or an E-7, leading a squad. We’re acting as another maneuver element for the infantry just like any other Army maneuver unit”. In Afghanistan particularly, “the infantry groups will not survive without helicopter support. This is what it’s about, defending the ground forces. We’re not focused on the mass hordes anymore”, Pysh emphatically emphasized.
A 1-101 Avn. Regt. Apache over the rugged mountains of Afghanistan. (US Army Photo)
US and allied forces in Afghanistan are particularly dependent upon helicopters primarily due to the extraordinarily rugged terrain of that mountainous nation. Additionally, while the geography of the Afghanistan is extremely challenging, the difficulties are compounded by the lack of proper transportation networks and the constant threat of ambushes and improvised explosive devices. As such, ground troops in Afghanistan are not only dependent upon helicopters for transportation, they have to rely upon airpower for everything from resupply to security duties for convoys, said Chief Warrant Officer Four (CWO-4) John Snow, a standardization pilot with the 1-101st Avn. Regt.. He added, “Everything is brought in by helicopter, ammunition, food, fuel, the mail. Everything”.
Because of the high demand for their services, Army aviation brigades divide their constituent battalions into mixed taskforces, explains Snow. Each taskforce consists of Apache gunships, UH-60 Blackhawk medium lift transportation helicopters, and CH-47 Chinook heavy lifters. Additionally, OH-58D Kiowa Warrior armed reconnaissance helicopters may also be assigned to a taskforce. Snow explained that the Apaches escort the transport helicopters in order to defend the larger machines from attack. With troops and vital supplies being carried onboard the lumbering transports, the Blackhawks and Chinooks are tempting targets for the enemy.
Pysh and Hasken both point out that these tasks are not part of a new doctrine for the Army. “It was always part of our doctrine since Vietnam”, Pysh said, adding, “It’s a more modern interpretation of the same thing, but conducted with more modern helicopters and weaponry”. Hasken and Pysh both say that it is a matter of imparting those lessons onto a new generation of warriors.
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An Apache hovering over the barren Afghan landscape. (US Army Photo)
Training new pilots within the time constraints imposed by the Army’s deployment cycle is a challenge. “We’ve done four twelve month deployments over the past six years”, Snow said. He explained that the battalion’s key personnel, including most of the senior officers, company commanders, and senior warrant officers “are switched out at the end of a deployment”. This turn over of experienced hands compounds the challenges of preparing inexperienced new pilots for war in the short twelve month period the before the unit is rotated back into combat, Snow explained. He added that preparations for the next deployment begin almost immediately after the unit returns from the previous deployment cycle because “the dwell time is so short”.
New pilots arrive at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, to join the 1-101st Avn. Regt. only after they have mastered the basics of flying the Apache helicopter at Fort Rucker, Alabama, Snow said. Snow, who was formerly an instructor pilot at Fort Rucker, explained that after initial flight training, where students learn how to fly a helicopter for the first time, the fledgling aviators spend 13 weeks transitioning to the AH-64.
At the transition course, the students learn the basics of flying the Apache. This initial course includes the students’ first exposure at “training to fly using the aircraft’s night vision sensors”, Snow said. Toward the end of the course, the students begin to learn the basics of aerial gunnery before moving onto Advanced Combat Skills training, he added.
Advanced Skills Training focuses on employing the Apache as a weapons system, Snow explained. Students learn basic tactics to employ the Apache for Reconnaissance, Security, Deep Attack, and other missions. Of these, Deep Attack represents the original mission of the AH-64, which was to destroy incoming hordes of Soviet tanks on the open battlefield.
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A 1-101 Avn. Regt. Apache parked at its base in Afghanistan. (US Army Photo)
Once Advanced Skills Training is complete, the students are transitioned to an operational unit like the 1-101st Avn. Regt.. At their operational units, the new pilots are required to undergo mission training, which is tailored to the role of a particular battalion. Snow explains, that while “the basic skills are there”, unit training varies depending upon the mission assigned to the battalion.
The tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) used by individual units to prepare for combat are tailored to their assigned area of operations. Environmental conditions, and the enemy threat level the troops will face in theatre, play a dominant role in defining a battalion’s TTP. The enemy threat level is determined based on intelligence gathered about enemy equipment and tactics, Snow explains. Pysh said that it is because of these factors that tactics and training are radically “different in Korea compared to Iraq and Afghanistan”. In Korea, the traditional anti-tank mission of the Apache still reigns supreme, Pysh said.
Mission training is extremely intense, explains Chief Warrant Officer-Two James Edler, a junior Apache pilot who is new the unit. Edler says that his life revolves around intensive study and in-flight training with senior instructor pilots. Compared to the collegiate atmosphere of the training units at Fort Rucker, life for new pilots at the battalion is considerably more demanding. Pysh explains that new pilots have to pass through Gate One before they are allowed to fly as regular battalion aviators. As a pilot gains more skill and ever-greater experience, he or she will pass though additional Gates, eventually becoming an instructor pilot in his or her own right.
Hasken said that during normal training in the United States, the Army budgets each aviator 140 hours of flight time per year. While pilots average 13 hours to 14 hours per month, depending upon the tempo of flight operations, pilots may fly more or less during a given month, Hasken explained. Hasken also points out that these are average statistics for the unit as a whole. Because senior officers like Hasken do not fly as often, younger pilots may fly more than 13 hours per month. During combat operations, obviously, there are no such restrictions on how many hours a pilot might fly. Snow said that, typically, in a combat zone, pilots fly anywhere from 800 hours to 1000 hours per year.
Unlike in the other services, most Army pilots are Warrant Officers rather than commission officers. Most of the instructor pilots and tactical experts are senior Warrant Officers like Snow. Younger officers, like Pysh, fly intensively early in their careers, however once they reach the higher ranks, the pace of their flying drops off drastically. Senior officers, like Hasken, fly only occasionally, as most of their time is monopolized by the administrative duties of commanding a battalion, Hasken said.
Pysh emphasizes that flying a helicopter gunship is a skill that is highly perishable. Only constant training keeps aviators’ skills up to par. “There is no point, even after 10 years of flying, where you can take a step back and relax. The skills are so complex. You can lose skills so fast it’ll make your head spin”, he said.
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