
Yesterday, President Obama—flanked by Gordon Brown and Nicholas Sarkozy—accused Iran of developing a second, previously undisclosed uranium facility near Qom at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh.
The announcement had been planned since last Tuesday and then President-elect Obama was told about the site in late 2008. On Thursday, the Security Council passed a resolution reaffirming nuclear nonproliferation. Critics were right that the resolution does not have much practical effect—rogue proliferators will not simply give up their nuclear programs and start hugging each other. But the resolution did unite Security Council countries against proliferation when countries like Russia and China had loathed to punish states possibly developing nuclear weapons. (This is not to say that the resolution changed China’s stance towards North Korea, which it still does not want to collapse under sanctions.)
But the stance of the world community against Iran seems to have changed. Iran, of course, does not have nuclear weapons, but most experts and intelligence suggests that it is trying to develop at least a nuclear weapons-ready capability, if not nuclear weapons.
I say it has changed because the Bush Administration had difficulty getting the international community to get behind sanctions on Iran. Now, the attitude seems to have changed with the recent announcement.
Russia is one part. Russia had previously dragged its feet at sanctions under the Bush Administration, perhaps angry at its diplomacy—or lack thereof—in regards to missile defense. The Obama Administration recalibrated the missile defense program, which pleased the Russian leadership. Yesterday, the Kremlin issued a strong statement condemning Iran: “Iran's construction of a uranium enrichment plant violates decisions of the United Nations Security Council.” Even earlier this week, President Medvedev was unusually harsh in talking about Iran with Fareed Zakaria. (His full interview is worth a watch, since it is his first American interview.)
China is another, more difficult obstacle. Its language was softer: “We hope that the IAEA will deal with the matter according to its terms of reference and its mandate…It is also our hope that Iran will cooperate with the IAEA on this matter.” One would hope that without Russia also being recalcitrant, that China would loathe to be the odd member of the P5 supporting Iran.
But what about the facility itself? The facility is located near the holy city of Shiite Islam—Qom. It is at a former site of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The facility is not yet operational. Intelligence analysts are still unsure whether Iran wanted to use the site as a backup in case their facility in Nantanz was attacked or eventually as a primary site.
Some experts were not surprised at the existence of a secret site. Dr. Jeffrey Lewis at Arms Control Wonk commented that a report by the IISS and even the much-criticized 2007 NIE had noted that a secret site may well exist. He added that the implication of this that international community will have to start playing “whack-a-mole” with sites (using good intelligence, of course) and not bargain on output of existing sites.
The P5 has become more united against Iran, but many questions remain. Will tougher sanctions work? Is a military option “on the table”? Should the actions of Iran’s government during its much criticized elections and post-election show trials figure into negotiations with Iran?
None of these questions have easy answers. But at least Iran appears to be on the defensive now. To understand that, watch both President Obama’s serious announcement about the facility along with Ahmadinejad’s defiant response—captured even in translation and with facial expressions—to Time.
Stay Tuned.
Questions? Comments? Email me at foreignpolicyexaminer@gmail.com