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The other battle of New Orleans
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November 23, 2009: Last week a federal district Court ruled that the Army Corps of Engineers was liable for some of the catastrophic flooding in New Orleans in August 2005 from Hurricane Katrina. The ruling against the Corps is based on its apparent failure to properly maintain a shipping channel linking New Orleans to the Gulf of Mexico.
U.S. District Court Judge Stanwood Duval Jr. wrote, "For over 40 years, the Corps was aware that the Reach II levee protecting Chalmette and the Lower Ninth Ward was going to be compromised by the continued deterioration of the MRGO ... The Corps had an opportunity to take a myriad of actions to alleviate this deterioration or rehabilitate this deterioration and failed to do so. Clearly, the expression 'talk is cheap' applies here."
The MRGO refers to the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet canal, which the Corps dug to shorten the shipping route between the Gulf of Mexico and New Orleans' inner harbor Industrial Canal via the Intracoastal Waterway.
History and mission of the Corps
The Army Corps of Engineers as it is known today came into being on 16 March 1802, when President Thomas Jefferson organized and established a Corps of Engineers. They initially were stationed at West Point. The United States Military Academy was under the direction of the Corps of Engineers until 1866. Ironically, the Corps' authority over river works in the United States began with its fortification of New Orleans after the War of 1812.
Aside from the actual construction and maintenance of canals, locks, and other navigation features, Army engineers historically conducted important survey work.
In September 1850, Congress appropriated $50,000 for a topographical and hydrographical survey of the Mississippi Delta, including a study of the best means of securing a 20-foot navigation channel at the Mississippi's mouth. Southern congressmen had sought the federal funds to address the continuous flooding of New Orleans and lower Mississippi River communities and to assist shipping between the Gulf and the Mississippi.
Topographical engineer Captain Andrew A. Humphreys initiated and supervised a Mississippi River Delta survey. In 1857 Lieutenant Henry L. Abbot's supporting field work proved so indispensable that when the final report was published in 1861, Humphreys named Abbot as its coauthor. Officially called the Report Upon The Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River, the survey is often simply referred to as the Humphreys Abbot report.
Messrs. Humphreys and Abbot’s findings in the report influenced river engineering as well as the development of the responsibilities of the Corps of Engineers. They developed a new formula to measure the river water flow, which subsequently proved to be faulty largely because it did not account for the degree of roughness of river channel slopes.
The authors posited that levees could control lower Mississippi River flooding without costly reservoirs or cutoffs. Their conclusions influenced river engineering and the future of Corps’ development of water resources. Their influence also extended beyond the mid-twentieth century, influencing further research and gaining respect from engineers around the world.
The Katrina decision
Judge Duval wrote in his decision: "For over 40 years, the Corps was aware that the Reach II levee protecting Chalmette and the Lower Ninth Ward was going to be compromised by the continued deterioration of the MRGO ... The Corps had an opportunity to take a myriad of actions to alleviate this deterioration or rehabilitate this deterioration and failed to do so. Clearly, the expression 'talk is cheap' applies here.”
The centerpiece of the case was the maintenance and operation of the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet. Completed in the 1960’s, its purpose was to create a shortcut for ships to travel between the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi River. Over the years the MRGO’s marshy banks widened significantly in spots. Many years prior to Katrina experts warned that the redesigning of these wetlands could create a funnel effect that would intensify storm surges.
According to the Coalition MRGO Must Go, that is what exactly happened. The Corps’ construction of MRGO facilitated Hurricane Katrina's destructive power because the levees failed to stop the hurricane surge from the Gulf of Mexico.
MRGO’s construction destroyed what was a natural storm buffer. The Corps dug 27,600 acres of wetlands to widen the channel then built levees. As predicted, this design created a funnel where MRGO merges with the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (GIWW). When Katrina’s surge hit that funnel, it increased the height and velocity of the flood right into the heart of the New Orleans metropolitan area and St. Bernard Parish
"It is the court's opinion that the negligence of the Corps, in this instance by failing to maintain the MRGO properly, was not policy, but insouciance, myopia and short-sightedness," Judge Duval wrote.
"The judge's ruling today validates the feelings and beliefs that many citizens have held for four years," New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin said in a statement. "Although the ruling is liberating for thousands impacted by the devastation and tragedy of Hurricane Katrina, it is my hope that justice will prevail to help families make their lives whole again."
"This is not the Corps that built the Panama Canal," Joe Bruno, plaintiffs' attorney, told CNN. "This is a different Corps. This is a Corps that's reckless."
"The people of this city are vindicated," said Bruno. "They didn't do anything wrong. It's now time for them to be compensated."
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