Choose Your Location
|
![]() |
There's Sunni/Shia strife that's been simmering for nearly 2,000 years. There's the story of Britain assembling a hodge podge nation of disparate, warring sects after WWI. There's the rise of the Bathist party and the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, arguably the only thing that held the country together. There's U.S. sponsorship of Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war. It goes on and on.
A snapshot of Iraq today (please pardon omissions - it's way more complicated than I understand):
The Bush Administration has been rightly criticized for not doing their homework prior to the invasion and not understanding the basic fundamentals of Iraq and Islam. Even purchasing "The Dummie's Guide to Iraq" before the invasion would have been a smart move and prevented a lot of our missteps. That said, I reckon all but the most savvy would have failed to see the ferocity of the intra-Shia struggle that has emerged in Iraq.
Shia Muslims, given their majority status, will be the dominant party in the Iraqi government. The de facto leader of that Shia Muslim contingent is less clear. Spencer Ackerman recently asserted we could be betting on the wrong horse:
In Iraq, Moqtada Sadr is perhaps the most powerful single political actor. But in the United States, he is treated with derision and contempt by both officials and commentators. During a visit to Baghdad last week, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice all but called Sadr a coward, saying he was "sitting in Iran" while promising "all-out war for anybody but him." In the right-wing blogosphere, Sadr is commonly called "Mookie." Yet while the political fortunes of all other Iraqi Arab political figures have waxed and waned, only Sadr has consistently gained strength. That raises the question: Why?
One common explanation is that Sadr is the heir to a distinguished Shiite clerical line that offered the most potent and authentic resistance to Saddam Hussein. A complementary theory holds that Sadr's anti-occupation demagoguery provides all the adherent force he needs.
But a different interpretation -- not exclusive of the other two -- might hold the key to Sadr's continued success. Sadr is an insurgent figure who adopts key principles of counterinsurgency. His military strategy is complemented by an appealing political and economic strategy for securing the loyalties of the population. That would help explain why the counterinsurgents battling Sadr in Baghdad have consistently lost
Some counterinsurgents believe that Sadr's own dexterity with counterinsurgency principles, combined with his deep political support in Iraq, make accommodation the only sensible strategy. "The best solution now," said longtime counterinsurgency advocate and former Army officer Terrence Daly, "is to try to coopt Sadr's forces." Defeating him, in other words, is beyond the U.S.'s capabilities.
The obvious question now is whether U.S. forces should be involved in an intra-sect battle in Iraq, having to choose sides and, in so doing, risk damaging future relations with Iraq. Our stated intent is that Iraq evolve into a stable, self governing ally of the United States. We are not doing ourselves any longer term favors, either with the Iraqi populace or future Iraqi leaders, by picking sides and forcing the Maliki government on the people of Iraq.


