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General McChrystal’s counter insurgency strategy

September 29, 9:31 PMDefense Dept. ExaminerBruce Clarke
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 In his report to the Pentagon and the President of 30 August General McChrystal advocates the need for a change of strategy. He recommends that NATO adopt a counter-insurgency strategy and that the United States provide an additional 30 to 40,000 troops. This article will examine what a counter insurgency strategy will entail and some critique of the strategy.

McChrystal’s report and the Army’s new counterinsurgency doctrine require convincing the local population to support a legitimate government and stop support for the insurgents. Mao originally argued that the insurgent must swim in the sea with the population. Denying local support to the insurgents will occur when the people believe that the government and its outside supporters (such as NATO) are completely committed to their security and well being and will have patience and persevere until the people are secure. If the people have any doubt about this commitment, they will not cooperate with anyone because they know that if they miscalculate, they risk being killed by the insurgents. This, of course is the major source of power for the insurgents, as detailed in an earlier article.
Afghanistan is not a unified nation. It is a nation of tribes and tribal loyalty which trumps national loyalty. The Taliban have a loose command structure that functions on regional and local levels based upon tribes. The Taliban’s unifying factor is it desire to expel foreigners.  These tribal and ethnic splits explain why Afghan security forces are frequently targeted in attacks. The Afghan tourist website shows that the chief ethnic groups/tribes, are the Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras.
Towns & Ethnic Majority
Town
Approximate Population
Dominating Ethnic Group
Kabul
1,500,000
Pashtuns
Kandahar
225,500
Pashtuns
Herat
177,300
Tajiks
Mazar e Sharif
130,600
Tajiks
Andkhui
Uzbeks
Kunduz
Tajiks

Ethnic Groups Population Ratio
Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%
Each of these tribes has their own ways of living and distinct loyalties. Therefore, one would expect that rather than seeking loyalty to the central government that the first effort would be to gain tribal support for security by empowering the tribal leadership and making it part of the solution, not the problem. However, General McChrystal’s report does not even contain the word “tribe”.
By focusing on tribes in prioritized areas and charging the forces assigned to the area to secure the villages according to the priorities of the tribal leadership one can start the security effort and expand it in cooperation with the tribal leadership.  This would also allow a focus on the Taliban splinter groups in priority.
In Vietnam, at one point, the US sought to implement what was called an “ink blot” strategy. The idea was that expanding ink blots would eventually overlap and security would spread throughout the populated parts of the country. Coupled with this was the arming of local popular forces, whose mission was to secure their own village. The Marines, as explained in Expendable Warriors, formed Combined Action Program (CAP) platoons. They stationed a Marine squad with the Popular Force platoons to train them, fight with them and call for fires and reinforcements provided by units in the area, if required. The program was barely supported by the Marine Corps, but was successful. A similar program that focuses on prioritized geographic tribal based security plans and forces could have an ink blot effect. When coupled with economic and social improvement the strategy would result in the Taliban being denied a source of new recruits, Mao’s sea would progressively become unfriendly and stability at the local level would increase.
An increase in local security would eventually result in national stability and give an opportunity for nation building. This is what the counter insurgency strategy might look like.
What do you think our strategy should be?

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