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Is Pakistan’s war for real?
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Press reports from Pakistan’s invasion of southern Waziristan are now predicting the end of the offensive possibly before winter closes in. Further reporting from the separate battles shows relevantly few casualties in each of the battles. Could it be that the Pak Army’s strategy and prior announcement of the upcoming offensive have allowed the militants to escape?
Tuesday’s Pakistani military reports are that “hundreds of foreign fighters were on the run in southern Waziristan near Afghanistan Sunday. Reportedly between 600 and 800 foreign militants had been in and around the town of Kanigurram, but their resistance was broken by heavy bombing from jet fighters, helicopters and artillery, A Pak Army spokesman said that: "They are on the run."
The News citing police sources reported Monday that Pakistani security forces had taken control of Kotkai in South Waziristan, the village home to Taliban Pakistan leader Hakimullah Mehsud. Reportedly at least five militants were killed by security forces during operations in this area of South Waziristan. The problem with this story is that this is at least the second time official sources announced that forces had taken control of Kotkai. Most official statements about progress in the South Waziristan operations appear to be either inaccurate or misleading. Why was it necessary to seize Kotkai twice? Why were there so few casualties?
The military claimed Wednesday that more than 330 Taliban fighters and 35 soldiers have been killed since the operation began. However there are no reports of senior Taliban commanders having been killed or captured. The Taliban claim only 11 fighters have been killed. The Taliban are refuting the military's claims of success and said their forces "are drawing government soldiers into a trap," according to a report in the Associated Press.
Our previous reporting has indicated upwards of 12,000 militants with about 2,000 hard core fighters in the region. We questioned Pakistan’s commitment of only 30,000 troops into the battle given the size of the potential opposition and suggested that maybe the Pak Army was offsetting its lack of troops with its firepower—air, attack helicopters and artillery. We went on to point out that the Pakistan Army’s Corps commanders see India as the critical threat—not the militants in the Northwest Territories. The Pakistanis have been preparing for this set of battles since June and made their intent clear. They also are reported to have reached temporary truces with several tribes, to include some anti-US ones.
There are two ways that one can interpret the above news reports:
1. The Pakistan Army is seeking to isolate and only deal with a very specific set of militants. Some press reports suggest that 80% of the bombings around Pakistan are caused by a small group of Uzbeki Taliban. The Army also sought to minimize civilian casualties by pre-announcing its attacks. The attack has bypassed many other militants as part of this focus.
2. The Army wants to appear to be attacking the militants while minimizing casualties by only having to fight rear guard forces while the militants take advantage of prior warning and open escape routes into border sanctuaries where they will regroup and return to fight another day. If this is the strategy will the Taliban reciprocate and reach a tacit ceasefire? (Readers are reminded that the Pak Army has reached such agreements in the past.)
The first scenario is tactically sound and might be said to deal with the “critical” near term threat to civility, while not taking a risk. The second scenario gains US support while also not taking a significant risk. It also insures critical supply of needed items such as helicopters and night vision devices from the US.
Is either scenario helping reduce the problem of cross border threats against Afghanistan?
Does either scenario increase the chances of finding Bin Laden or the other hard core Al Qaeda who are supposed to be hiding in this highly mountainous border region? These two questions and the actual intent of the Pak Army are critical to NATO’s future activities in Afghanistan.
Which scenario do you think is the true strategy?
