Recommended Reading: Critique of Religion and Philosophy by Walter Kaufmann

August 8, 6:59 PMOakland Atheism ExaminerJonathan van Belle

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Walter Kaufmann's Critique of Religion and Philosophy

Walter Kaufmann’s Critique of Religion and Philosophy is an exceptional work of philosophical insight. From Christian theology to analytic philosophy, from Greek tragedy to Higher Criticism, from Psychology to dialogues with Satan, the Critique encompasses various genres, figures, issues, and histories. In addition to this variety, Kaufmann offers an eminently well-developed and delightful style. In the latter portions of the Critique, Kaufmann engages us with a few, Faustian-like dialogues between Satan and, respectively, a theologian, a Christian, and an atheist. Each dialogue craftily employs most of the argumentation of earlier chapters—but in a life-like, subtle manner. Through this “satanic dialectic,” Kaufmann provides us with a more poetic and flesh-colored perspective on topics that have often been, especially in positivistic 20th century philosophy, rendered mere matters for syntactic or semantic reduction. In fact, Kaufman begins the Critique with criticisms of such reductionist, linguistic philosophies:

The position of the ordinary language philosophers is inconsistent at this point. On the one hand, they tell us that philosophers have no business making empirical statements that are confirmable by observation; on the other hand, their articles consist largely of empirical statements that are confirmable by observing how educated people employ certain words. – p.50

A final excerpt in relation to the critique of modern philosophy, and then we can move to the more relevant critique of religion (or rather, more relevant to this article):
 

The outsider may say: if philosophers would only define their terms, this difficulty would disappear. Spinoza begins his Ethics by offering six definitions, of which this is the first: “By cause of itself, I understand that whose essence involves existence; or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing.” But what is the meaning of “cause” and “essence” and “existence”? What does the phrase mean: “cannot be conceived unless existing”?

Hegel recognized these difficulties when he argued in the Preface to his first book that truth could be offered only in the form of a system. Philosophic propositions are not self-explanatory: they point beyond themselves and must be evaluated in context. Even a whole paragraph or chapter points beyond itself to a larger context. Reverence for single propositions gives away the nonphilosophic reader. – p.70

Walter Kaufman

Since this is an article for “recommended reading,” not Walter Kaufmann 101, I will make my recommendation brief. Kaufmann’s style and intellect can sell itself—
 

The fact that the religious person frequently considers his religious propositions ever so much more important only aggravates the problem. The more important the issue at hand, the more it demands careful scrutiny. This is a simple but important point which most religious people overlook. – p.105
 

But what is a “necessary being”?

…As Kant noted in his Critique of Pure Reason (B 620 ff.), the adjective “necessary” has no applicability to beings: “One has at all times spoken of an absolutely necessary being, without exerting oneself to understand whether and how one could even think of such a thing…All examples are, without exception, taken only from judgments, not from things and their existence. But the unconditional necessity of judgments is not to be confused with the absolute necessity of things. For the absolute necessity of a judgment is only a conditional necessity of a thing or the predicate in the judgment. The previously cited proposition does not assert that three angles are altogether necessary but rather that, assuming the condition that a triangle exists (is given), three angles also exist necessarily (in it).”

A “necessary triangle” is obviously in the same category with a “neurotic triangle.” But “being” is in the same category, too. Yet there are predicates that cannot be ascribed to beings. “Valid being,” for example, and “cogent being” are as illicit as “necessary being.”

Nor will it do to substitute for “necessary being” some such phrase as “a being that necessarily exists.” Even as “valid” has meaning only in relation to some logical or legal framework, “necessary” has meaning only in relation to presupposed conditions. It makes sense to say that, if A and B exist, C must necessarily exist. But taken by themselves, the last four words do not make sense. – p.156
 

To understand such peculiarities of theology, one must remember that theology, and indeed any systematic discussion of God, was born as a defensive maneuver. It is the product of a distinctive historic situation. Claims of a less sophisticated age have been exposed to rationalistic attack when theology appears to salvage the tradition. The word theology is encountered for the first time in Plato—at the point where he proposes to expurgate Homer’s epics to rescue the belief in the gods from the cynicism of the Greek enlightenment (Republic, 379). The theologian defends his religious heritage by sacrificing its plain exoteric meaning. He says to the atheist: you are quite right to deny what you deny, but I deny it, too; what you repudiate is indeed superstitious and wrong—but you are wrong, too. – p.180

As I mentioned earlier, some of the more interesting portions of the book are the satanic dialogues. Here is an excerpt from one of those dialogues—this one between a Christian and Satan:

Satan: I still do not understand what it is that, you think, exists, or in what way it exists. Does God take up space as you do?
Christian: Of course not.
Satan: Why, then, do you say that he exists?
Christian: Surely, many things exist that do not take up space.
Satan: Name three.
Christian: Does a dream take up space? Or a feeling? Or a thought?
Satan: Is God a dream, a feeling, or a thought?
Christian: Certainly not.
Satan: Try again.
            – p.247

True to his commitment to candor and clarity, Kaufmann presents arguments against Christianity in a memorable, almost conversational fashion. Kaufmann does not skimp on substance, on the methodical construction of proofs, but he likewise does not burden the reader with excessive or esoteric pedantry.

Presumably because the articles of the Christian faith do not stand up well under rational investigation, reason has been declared, again and again, incompetent to judge that which must be believed. Traditionally, Christianity has been suspicious of reason; and except at times when reason was safely enslaved by faith and rendered harmless by the potent threat of certain persecution of all heresies, reason was denounced. – p.311

A god who, able to make the sick well, did so only if asked often enough or ardently enough, would be a sentimental devil who occasionally traded an ounce of mercy for a ton of sycophancy. – 367

Echoing a Nietzschean point, Kaufmann says:

[Religion] does not merely satisfy needs—many more needs than most psychologists give it credit for—religion has, if not created, cultivated needs which no longer allow man to feel at home among the other animals. – p.355

In this next excerpt, Kaufmann directs our attention to the vital role of reason and criticism—and its de-vitalization in the guise of idolatry, faith, superstition, etc.

Reason can never stop with facts, whether in this world or another; it cannot abide beliefs without subjecting them to criticism. […] No religion has paid sufficient respect to reason, and some have made war against it. But if we are made to choose between reason and religion, the choice is between criticism and idolatry. Whatever in religion cannot stand up to criticism is not worth having—and that means a great deal, but it does not mean everything. – p.430-431

Kaufmann is not mechanistic in his recommendation of reason; his picture of existence is more tropical, more pregnant, and more tragic than this. However, Kaufmann is careful to preempt any religious misuse of his understanding of our emotional lives.

That our valuations are tied up with our emotions and not grounded in a rational vision of absolute values is surely right, but we should not ignore the difference between untutored emotion and cultivated emotion. Nor is “cultivated emotion” merely a euphemism for the emotions of those who share our value judgments. – p.410-411
 

Lastly, for those of you who enjoy abstracts and summaries:

My critique of theology, and my polemics against finished philosophic edifices and the finding of dubious reasons for what we believe anyway, could have been forced into the mold of a commentary on Job. – p.348-349

Why a commentary on Job? Kaufmann could read biblical Hebrew, among other languages, and translated passages now and again. The following translation from Job 13 is his own translation—and may give you a sense of why Kaufmann would associate his critique of theology with the story of Job:

Behold, my eye has seen all this,
my ear has heard and understood.
What you know, that I also know…
But you, you beautify with lies,
idol-physicians that you are…
Would you speak wickedly for God
and deceive for his sake?
You think, you favor him?
You think, you take his side? …
Be still and leave me that I speak,
and let come on me what will.
Wherefore? I will take my flesh between my teeth,
and my life I will put in my hand.
He will slay me? For that I hope.
But my ways I will maintain to his face.
And let this be my salvation
that no hypocrite comes to face him

Kaufmann is a philosopher in the tradition of Albert Camus or Michel de Montaigne. His worldview, his vision, is conscientious and imaginative—but it does not lose its skeptical aspect. Critique of Religion and Philosophy, moreover, is an excellent starting-point in one’s study of theology and anti-theological philosophy.