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A commentary on Relativism
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If there is one sort of thinking which to me seemed absurd beyond the means of simple ignorance it is relativism. It has been a vein of thought which I could never make heads or tails of. It just plain does not make sense to me. The reduction of value to emotive propositions always seemed intuitively impractical. I could sympathize with Ayn Rand’s egoism, or I could entertain the idea of Oriental Confucianism (even if I disagreed with such aims), yet the platform from which their ideas spring seem at least square even if only two dimensional. The fundamental foundation of Ayn Rand’s egoism, in no matter what way it manifests, is still the simple value statement of ought and the comparative actions of individuals are still the primary way in which evil is measured by good. Even when we concede that what one must do to have a rich, fulfilling life is to look out for one’s self interests by being the best one can be at whatever one attempts, we are admitting that it is better to be the best than it is to be the worst and in that way the gradation from which life continues to measure itself stands firm.
Take, on the other hand, the quickly irritating sentiment that whatever I believe in is my personal choice beyond the need for agreement with my fellow man. Yet even these men, who so adamantly propose that what bounds my decisions as a human do not necessarily bound others, imply when they say such a thing, that the very thing which binds our agreeing, namely that morals can be differentiated between persons, is something of a common principle. When I say that I think polygamy is wrong and some other fellow disagrees what seems really to happen is not the reduction of morals to an emotive quality (i.e. I feel that polygamy is wrong while he feels that it is all well and good) but a disagreement on the fabric of objective morality itself, else there would be no real reason for disagreement. As Mr. Lewis seems to point out, what an absurd conversation it would be if a man claiming his favorite ice-cream flavor was vanilla was met with the response, well I disagree, my favorite flavor is chocolate. What is there to disagree about if not the objectiveness of the comment? Certainly you do not propose to say that because you like chocolate he cannot truly like vanilla, because in many ways that is the implication.
As Mr. Lewis points out in “The Abolition of Man” as well as “Mere Christianity” what those men do who wish to 'debunk' the current system of objective value is attempt to use that very value not only as the weapon used to wage war on value, but also indirectly as the thing which they afterwards attempt to erect. That man who says we are to tolerate each and every religion does so only through the value statement that such toleration is better than the lack of toleration, and that as such we ought to stand by tolerance as our value. This is more so, of course, than the utilitarian need for civility, because to the true utilitarian it would not matter so much if they agreed or not so long as there remained no disruption.
I suppose what has always bothered me has not been the disagreement about value, but the refusal to believe that there is any disagreement at all. When a foreigner approaches while I am in another country saying that in this country such an action is thought improper, when I respond that in my country we are allowed to do such things we are not at a stand still. The next necessary move is not to compare my culture to his so as to determine how various customs came about that caused such differences, but rather the simple conversation (friendly or hostile) about whose custom is really right. He cannot say, “well you may do it in your country but not mine” without implying that it is wrong to do it in both countries. conversely, when I insist that I should be able to do such and such a thing because I have always done it in my country, I am implying that it is right for me to do that action in both countries. The disagreement fundamentally is always an objective disagreement which, when turn instead to tolerance, we reduce not to relativity but indifference, because we cannot find a resolution. To return to this idea of tolerance -- it is telling that we are asked to tolerate not accept others -- a word with the implication of a fundamental disagreement beyond the emotive and into the objective. It is a weakness of ours that we have reduced our beliefs to being no more believed by us than the emotive quality of every day life. God, Truth, Beauty -- these have all become as simple-minded ideas as vanilla and rocky road ice cream. Should not our responsibility for action be equivalent to our convictions? If we are to believe with any level of credibility that something is true we must in every way defend its truth, the value of its truth and the objectivity of its truth, else it should no longer have any validity.
