Married parents don't have any legal obligation to pay for their adult children's college education or living expenses. But a bill just introduced in Virginia's legislature would require divorced parents to pay for such expenses.
HB 146 would extend child support beyond age 18 to age 23 when the "child" is attending college. Right now, child support in Virginia usually ends soon after the child reaches the age of majority.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a similar provision providing for post-majority support as a violation of the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause. It reasoned that since married parents do not have to support their adult children, it was discriminatory to force divorced parents to do so. See Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995). (Courts have apparently split over the constitutionality of such requirements).
I agree with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s reasoning, on principle. Married parents in Virginia generally have no duty to support their college-age children. Thus, neither should divorced parents.
But I also oppose this requirement based on my experience as a lawyer. (I should note, by the way, that I am not divorced, and have no child support obligations).
As an intake lawyer for a non-profit law firm for over 6 years, I saw cases of aging divorced parents forced to pay the college bills of disrespectful, ungrateful offspring with whom they had an acrimonious relationship, even though they could ill-afford to do so – like a father dying of an incurable liver disease forced to pay his estranged daughter’s graduate school expenses, under a state law permitting child support to be awarded for adult children. (We did not handle family-law cases in state court and I thus had no choice but to reject these people’s pleas for legal assistance).
Divorced parents, like married parents, should have the right not to pay for their adult children's living expenses or college costs -- for example, if the child engages in conduct or a field of study that is objectionable to the parent.
It is an unfortunate reality that courts are likely to apply this bill, if it is enacted and not struck down, in a way that results in support obligations that are inequitable to some aging parents. Virginia courts have sometimes awarded support even in situations where statutory language would appear to bar any support. For example, in Calvin v. Calvin, 31 Va. App. 181 (1999), the Virginia Court of Appeals awarded spousal support, even though the recipient had engaged in adultery and been “vindictive and cruel” in the court’s own words, and even though Virginia’s statutes expressly bar support to adulterous spouses absent a finding of “manifest injustice” based on both fault-based and economic factors. Additional examples are given here.
Comments
The only people in VA dumber than the judges is this idiot Del. John O'Bannon (R-Richmond)--and he's a practicing physician!! I hope none of the other legislators are this stupid. I hope the voters remember this at the next election.
Another example of the "Cartman Technique". Once divorced parents must support their post-majority children, then it won't be long before all parents are assigned the same obligation in the name of Equal Protection.
Delegate O'Bannon has, thus far, declined to tell me the "constituent" he carried this legislation for...I have converted my request to a FOIA request so we should find out shortly.
Pennsylvania has declared this type of crap unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. The Delegate now nows this.
Ironically, this legislation would mandate that support be paid for adult children during basic military training and tech school.
Don't be nasty to Delegate O'Bannon, who introduced the bill but may not be wedded to it. The summary of the bill on the legislature's web site says it was introduced "by request."
So he likely introduced this bill as a courtesy to a constituent who requested that he do so, without claiming to offer an expert opinion on its merits, much less being wedded to it. He is not a specialist in this area, nor does he sit on the relevant committee that would evaluate it in the first instance.
Address your concerns to the relevant committee -- probably the Courts of Justice committee of the House of Delegates.
Dave Briggman speaks of a FOIA request. Do you really think FOIA even covers the legislature? (The federal FOIA doesn't cover Congress, nor does it cover state governments. I assume Virginia has a FOIA of its own, but how likely is it that it even covers delegates or other legislators?).
This is a deeply misguided bill. As legal commentator Walter Olson noted today, quoting a resident of one of the few states that has a similar law:
"A reader writes: 'We have this in Connecticut. It is a disaster. On paper, the CT court is to consider all factors as to whether it is reasonable to order a parent to pay child support. In reality, it is ordered whether or not the parent can afford to pay, whether or not the adult 'child' even speaks to the parent. So you have children who are basically giving their parent no respect or any sort of relationship who are given a free college ride. It is also used as a tool by vindictive parents against the other parent."
Actually, the Connecticut law is better than the Virginia bill in one way: it supposedly limits judges' power to grant support based on specified factors (unlike the Virginia bill, which lets judges order support without such limiting factors).
I wonder why the Connecticut law hasn't been challenged as discriminato
@Commenter...Yes, FOIA covers the legislature...I FOIA'd both Sal Iaquinto and Fred Quayle for all documents relating to House Bill 1382 and Senate Bill 788.
Not familiar with those pieces of work? They were introduced after I sued the Commonwealth for enforcing court orders that were obtained by the unauthorized practice of law by non-attorney employees of DCSE.
While the Court tossed the case, Judge Conrad of the Western District of Virginia expressed that while I needed to seek relief in Virginia courts, my suit had "arguable merit"...
1382/788 gave non-attorneys the ability to practice law in Virginia courts, and it included a retroactive provision to try and tie the hands of Virginia judges from declaring such orders entered prior to the date of enactment as VOID AB INITIO.
I'm more than familiar at the hand-holding Virginia's legislature does when it comes to our Title IV-D agency...
My email address is briggman@gmail.com if someone wants to email me directly.
There is no limitation on a JDR Court judge's power in Virginia (and this legislation permits administrative REINSTATEMENT)...unless you have wads of cash lying around, a JDR Court judge can screw you every which way but loose and just set an appeal bond way out of your reach...
My case is before the Court of Appeals only because I actually WON on the non-attorney employee issue in JDR, and DCSE was stupid enough to appeal it to a court of record.
Wow, thats just plaimn messed up dude, I mean really.
RT
www.anonymity-tools.ru.tc
Before you start giving someone's money away, consider how the child support payments are being used. Custody parents use the child support payments anyway they choose that are totally unrelated to the care of the child. Before you victimize the parents who are paying, why don't you require the existing child support payments be used for the child?
The same bad bill has been introduced in the Virginia State Senate as SB 319 by Senator Frank Ruff. I am baffled by legislative support for this bill, which is anti-family and discriminatory, given that few in the public seem to like it.
As "Commenter" noted below, Connecticut has such a law, and "It is a disaster. On paper, the CT court is to consider all factors as to whether it is reasonable to order a parent to pay child support. In reality, it is ordered whether or not the parent can afford to pay, whether or not the adult 'child' even speaks to the parent. So you have children who are basically giving their parent no respect or any sort of relationship who are given a free college ride. It is also used as a tool by vindictive parents against the other parent."
This is a legislative tactic to bring in more federal financial incentives from the collection of child support...absolutely nothing more.
If Dave Briggman is right that this bill is a scheme to bring in more federal financial incentives, then it shows legislators' foolishness, since the bill is a long-run loser for the state, financially.
States may get some matching funds for child support collections, but it's not dollar-for-dollar.
More importantly, child support collections take a huge amount of state money to enforce. The state spends hundreds of millions every year collecting child support -- most of which would be paid even without the costly child support bureaucracy.
(In the old days, middle-class fathers typically paid their child support even without much enforcement, although working-class fathers often didn't -- and frankly, sometimes still don't).
The state also spends a lot of money on jails (child support deadbeats are the largest contingent in some county jails) and lawyers.
It seems to be bad for jobs, too, judging from the May 25 story linked in the bottom of the above story.
NEVER Reelect
Trivia: Who is the one and only $88,000.00 a year government employee in Virginia who does not pay child support to his minor child? Ask Judge Herbert C. Gill Jr. / Chesterfield for the name.
This same lousy bill exists in the Virginia State Senate, as SB 319, where it was introduced by Senator Frank Ruff even AFTER all the controversy about this bill in the House. (Legislators have gotten loads of emails from constituents opposing the bill. The poll at Richmond Sunlight currently shows people opposing the bill by a vote of 43 to 0, and everything on the web discussing the bill seems to criticize it).
The bill was killed in the House on January 22 by the Courts of Justice Committee.
I've heard that a subcommittee in the State Senate also recommended that it be rejected as well, although I can't see any evidence of that on the Legislature's web site.
This Virginia bill died in the State Senate on February 1, after dying in the House of Delegates on January 22.
But in neighboring Maryland, legislators are now seeking to push through a dramatic increase in child support obligations, as SB 252 and HB 500. The Maryland child support bills are far more economically significant than the Virginia bills, which would have affected only a few thousand people.
The problem is that if a parent with a lot of money refuses to pay for college, the other one who doesn't have a lot of money can't get financial aid. Because colleges expect that both parents will pay for tuition, they consider their income, not just the "child's." My ex won't pay; I can't afford it without giving up all of my retirement but I'll have to because I can't get financial aid as he earns $500,000 a year. I wish my state made him honor his obligation instead of leaving it up to me.
ADULT CHILD SUPPORT MUST END
AS ITS PURPOSE WAS DIRECTED AT CHILDREN
The law in New Jersey that requires only divorcing and non-custodial parents to pay adult child support and pay higher education costs for their adult children is unconstitutional.
NEW JERSEY LAW FOR ADULT CHILD SUPPORT & HIGHER EDUCATION
In New Jersey, the Legislature and our courts have long recognized a child's (a young adult’s) need for higher education and that this need is a proper consideration in determining a parent's adult child support & higher education oblation. Writing for the Court in Newburgh, Justice Pollock set forth a non-exhaustive list of twelve factors a court should consider in evaluating a claim for contribution toward the cost of higher education. See Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982).
The enumerated factors are as follows:
(1) whether the parent, if still living with the child, would have contributed toward the costs of the requested higher education; (2) the effect of the background, values and goals of the parent on the reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher education; (3) the amount of the contribution sought by the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the ability of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship of the requested contribution to the kind of school or course of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources of both parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of the child for the requested education; (8) the financial resources of the child, including assets owned individually or held in custodianship or trust; (9) the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on vacation; (10) the availability of financial aid in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the child's relationship to the paying parent, including mutual affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship of the education requested to any prior training and to the overall long-range goals of the child (adult).
In the aftermath of the Newburgh Decision, the Legislature essentially approved those criteria’s when amending the support statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(5). Compare N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(5) (listing factors to consider in determining support) with Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 545, 443 A.2d 1031 (listing factors to consider in determining payment of education expenses). Kiken v. Kiken, 149 N.J. 441, 449, 694 A.2d 557 (1997). Thus, a trial court should balance the statutory criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and the Newburgh factors, as well as any other relevant circumstances, to reach a fair and just decision whether and, if so, in what amount, a parent or parents must contribute to a child's educational expenses. It can be argued by the New Trial Lawyers Association and various women support groups that law in question is designed to promote the highest good, does not make this law constitutional.
THE NEW JERSEY & FEDERAL CONSTITUION SHOULD
PROTECT AGAINST AN INJUSTICE THAT WOULD
LEAD TO UNEQUAL TREATMENT
Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution sets forth the first principles of our governmental charter – that every person possesses the “unalienable rights” to enjoy life, liberty, and property, and to pursue happiness. The Equal Protection clause of Federal Constitution provide that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Although our State Constitution nowhere expressly states that every person shall be entitled to the equal protection of the laws, the New Jersey Supreme Court has construed the expansive language of Article I, Paragraph 1 to embrace that fundamental guarantee. Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 177 N.J. 318, 332 (2003); Greenberg v. Kimmelman 99 N.J. 552, 567-68 (1985). The first paragraph to our State Constitution “protect[s] against injustice and against the unequal treatment of those who should be treated alike.” Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 568.
When a statute is challenged on the ground that it does not
apply evenhandedly to similarly situated people, our equal protection jurisprudence requires that the legislation, in distinguishing between two classes of people, bear a substantial
relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. Caviglia v. Royal Tours of Am., 178 N.J. 460, 472-73 (2004); Barone v. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 107 N.J. 355, 368 (1987). The test that New Jersey Courts have applied to equal protection claims involves the weighing of three factors: the nature of the right at stake, the extent to which the challenged statutory scheme restricts that right, and the public need for the statutory restriction. Greenberg, supra, 99 N.J. at 567; Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 491-92, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed. 2d 219 (1973). The test is a flexible one, measuring the importance of the right against the need for the governmental restriction. See Sojourner A., supra, 177 N.J. at 333. Under that approach, each claim is examined “on a continuum that reflects the nature of the burdened right and the importance of the governmental restriction.” Ibid. Accordingly, “the more personal the right, the greater the public need must be to justify governmental interference with the exercise of that right.” George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 137 N.J. 8, 29 (1994); see also Taxpayers Ass’n of Weymouth Twp. v. Weymouth Twp., 80 N.J. 6, 43 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 977,97 S. Ct. 1672, 52 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1977). Unless the public need justifies statutorily limiting the exercise of a claimed right, the State’s action is deemed arbitrary. See Robinson, supra, 62 N.J. at 491-92.
Our state equal protection analysis also differs from the more rigid, three-tiered federal equal protection methodology. When a statute is challenged under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, one of three tiers of review applies -- strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or rational basis --depending on whether a fundamental right, protected class, or some other protected interest is in question. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465, 471
(1988). All classifications must at a minimum survive rational basis review, the lowest tier.
POINT ONE
Why N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)(5) & New Jersey Common Law requiring
only divorcing & non-custodial parents to pay adult child
support & higher education costs for their adult children
is unconstitutional.
In cases where there is an intact family, with parents married and residing together, the statute has no application. In such cases, the parents have no legal obligation to provide support for adult children and adult children have no remedy for compelling such support. In essence, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and case law permits a burden to be imposed upon one class of citizens---divorced or separated parents---that cannot in like circumstances be imposed upon married parents residing together. Parents in this latter class are thus immune from such legal liability. Likewise, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and case law creates a privilege for one class of citizens---adult children of divorced or separated parents---that is not granted to children whose parents are married and residing together. In consequence, by establishing distinctions based upon the marital status of the parent, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) and case law violates the equal protection clauses of both New Jersey and United States Constitutions.
A state's interest in secondary education, however highly ranked, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights and interests. This type of law that exists in New Jersey must be struck down --- even if it is a good law. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 37, 42 S. Ct. 449, 66 L. Ed. 817 (1922) (reviewing court must strike down unconstitutional law even though that law is “designed to promote the highest good. The good sought in this unconstitutional law is an insidious feature, because it leads citizens and legislators of good purpose to promote it, without thought of the serious breach it will make in the ark of our covenant, or the harm which will come from breaking down recognized standards.”) The law also egregiously places different burdens and benefits placed on persons similarly situated also violate the guarantees of equal protection. Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412, 101 S. Ct. 2434 (4,5) (1981), South Central Bell Telephone Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 119 S. Ct. 1180 (1999), Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). This law establishes distinctions that are wholly unrelated to the legitimate state interest that the law seeks to advance.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
A recent South Carolina Supreme Court struck down a similar provision mandating post-majority support as a violation of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause. It reasoned that since married parents do not have to support their adult children, it was discriminatory to force divorced parents to do so. See Webb v. Sowell, 387 S.C. 328, 692 S.E.2d 543 (2010), see also Curtis v. Kline, 666 A.2d 265 (Pa. 1995).
SUPPORTING LEGLISLATIVE ACTION
In January of 2003, the New Hampshire legislature introduced a bill proposing to change the existing law regarding post-secondary education orders. The previous statute, which applied before the amendment was introduced, granted superior courts the authority to order divorced parents to contribute to their child’s post-secondary educational expenses. This new bill was drafted to amend RSA § 458:17 by inserting the following provision: “No child support order shall require a parent to contribute to an adult child’s college expenses or other educational expenses beyond the completion of high school.” The purpose of this provision, according to the bill’s sponsor, was to remove a trial judge’s discretion when ordering divorced parents to contribute to their adult child’s college expenses. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted in favor of the bill, and on January 1, 2004, the new child support provision took effect. The new law is codified as RSA § 458:17(XI-a).
In February, 2010 the Virginia legislators killed bills to extend child support to adult college students. The bills would have required a non-custodial parent to make payments to the other parent while their adult child is attending college. A limited number of states have such laws, but legislators in Virginia voted the bills down after receiving an avalanche of angry e-mails and phone calls from their constituents opposing the bill. The bill was killed by the House of Delegates Courts of Justice Committee in an voice vote on January 22 to strike the bill from the docket. It was killed this legislative session by the Senate Courts of Justice Committee, which voted 13-to-1 to shelve the bill indefinitely on February 1. Only Senator Roscoe Reynolds (D-Martinsville) voted to keep the bill alive.
POINT TWO
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its Fifth Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process." The Clause also includes a substantive component that "provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests."
The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by the Supreme Court. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), the Court held that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" and "to control the education of their own." In New Jersey however, this right only applies to intact families in which they can not be forced to pay adult support and higher educational expenses for their adult children.
A few years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), the Court again held that the "liberty of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." The Court explained in Pierce that "the child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."
In subsequent cases also, the Court have recognized the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) ("It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children 'comes to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements'"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205(1972) ("The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition".)
In New Jersey, these applicable principles are well settled. “Parents have a constitutionally protected, fundamental liberty interest in raising their biological children.” In re Adoption of a Child by W.P. & M.P., 308 N.J.Super. 376, 382, 706 A.2d 198 (App.Div.l998) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L. Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982)), vacated on other grounds, 163 N.J. 158, 748 A.2d 515 (2000). “The Federal and State Constitutions protect the inviolability of the family unit.” W.P. & M.P., supra, 308 N.J.Super. at 382, 706 A.2d 198 (citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212-13, 31 L. Ed.2d 551, 558-59 (1972)). However, government “is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized.” Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L. Ed.2d 101, 119 (1979) (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1540, 32 L. Ed .2d 15, 33 (1972)). The State, as parens patriae, may sever the parent-child relationship to protect the child from serious physical and emotional injury. W.P. & M.P., supra, 308 N.J.Super. at 382, 706 A.2d 198.
It can be argued that the State's is empowered, as parens patriae, to extend the benefit of secondary education to adult children regardless of their parents' wishes can not be sustained against a free exercise claim. In selecting compulsory secondary education law to a select class based on marital status, it can not in anyway impair the physical or mental health of an adult child, nor result in an inability to be self-supporting, or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any way materially detract from the welfare of society. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 1,14.
Because fundamental rights are so important to our freedom as Americans, the government must meet a heightened burden of proof in order to restrict those rights. In legal terms, the government's case begins with a positive demonstration – they must prove that there is a government interest in restricting the right, and that the government has a specific interest in restricting the right of the particular parents whose actions are being challenged. In early 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court used this very language when talking about violations of religious liberty. According to the Court, the government must "demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law 'to the person'--the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened." Gonzales v. O Centro Espirito Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 548 U.S. 418, 430-431 (2006).
In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court held that in order for the state of Wisconsin to override the rights of Amish parents, the government had to show that it had a compelling interest in requiring students to stay in school until age 16. Speaking of the right of the parents, the Court said that "the essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has required the government to follow this standard whenever there is a violation of a fundamental right. Prominent examples of this are cases that deal with racial discrimination (see Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995): "All racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. . . . Such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests"), restrictions on free speech (see Widmar v. Vincent, 254 U.S. 263, 269-270 (1982): Whenever discriminating against speech on the basis of its content, the government "must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end"), and invidious discrimination against religion (see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993): "To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance 'interests of the highest order' and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests." In all these cases, the government must prove that it has a compelling interest, before the fundamental freedom at stake can be limited.
In general, parents of adult children have an "important" right concerning the question of whether or not they contribute to the cost of a college education for their adult children. Moreover, these constitutional rights derive from both privacy rights and liberty interests which have been established. To have laws in New Jersey compelling parents of a selected class to pay for secondary higher education is wrong. The decision of parents as to whether or not the adult children should go to college, and who shall pay for those educational expenses are matters of right that are purely personal to the parents, and to the adult child. The state of New Jersey has no legitimate interest in interfering with these decisions. The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the right of a parent to the "custody and management" of a child is "constitutionally protected." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 at p. 652, 43 L.Ed.2d 514, 95 S.Ct. 1225 (1975). The Court has specifically addressed the importance of parental interests.
The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her child come(s) to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 at p. 559, 92 S.Ct. 1208 (1972).
The degree to which any parents wishes to support, or discourage, the post majority educational opportunities of adult children is encompassed within the management of children concept. The purpose of “Child Support,” is for the care and maintenance of children. Upon attending age 18, a child is deemed an adult in the State of New Jersey, and is thereupon possessed of all of the rights, privileges and obligations of adulthood, including the right to decide for himself whether or not to attend college, and which college to attend. The “Child Support Laws,” were created to assist children, not young adults. If so, Social Security Benefits and Welfare Benefits would be extended to all adult children attending college.
In light of this extensive precedent, there can be no doubt that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children’s education as they deemed fit. I respectfully submit that since married parents can not be forced to support their adult children with higher education and adult support, it is discriminatory and unconstitutional to force divorced parents or noncustodial parents to do so. In this State, upon attaining the age of 18, you are considered legally an adult. Adult support must end as well as forcing divorced and non-custodial parents to pay for higher education.
POINT THREE
The New Jersey Compulsory Education Law, N.J.S.A. 18A:38-25 terminates a parental obligation to educate their child upon attaining the age of 16.
N.J.S.A.18A:38-25. Attendance required of children between six and 16; exceptions provide:
Every parent, guardian or other person having custody and control of a child between the ages of six and 16 years shall cause such child regularly to attend the public schools of the district or a day school in which there is given instruction equivalent to that provided in the public schools for children of similar grades and attainments or to receive equivalent instruction elsewhere than at school.
The relationship between child and school authorities is not voluntary one but is compelled by law; child must attend school and is subject to school rules and disciplines; in turn school authorities are obligated to take reasonable precautions for his safety and well-being. Jackson v. Hankinson, 51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685 (1968).
Hence, based on N.J.S.A.18A:38-25, a parent’s obligation for educating their children end upon a child turning 16. The question is, how can you reconcile the case and statutory law compelling college contribution and adult support to a select class of parents?
These child support laws EVERYWHERE are clearly designed to deter men from procreating! I don't get why men EVERYWHERE don't get a vasectomy IMMEDIATELY upon majority!!!! If I were a man, knowing the divorce rate is what it is, I WOULD NEVER have kids. After a divorce men have ZERO freedom! I'm hoping to convince my son not to have ANYTHING to DO WITH WOMEN, or at the very least, convince him not to have kids! I'm against homosexuality, but would prefer that over him allowing some woman to RUIN his life!
Got something to say?
Examiner.com is looking for writers, photographers, and videographers to join the fastest growing group of local insiders. If you are interested in growing your online rep apply to be an Examiner today!