Tom Elliott
2007-05-07 07:00:00.0
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WASHINGTON -

Once it became clear the claims about Saddam’s WMD stockpiling would never be realized, there was no shortage of apologies from a red-faced press embarrassed by its earlier failure to ask tough questions.

The New York Times went so far as to issue an 1,100-word apology. “We wish we had been more aggressive,” The Times said, referring to articles that took officials too closely at their word. Going ahead, the paper promised, it would “continue aggressive reporting aimed at setting the record straight.”

The first opportunity to flex this newfound appreciation for journalistic skepticism came the day congressional Democrats dropped their policy of laying Iraq’s failing at the feet of the Bush administration. Instead, a wholesale Iraq policy shift was attempted.

Democrats’ initial solution — for a conflict alternatively lambasted for mass casualties, savaging of America’s reputation, inspiring “civil war”; with some even going so far as to call it the “greatest foreign policy blunder in American history” — was a pork-laden war-funding bill imposing timetables for withdrawing American troops.

How such a measure would serve as an Iraq cure-all was never adequately explained. For its part, the media — the supposedly fearless D.C. press corps in particular — seemed satisfied with Democratic explanations that such measures are just responding to public demands. But if popular opinion provides a suitable compass for guiding foreign policy, why all the apologies for an earlier lack of skepticism with WMD?

Why not, instead, tough questions — like:

» Is a timetable for withdrawal intended to hasten victory — or defeat?

» If victory, how will withdrawal help?

» If defeat, how will that help national interests?

» How will abandoning Iraq’s burgeoning government affect America’s reputation in the region?

» A Taliban spokesman recently stated Osama bin Laden is coordinating insurgent attacks in Iraq. If true, how is it possible to simultaneously fight the war on terrorism but not insurgents in Iraq?

» What are some possible worst-case scenarios of withdrawing from Iraq?

» Should such a scenario manifest, what are Democrats’ contingency plans?

» The bill mandates the last of Iraq-stationed U.S. troops to leave by September 2008. What’s significant about this date other than being two months prior to the next presidential election?

These questions never came because the answers are obvious: Abandoning Iraq will hasten an American defeat; leaving the country halfway broken will leave a permanent scar on America’s regional reputation; it’s impossible to fight the war on terrorism but not Iraq’s insurgents; leaving Iraq could beget a full-fledged regional war; Democrats have no plan should such a contingency arise; the final pullout date is arbitrary aside from its intent of removing Iraq from the next election’s political equation.

This wouldn’t work, as Democrats and the media, both having claimed to have been “duped” by President Bush, invested personal credibility in using Iraq to bring down President Bush. Diverting even a fraction of energy spent challenging the president over his war plans to do likewise with Democrats threatens not only Democratic leaders, but the D.C. press corps itself.

Having failed to survive Bush’s veto, Democrats are now scrapping “timetables” in favor of “benchmarks.” Ostensibly these make America’s continued support conditional upon verifiable progress from Iraq’s government.

Again, the press, Washington’s (with its closer access) in particular, has an opportunity to prove its mettle. Tough questions:

» Does it make sense to threaten American allies?

» How can Congress be sure “benchmarks” won’t increase short-term violence, whereby insurgents could ensure discontinued U.S. support?

» Who creates the benchmarks? How will they be verified? How will it be determine they’ve been met to satisfaction?

The media have expressed in no uncertain terms its rather limited fanfare for the level of carnage in Iraq. Yet what we’re seeing now threatens to pale in comparison to a possible worst-case scenario.

Should the press continue expressing limited curiosity about what potentially lies behind door number two, such a dystopic finality becomes, sadly, only more likely.

Tom Elliott is an editorial writer for the New York Post.