FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction experts failed simple test questions, report says

  Some of the FBI's so-called 'experts' on Weapons of Mass Destruction couldn't even name the most important targets and threats in their own back yard, according to the Justice Department's Inspector General.

In an audit released today, the Houston field office was examined along with seven other field offices and the bureau's headquarters.    The report spells out that those WMD 'experts' are now in place at all field offices, and yet some flunked the test when they were asked to name the 10 top threats and targets in their areas.

Some simply answered the quiz by listing off threats and targets that had been assembled by previous assessments in other divisions, while others actually called their peers to help them answer the auditors' questions.

The report also says those experts, known as "WMD Coordinators" are also not getting crucial intelligence from local law enforcement and other FBI offices that could identify emerging threats.

Then, there is the question of training for those FBI experts.  The report states,

We also found that the FBI has not established specific qualifications that WMD Coordinators need so that they can perform their critical functions.

The report says that without requiring that specific training for these experts,

"The FBI is not positioned to identify and mitigate knowledge gaps in WMD preparedness.

The report mentions that since some of the WMD coordinators had none of the specific training that is needed for this type of work,

"Some Coordinators had no background in WMD matters or had received only limited training before being named their field division's WMD Coordinator.

The 97-page report pointed out that only 7-percent of those 57 WMD Coordinators had received training about nuclear threats, 25% had been trained on radiological material being used as weapons, and 28% had been trained on chemical weapons being used by terrorists, home-grown or otherwise.

The Inspector General's report said that FBI managers were reluctant to assign intelligence analysts to work with the WMD Coordinators.  In some cases, auditors said that intelligence analysts resisted being paired with the WMD Coordinators because they would then be relegated to work that's beneath them, like scanning tons of documents or doing routine follow-up phone calls with sources of information.  Only 21 of the 56 field offices designated a specific intelligence analyst with the WMD Coordinator.

Those intelligence analysts who were working with WMD Coordinators also lacked training.  The report said those analysts admitted,

They did not have a strong WMD background or knowledge base and also lacked substantive training on WMD modalities, such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear disciplines.

The FBI wrote that it agreed with the recommendations in the report, and the bureau issued a press release from Dr. Vahid Majidi, the Assistant FBI Director over the WMD program, saying that most of the improvements had already started before this audit was published.

The 13 recommendations include better training for the WMD Coordinators, better use of intelligence analysts, and staying better plugged in with the other agents in their field office for a broader picture of intelligence and threats.

requiring that WMD coordinators actually participate in the overall threat assessments at their field office, giving them better intelligence with which to work. 

In October 2007, the report says FBI was investigating nearly 1,000 cases involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, including threats and hoaxes.

The full-time WMD Coordinators were established in April 2008.   Before that, it was a "collateral duty," basically serving as the "point person" on WMD matters while also handling unrelated duties.

Headquarters even funded an extra position in each office to make up for the agent who was moved into that job.

In a memo that named these coordinators as each field office's "expert" on Weapons of Mass Destruction, the duties were spelled out to include

1. Conducting outreach with other agencies and private sector about threats
2. Investigate WMD crimes, including other cases that involve WMD components
3. Implement Countermeasures  to detect threats and vulnerabilities
4. Provide Training within the FBI and local community
5. Manage Incident Response when threats or incidents happen

The report says each WMD Coordinator is supposed to be constantly evaluating the "WMD Domain" in his or her area.   This means evaluating secret intelligence, local police incidents, keeping tabs on potential targets such as transportation, sporting events, chemical facilities and military facilities.   The report says that this can include thousands--if not millions--of different entities.   While it's not feasible for field divisions to evaluate all of that simultaneously, the report says those WMD Coordinators should have an overall knowledge of the most serious threats and vulnerabilities.

Some WMD Coordinators responsible for compiling this information told us that they had difficulty identifying their top threats and assessing their intelligence support capability because no one told them how this information should be compiled or assessed.

Some of those coordinators, the report said, even said they had no idea how to perform an initial domain assessment that was required to even start managing the WMD domain in their area.

The Inspector General said that WMD Coordinators need to better coordinate with other agents, perhaps right down the hall from them.      Some events are not funneled to the WMD Coordinator because specific criteria are not met, but the report said better collaborating with fellow agents may yield emerging threats that are presently being missed because of the way new reports are categorized.

The report even says these coordinators are not in close enough contact with the Joint Terrorism Task Force agents that became the agents out front of all terrorism investigations after September 11, 2001.

Consequently, we believe it is important that the FBI ensure that field divisions identify and share WMD domain information available from case files and other Special Agents with the WMD Coordinator.

The lack of information sharing, the report said, resulted in different FBI employees contacting the same groups for similar reasons, basically tripping over each other.    In late 2008, FBI began working to use liaisons to keep that from happening.

The field division offices audited for this report, along with Houston, are Oklahoma City, Baltimore, Washington D. C. , New York, Phoenix, Tampa, and Los Angeles.   Some 80 agents and other employees were interviewed.

In a letter to the Inspector General, responding to the audit, the FBI's WMD chief Dr. Majidi, wrote that,

The FBI has made strides to increase the competency of, and professionalize, our WMD Coordinators and Intelligence Analysts through a formalized training curriculum and select performance requirements.

As far as missing intelligence or correctly identifying potential WMD cases, Dr. Majidi wrote,

The WMD Directorate has taken a forward leaning approach toward cross-program integration.

The FBI's letter says it concurs with the 13 recommendations.   Field offices are now mandated to examine all incoming cases for a potential WMD nexus, and training requirements have been formalized, the letter said.

For more info:               FBI Inspector General's full report