A contemplation of Aristotelian substances

June 17, 10:20 PMFort Worth Philosophy ExaminerBenjamin Mullikin

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The School of Athens by Raphael taken 2008

The first category of being which we need to explore if we are to understand the ten-fold categorization of Aristotle is substance. We can define substance in two ways, as primary and as secondary.

Primary Substances: are things which can neither be said of a subject nor which is in a subject. I.E. an individual man or an individual horse is a primary substance.

Secondary Substances: are those species or genera from which the Primary Substances are. For example, Animal is a species and Man is a genera.

If we take a moment to contemplate this in light of our previous discussion on predication we will realize that secondary substances are predicated to primary substances. We can therefore apply the rules of predication such that the way in which we define an individual thing (primary substance) is in terms of its genera or species (secondary substance). So let us look at the characteristics of primary substances and secondary substances in turn.

Primary Substances

When we speak of primary substances we mean the most basic thing that exists. Primary substances are that which we can no longer predicate to something else. That is, all other characteristics or secondary substances can be said to be either of a primary substance or in a primary substance; if there were no primary substances it would be impossible for all other things (characteristics and secondary substances) to exist.

Naturally because we are establishing a hierarchy from the specific to the more general we can say that species are more primary than the genera from which they belong, being themselves a predication of the genera. This is important to recognize because it allows us to more thoroughly define a thing. We can call Robert an animal, but it is more specific to call him a man and even more specific to call him an individual man.  In this way we can call Robert both a man and an animal, but it is all the same most specific to call him Robert.

Because primary substances are that which cannot be predicated to something else it is absurd to claim that there is anything more primary. A simpler way to state this is to say that any horse cannot be more “horsey” (in respect to substance and not characteristic) than any other horse. Similarly we cannot say that a horse is more a substance than a man because while they are of a different kind, they are both primary.

Secondary Substances

Secondary sources, as we have said, are the species and genera from which a primary substance extends. Because secondary substances extend their predication to primary substances in a similar fashion as characteristics, it is all too easy to improperly understand how a secondary substance is indeed a substance. this nice quote should put it in perspective:

“It is because the primary substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances most strictly. But as the primary substances stand to everything else, so the species and the genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are predicated of these.” (Categories, V 5, 2a36-3a4)

If we want we can use slightly different terminology: because secondary substances describe a kind of a thing and not a thing itself they cannot be something which is found as a characteristic in something. We can know that a man is a kind of animal but we do not suppose that an animal is in a man, or in anything else for that matter. We also do not mean that secondary substances are parts because it is not the case that man is a part of an animal, but rather it is fully an animal because animal is predicated to it.

Qualification of Substances

Since substances are either an individual thing or a kind of thing and cannot, as we have discussed, be more or less in degree from another substance, we must concede that there is also nothing contrary to them. We cannot say that there is anything opposite of man, let alone an individual man. When we do refer to a substance as the opposite of something else we mean the characteristic of the substance not the substance itself. For example, if we say one man is tall and another man is short, it is the substance of man which is taller or shorter, but the particular characteristic of those very men before us. More, when we refer to substance as having changed, growing taller or getting hotter, what we mean is that the characteristics of the substance have changed. Naturally then, we can say a substance (by its characteristics) has contraries in it, as it can at one time be cold and at another time be hot, but we are merely saying that a certain substance has different accidental characteristics at different times, not that the substance itself has been altered.