Let us now look at an expansion of language (2). Besides the four words "block", "pillar", etc., let it contain a series of words used as the shopkeeper in (1) used the numerals (it can be the series of letters of the alphabet); further, let there be two words, which may as well be "there" and "this" (because this roughly indicates their purpose),that are used in connexion with a pointing gesture; and finally a number of colour samples. A gives an order like: "d---slab---there". At the same time he shews the assistant a colour sample, and when he says "there" he points to a place on the building site. From the stock of slabs B takes one for each letter of the alphabet up to "d", of the same colour as the sample, and brings them to the place indicated by A.---On other occasions A gives the order "this---there". At "this" he points to a building stone. And so on.
Wittgenstein here creates an expansion of the language game described in remark 2. Instead of only being able to imperativally utter things like "Slab!", one will now be able to use numbers to indicate how many slabs one wants, as well as where one wants them to be placed. In addition to the use of numerals, Wittgenstein notes that we are now, with this expanded language game, able to utilize demonstratives to compare and contrast building materials with color samples and indicate where one wants a piece of building materials to be placed.
These additions to Wittgenstein's primitive language game thus allow us to form a primitive grammar or syntax. What is interesting about Wittgenstein's "grammar" here is that it is not a merely formal grammar, but one that is embedded in a concrete circumstance, and that the grammar depends for its integrity upon this circumstance. For example, "a-slab-there" becomes a nonsense statement apart from a demonstrative indication of where one wants the slab. Thus, the pointing gesture itself becomes part of the grammar. This is obviously quite different from the more mainstream understanding of grammar according to which syntax or grammar refers solely to a set of formal or abstract rules independent of a concrete context. Wittgenstein's grammar thus consists of a combination of a set of parts of speech, lexical tools and gestures embedded in a concrete context.