Wisdom Ethics part 2: One possible solution

As a birthday present to myself, I thought I would finish the second part of this little series on what I'm calling wisdom ethics.  Previously, I've talked about the very basic function of three main modes of ethical thinking, those of results, rules and virtues (or consequentialism, deontology and areteology).  What I've found is that many thinkers espouse one of those three (primarly results or rules since the Englightenment, primarily virtues before) and that I find it challenging to actually use only one of those modes in my own thinking about right and wrong.

When this topic came up with friends from seminary on a little road-trip recently, what I realized is that I have taken to using one mode primarily at any given time, but using the other two modes to inform and refine my thinking.  I treat these three major modes like the proverbial three-legged stool, rather than trying to balance precariously on just one.

In the case of results thinking, it is crucial to make sure that in seeking the best results, one does not violate any of the basic rules that we as a society mostly agree on.  For example, in seeking the most good for the most people, it probably shouldn't be allowable to murder someone in the process.  One of the big weaknesses of results thinking, to me, is the tendencey to fall into "the ends justify the means".  Not only is this not true (that the ends justify the means), but it is also one of the big arguments put forward to justify evil.  You can think of the argument put forward in the Vietnam War that "we had to destroy the village to save it"  You can see the same perverted reasoning being used even today.

Virtue thinking is also very important as a limit on results ethics.  It's important to think not just of the results of one decision as 'results', but to look at the life and flourishing of everyone involved as part of the desired good 'result' - nothing less seems like it would be acceptable.  Virtue ethics breaks away from the instantaneous focus of results or rules ethics and takes a longer view, something I think we as a society have frankly forgotten.

In the case of rules thinking (including divine command ethics for example) I can see plenty of problems which arise when the results of choices are ignored.  The idea that one should blindly follow a rule as such with no consideration of the impact of following that rule on others is absurd and potentially quite damaging.  I think looking at results is also a good test of a given rule.  If following a good-seeming rule does not result in the most good for the most people, then how can you say it is a good rule?  What's your standard exactly?

Virtue ethics also informs rules-based ethics, in that it is possible to look at the kind of person a rules-follower is and get a good idea of how that rule-following is working out for them.  This is directly in line with Biblical talk about how following God will result in good fruit, and that if someone says they follow God but don't bear good fruit, you can safely assume they're mistaken.

Lastly, virtue thinking can and should be informed by both results and rules thinking.  (I would otherwise make the argument that classically it was informed by both, but that is another conversation to have).  I am personally most drawn to virtue ethics, but can also find ways in which it is difficult to apply on a case-by-case basis.  Virtue thinking focuses on the kind of person one should seek to become, and on building practices which develop the virtues that a 'good' person should exhibit.  Like the 'fruits of the spirit' in the Bible, there are classical lists of virtues, and I tend to like the Thomistic list of four humanistic virtues and three theological virtues.

The humanistic virtues are fortitude, justice, prudence and temperance.  These four are core virtues because they are necessary for any virtue to develop.  Fortitude means one can endure hardship for the sake of the good; justice means that one considers how their actions affect others and what others are due; prudence is wisdom, or the ability to make good choices; temperance is the avoidance of extremes, either ascetic or hedonistic, but rather to find a middle way of balance.

The theological virtues, for Thomas Aquinas, are gifts from God and cannot be cultivated by human beings on their own.  They are faith, hope and love.  Faith is a gift from God, something that Reformed theology strongly agrees with.  Hope is a gift because as Christians our hope is in God and not in this world as it is now, nor in our own abilities and capacities.  Love is a gift because it is God who shows us what love is and how to love by God's very being manifested in Jesus Christ.

Given that, however, it is hard for someone practicing virtue ethics to make the moment-to-moment decisions that constitute life.  For these, I find the other two modes very helpful.  Results ethics reminds me that it is not only my flourishing that is at stake, but that of everyone else as well.  It forces me to remain connected and not become some kind of holier-than-thou kind of person concerned only with my own development.  It is, in effect, an antidote for self-help thinking.

Rules ethics reminds me that I should not do anything in my pursuit of virtue which violates a basic ethical rule.  There is a framework of do's and don'ts that my decisions take place within.  It also gives me a good guideline about what virtue looks like.  If I am led to break one of these basic ethical rules, I am probably doing something wrong, however I might feel about any 'progress' I've made.

Of course, this thinking leaves one with all the usual challenges of any thinking about right and wrong.  What constitutes the 'best' for the most people in a given situation?  What exactly are these 'basic moral rules' I am mentioning, and how did I come by them?  How does one decide what the virtuous person looks like, given the limitations of our capacity to think and perceive clearly.

This isn't meant to be a revolutionary solution, it just happens to be the mode that I use now in my own life.

Next up, for part 3, I think I will give an example of this method in practice in my own thinking about abortion, which has become both more clear and more complex in the last few years.