Why the mullahs will (probably) win

By any standard, the last 10 days in Iran have been nothing less than extraordinary.  From the moment the mullahs proclaimed victory for the incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad--only four hours after the polls closed--Iranian students and dissidents took to the streets.  Since then, they have sustained massive protests against the government, despite the swift expulsion of most foreign journalists, and a brutal crackdown, led by the hated Basij militia. 

It has been a remarkable display of courage and conviction, considering the (increasingly) brutal tactics employed by the regime and its security forces.  Hundreds of Iranian students, accused of fomenting the protest, have been taken from universities in Tehran and other cities.  Many will never be heard from again. 

Scores of other demonstrators bear the bloody scars of their encounters with police, the Basij, or Hamas thugs who have assisted with the crackdown.  Western media reports say at least 17 protesters have been killed by security forces; other sources put the death toll at more than 200--and rising.  The cold-blooded murder of one female demonstrator, known as Nada, galvanized global opposition against the government.      

As the violence continues, some analysts believe that Iran is again ripe for revolution.  A generation that has grown up under the repressive Islamist government is clearly ready for change, and they are risking their lives by openly backing the "reformist" candidate (Mir Hossein Mousavi), challenging the re-election of Ahmadeinjad, and openly defying regime threats.  

Still, there are troubling signs that the latest uprising will end in the same fashion as the student riots of 1999.  Those demonstrations, sparked by the closure of an opposition newspaper, sparked six days of protests and demonstrations led by Iranian college students in Tehran.  Then as now, the government responded brutally, beating and detaining more than 1,000 students, while limiting coverage by state-run media outlets and the western press.  Human rights organizations estimate that 70 student leaders vanished after the uprising and were likely murdered by government agents.  Other organizers spent years in hellish Iranian prisons--a fate that awaits many of those detained in recent days.  

And ironically, the Iranian government is in a better position to suppress domestic unrest than it was a decade ago.  Despite the glare of global media coverage--and the physical courage of the demonstrators--the mullahs will likely win this round because of political and social dynamics that are readily evident across Iran.  Simply stated, the regime has several advantages it can leverage in beating back the protests and capping the current unrest.  These advantages include:

1.  Prior Planning and the Consolidation of Security Elements.  The 1999 riots frightened the government, which has subsequently devoted significant resources to the "internal" threat.  When a new commander took over the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Council (IRGC) last year, he announced that the prevention of a "velvet revolution" was one of his top priorities.  That spurred further increases in funding and training for security forces, and a greater emphasis on the surveillance of Iranian dissidents.  It was no accident that the first raid on student dormitories occurred less than 72 hours after the post-election protest began.  By hauling off suspected leaders, the regime sought to decapitate the opposition.  So far, that effort has been only marginally successful, but the dorm assaults show that the police, the IRGC and the Basij know something about the opposition's organizational structure, and are attempting to target its leaders--particularly those who can mobilize crowds in the streets.   

Additionally, Iranian security forces have mobilized in large numbers, giving them an advantage over the demonstrators.  During one key encounter in Tehran on Saturday, security personnel reportedly outnumbered protesters by a 7-1 margin.  Tactically deployed at key intersections, security elements were able to channel dissidents away from potential gathering places, reducing the size (and effectiveness) of the crowd, while making it easier for the police to deal with smaller groups of demonstrators.  

It's also worth noting that the IRGC--and its Basij auxiliary--have increased their governmental standing under Ahmadinejad.  He has appointed more IRGC officials to key positions than any of his predecessors, boosting the organization's standing, and further cementing its loyalty to the regime.  The IRGC is also in a good position to ferret out potential opponents within the government.  

2.  Fissures Among the Opposition.  Anti-regime elements have long been beset by in-fighting and tribalism, making it more difficult to present a united front that can legitimately challenge the mullahs. Making matters worse, political opponents have lacked a leader who can transcend age, gender and ethnic barriers, at least until Mr. Mousavi began his recent presidential campaign. However, Mousavi is hardly an ideal model for a political reformer.  As Prime Minister during the early days of the Khomeini regime, he presided over his own, brutal crackdowns, resulting in the deaths of thousands of dissidents.  Many of Mr. Mousavi's supporters are siding with him simply because there is no other alternative.