A crucial element of ensuring peaceekeeing success in societies emerging from conflict is
the reintroduction of combatants into civilian life.
Exeprts specifically contend that “the reintegration of demobilized soldiers into civilian life was an other responsibility that was given to the UN PK force in Mozambique, but not to that in Angola. This task was another reason why the UN experienced far greater success in its PKO in Mozambique than in Angola.” He additionally remarks that “since demobilization in Angola came late, if at all, the lack of reintegration did not have an opportunity to become a major problem. The Angolan parties had created plans for reintegration but had grossly overestimated the donors’ willingness to pay for them.” Consequently, “Mozambique and Angola, the UN failed to come up with reintegration programs that made a contribution to the peace process. Another area in which the UN should have made major efforts to protect the process and preserve the peace in the future was in disarmament.There too, the UN was unable to achieve what was necessary.”
Access to, and the abundance and availability of, light weaponry such as AK-47s and RPGs was also a significant problem for the west in ending conflicts in these two countries. Toward this end, JT recognizes that “the demilitarization of these societies was by no means an inexpensive undertaking and many owners of weapons were reluctant to surrender their arms for a number of reasons, including physical protection and economic opportunity in selling them or using them for criminal activities.”
When assessing non state enemy combatants that use “terror” tactics or guerilla warfare to alter or achieve political goal use, there has to be a central binding factor or motivator . Experts can easily argue the novice position that polarization or compliance. One could argue that it is the altruistic syndrome that defines the psyche of a jihadist. Rather one has to account for the non ethic or non ethno religious extremist. There has to be an assessment and accountability for true ideologue. The extremist who seeks not for a religious caliphate or one particular cause or another , but rather the complete reorganization of the social order i.e the Yasser Arafat’s founder of the (PLO) , Michael Collins of the (IRA), Gudrun Ensslin (RAF) Red Army Faction, Ayatollah Khomeini (Islamic Revolution of 1979 )the true revolutionary’s.
Mobilization as defined by the Crenshaw as a social movement catalyst . Crenshaw is quoted directly as stating that .
“terrorism can do more than alter the behavior of an adversary. it serves importantly to mobilize and invigorate supporters and to develop new constituencies.” “It demonstrates power, even if striking a blow accomplishes nothing concrete” and “it satisfies demands for vengeance and overcomes feelings of humiliation and resentment.”
Assessing the objective mobilization
The idea of a movement is the only the entity that can fundamentally alter a governments composition and remove leadership is that idea of a mobilized and unified movement. When a terror group uses tactics such as creating a social mobilization movement. They gain the support of the general population. Hamas has been the most successful at this. The evangelizing of their jihadist doctrine, acts as means of recruiting and often gives the gives the group a seat at the political table. The open microphone by which the organization can justify its tactics can heard much clearer from a bread line in a refugee camp than in the assembly room of the UN. Mobilization connects the message to the people and creates “revolutionary atmosphere..
Benefits of Mobilization
Creates internal opposition
The organizations shapes and drives the message. Mobilization infiltrates the opposition and places pressure on those who are not loyal within a regime or administration. Open the door for defectors to become allies.
Reduces Civilian targets increase “Freedom Fighter” Perception.
While target attacks may weaken a enemy , they take a toll on the civilian population a group seeks to win over. Civilian attacks hurt civilians not a the entity in power.
Rock the Vote
The final, and perhaps most critical, factor in determining the success of UN PKOs in societies
emerging from or experiencing civil conflict is the holding of open, free, fair and competitive
elections. One can argue that this effect of such elections on longlasting peace cannot be