What crisis?

Over the past five days, North Korea has detonated its second nuclear device; test-fired at least six missiles of various types, announced it is no longer bound by the armistice that ended the Korean War, and threatened more "defensive measures" against the U.S. and South Korea.  

But don't worry, there's no "crisis" on the Korean peninsula.  If you don't believe us, just ask Defense Secretary Robert Gates. 

En route to a meeting of Pacific region defense chiefs, Mr. Gates told reporters on Friday that the situation in Korea hasn't reached the crisis stage, at least not yet.   

Glad he cleared that one up.  Of course, Mr. Gates' assessment begs a rather obvious question: if this isn't a crisis, then pray tell, what is.  Tensions on the peninsula are at their highest level since the infamous, 1976 "tree-cutting" incident--which resulted in the murder of two U.S. Army officers by North Korean troops--and the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968.  

And North Korea is doing everything it can to exacerbate the situation.  In the hours since Secretary Gates' made his comments, Pyongyang has test-fired a long-range surface-to-air missile (the same type that could be used to engage U.S. reconnaissance aircraft), and intelligence analysts have detected vehicle movement at a missile complex--the same one where the DPRK launched a crude ICBM in early April.     

Oh, and did we mention that Chinese fishing boats have vacated Korean waters in the middle of the lucrative crab season?  U.S. officials aren't sure if the departure was ordered by Beijing, or simply a decision by Chinese captains.  Apparently, the folks at Foggy Bottom have never watched an episode of The Deadliest Catch.  Chinese skippers devote the same effort to the Yellow Sea season that American captains put into their crabbing expeditions in the Bering Sea.  Put another way, it would take a cataclysmic event--and a directive from Beijing--to prompt a mass exodus by the Chinese crab fleet. 

In the meantime, U.S. and South Korean units have moved to WATCHCON 2, the second-highest readiness level for surveillance and intelligence-gathering activity.  That means that virtually every available ISR asset is focused on North Korea, in an effort to glean additional information on Pyongyang's intentions.  

Even General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff, felt compelled to tell reporters that our ground forces could handle a sudden attack from North Korea, despite the on-going demands of Iraq and Afghanistan.  The Army's 2nd Infantry Division has been based on the peninsula for more than 50 years, and currently backs up the South Korean units that man forward defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).  

Readers will note that General Casey didn't speculate as to whether 2 ID will be called into combat.  Fact is, Casey--and everyone else in the Pentagon--simply don't know.  Most of North Korea's combat power, roughly two-thirds of its army, is located within 60 miles of the DMZ.  That means that first and second-echelon invasion forces are located at their jumping-off points for a push against the south.  As the Defense Intelligence Agency cautioned a few years ago, North Korea has the ability to mount a limited invasion against the ROK, and the warning time would be measured in hours, not days.  

But it's not a crisis.  

In fairness to Mr. Gates, he is merely following the administration party line.  Despite the gravity of recent events, President Obama--and his national security team--have barely mentioned the situation in Korea, trying to deny Kim Jong-il the attention he craves.  But it's a little hard to ignore a nuclear test, given Pyongyang's propensity for sharing nuclear and missile technology with other rogue states.   That's why North Korea is still the top story for most papers and TV news programs, despite the administration's best efforts to manage our response and how it is covered.  

Indeed, it could argued that the DPRK's continuing belligerence has made a mockery of Mr. Obama and his policy.  In reaction to the nuclear test and recent missile launches, the President has turned to the United Nations, imploring the Security Council to pass another toothless resolution.  That sort of timid reply didn't exactly send shivers down Mr. Kim's spine, so the North Korean dictator has decided to continue his challenge.  If recently-detected activity is any indication, Pyongyang may be preparing for another ICBM test, literally challenging the U.S. to do something about it.  

Clearly, no one wants another Korean War, but there are steps the administration could take, short of conflict, that could deter North Korea.  For starters, the U.S. (along with South Korea, Japan and other regional partners) need to reimpose strict financial sanctions against Pyongyang.  Targeting the private bank accounts of the DPRK regime produced a burst of cooperation two years ago, because it denied Kim Jong-il of the cash needed to buy consumer goods and luxuries for his allies, ensuring their continued support.  

Additionally, the United States should tighten the maritime inspection regime imposed on North Korea.  Not only would it limit Pyongyang's WMD export activities, it would also complicate other activities that support the regime.  Keeping North Korean mother ships in port would curtail drug smuggling and counterfeiting, denying other sources of revenue for the DPRK.  The naval inspection program--make it a full-fledged quarantine--would also reduce the infiltration of North Korean agents into South Korea, reducing intelligence collection and potential sabotage efforts.  

Unfortunately, the current inspection program has a serious deficiency--it doesn't cover air routes.  Mr. Obama should lean hard on China (and other countries) to deny overflight and landing rights for cargo aircraft that travel between North Korean and its customers in the Middle East.  Elimination of the "air option"--coupled with the naval quarantine--would make it almost impossible for Kim Jong-il to ship his most important products to his most valuable customers. 

Of course, China can (and should) do much more to bring Pyongyang into line.  If Beijing continues to balk, there are other steps that the administration must take, including greater military aid to our allies; bolstering U.S. military forces in the region, moving our own tactical nukes back into South Korea, and encouraging both Seoul and Tokyo to pursue their own nuclear deterrents.  Collectively, those measures should convince Kim Jong-il (and his supporters in Beijing) that all options are on the table in dealing with the North Korean threat.                                        

Sadly, the chances that Mr. Obama will "get tough" with the DPRK are somewhere between "slim" and "none."  Pyongyang has judged the president to be weak, and will continue its program of provocation and confrontation, hoping to undermine the current ROK government, and strain our alliances with South Korea and Japan.   Kim Jong-il hasn't achieved those goals (yet), but he's making progress, thanks to a new administration that is failing its first, major foreign policy crisis.