International trade of weapons .... why does it matter?
Can the International Legal system must alter the sale of WMD's and destructive technologies? The development of the new Project-885 Yasen-class multi-purpose nuclear submarine has come into service with the Russian Navy. More advanced the Typhoon Class , Akula Class, Iada Class, is a clear rival to the U.S. Seawolf-class and Virginia-class submarines, the new vessel has been decades in the making, with designs originally completed back in 1991. This ship has the ability to counter US strike capability in the sea. If sold it can alter combat in the regions specially the Pacific. The top customer will no doubtably be the Indian Navy and possibly the People’s Republic Navy. What we don’t want to see is countries such as Iran could threaten Israel and Europe with such a weapon. There are no laws that govern the such trade of destructive technologies traded to countries that have WMD payloads. It is this capability that and th proliferation of sales of such technologies that should the primary focus of international legislation.
Legal theoretical application as it applies to Russia’s new toy.
A sovereign State can unilaterally withdraw from the NPT, what legal framework would govern such a withdrawal, and what the legal implications of such a withdrawal would be. In those pieces he considers the legal meaning and application of Article X(1) of the Non Proliferation Treaty ? Art. X of the Non Proliferation Treaty is similar to provisions of Art. XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (the essential security clause) which provide for the state to make its own determination of when it’s security interests have been imperiled. There have been cases before international investment arboreal tribunals considering similar clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties. But it is important to note that those clauses are worded differently from Art. X of the NPT or Art. XXI of the GATT, and in fact the ICJ hinted at this in the. And Art. X of the NPT is like the GATT clause because of the “if it decides” phrase.
The expansion of US/NATO coupled with the marginalization of Russian influence in European Policy is seen by the Russian Federation Provocative and in some cases even hostile. Lavrov and Deputy Prime Minister and former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov both explicitly rule out “Cold War” as a label for Russo-American relations, their subordinates are not so soothing. The Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr’ Losyukov, speaking in Tehran, said that” Washington was using Korea and Iran’s proliferation as an issue to consolidate its global strategic position, i.e., invoking those two states to justify its missile defense program. If this issue cannot be resolved by diplomatic means, he warned, Russia will carry out a series of military acts to balance and establish security.”
The encroachment of NATO by the addition of Poland and the rumors of Ukraine and even talks with Georgia a country in which Russia has a very hostile border dispute with lends itself to possible conflict. And this could prompt an arms race. This frosty warning, rather than the calculated, insincere, and misleading efforts to invoke Russo- American partnership, more accurately characterizes the present state of Russo-American relations even if they are far from the Cold War.
Russian “assertive pragmatism “ as it relates to the former Soviet Union can be firmly rooted in the ideology for Post Stalin leaders such as Khrushchev. Khrushchev took a far more pragmatic approach than his predecessors , keeping in mind he was the longest ruling Post Stalin leader of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev was a loyal member of the Communist Party starting in 1920. Khrushchev sought to find a lasting solution to the problem of a divided Germany and of the enclave of West Berlin deep within East German territory. Khrushchev sought to eliminate many conventional weapons, and defend the Soviet Union with missiles. Khrushchev abandoned Stalin's plans for a large navy, believing that the new ships would be too vulnerable to either conventional or nuclear attack.
NATO is the premier globalist institution design explicitly for the purpose of governing transatlantic security . The current trends of political, social, and economic globalization provide both challenges and opportunities for the international community. Some nations experience the forces of fragmentation while others experience integration. With these recent changes has come an increase in the number of conflicts, exacerbated by instability, social and economic injustice, and political competition. In this environment, the NATO has an uncontested role as the leading organization for the maintenance of peace and security, development of political stability, social and economic progress, and well-being. The issues of peace, governance, democracy, and development are closely interrelated and must be simultaneously addressed. This situation not only demands greater efforts by the Organization to find political and financial solutions, but also requires the United Nations to identify and explore appropriate and adequate human resources, particularly in this field.
Why Nuclear Submarine Weapon Systems Matter…..
Clausewitz defines war as “…an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will”, specifically defining force as physical force (Clausewitz Chp 1 pg 14). “A struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end.” Clausewitz outlines war as a form of control, and power is necessary to wage war, these factors must be included in a comprehensive description of war. Clausewitz argues that a new proposed comprehensive definition of war follows: War is a deliberate use of power meant to reduce or eliminate an enemy’s source of power in order to produce a favorable change in the opposition’s control structure (governance and policy).
However, political aims, and the actual process of carrying out policies, are a way to govern and therefore control. Clausewitz states that “Strategy is the use of an engagement for the purpose of war. Clausewitz confines his definition of strategy to wars objectives, but does state that “It used to be the custom to settle strategy in the capita and this works only if the government stays close to the army. Clausewitz even describes war as a game of chance, specifically referring to it as a game of cards. Therefore, the dichotomy that Clausewitz’s presents is this: If war is a game of chance. Clausewitz contends that war is merely a continuation of policy by other means. If you consider that policy is the method of control, then his statement is partially correct.
Clausewitz views statecraft as a by product of War he sees war a method or a tool for the initation of statecraft. One can Clausewitz’s trinity as a simplistic relationship between the people, the armed forces and the government, with scant regard for the subtle trinity that lies beneath this. Consequently, he regards ‘trinitarian’ warfare based on his revisionist model as only one type of historical warfare and therefore Clausewitz’s theories are, if not obsolete, then at least incapable of explaining the full spectrum of warfare either past or present. His argument hinges principally on a consideration of ‘low-intensity conflicts’ (LICs), which he believes to constitute the bulk of contemporary conflicts
How are his views applicable today?
When you compare Clausewitz views to our National Security Goals outlined in the Department of Defense in 2008.
1. Strengthen U.S./E.U. security posture in the region. 2. Advance constructive security initiatives and build
transnational and partner nation capacity and capabilities in the region. 3. Thwart the emergence of security threats (transnational and HN) in the region. 4. Contribute to U.S. and international initiatives to alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy. 5. Enable and improve cooperative security arrangements for improved multinational operating performance. By applying the concept that that “Strategy is the use of an engagement for the purpose of war. Clausewitz confines his definition of strategy to wars objectives la Clausewitz's establishes three major principles in the first three chapters and throughout his writings. The first being that war should never be seen in what he calls a “Purpose to itself”, rather a way of “physically forcing an entities opposition. To quote Clausewitz directly in chapter one he defines war and says “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, political commerce”. Clausewitz next principle is war falls into two categories; wars that disarm and wars that achieve limited aims. Clausewitz‘s third principle is that war tends to favor the party employing more force and resources.
Where Politicians fail Lawyers can and will Win
Proponents of nonproliferation offer rebuttals to every step of this argument. The most fundamental is that verification mechanisms are not intended to and never result in a “clean bill of health.” Verification mechanisms provide a degree of transparency that would be otherwise unavailable, enabling the international community to gain confidence about the intentions of member States. If a State’s covert weapons program successfully evades discovery, the panoply of policy options potentially available to other nations, e.g. the United States, is broadened by the existence of treaty mechanisms to resolve doubts about compliance and respond to suspicious activities. If those compliance mechanisms are insufficiently effective, the problem is not that multilateral for a are resorted to too often, but that they are too weak and should be strengthened.
The transfer of strategic missile, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technologies, materials, and expertise to terrorist states or groups including threats posed to regional independence by the suspected unsanctioned nuclear program remain
a significant threat to the region and International System. The current principal components of legal strategy to Central Asia have yield little progress in producing the legal framework for an efficient counter proliferation verification system. Only by developing a criminological approach to the monitoring tracking and inspection process will there the process become
efficient and effective.