"When you draw a Red Line in the Middle East or Africa it better unambiguous and unequivocal."
The US Syrian Relationship
US Syrian Affairs are bilateral in nature and have been for decades. The US should refrain from engaging the current administration and continue to push for a UN security counsel resolution authorizing NATO forces to stop the Syrian violence A number of issues ranging from the bombing of Marines Barracks in Lebanon to the nuclear program dismantled by Israeli strikes in 2006 to the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq have been the status quo. Hezbollah and Hamas are known terrorist groups that operate with the Sanction of the Syrian government and this will intensify as sanctions and international commendation intensify. The US has been openly opposed to the violent suppression of the current Syrian Regime. The US has petitioned the UN Security Council to pass a resolution that will allow the US and NATO to intervene but all attempts have be stalled by Russia and China. Syria’s support of Iran has also brought condemnation by the US and western powers. The Obama administration attempted should prepare to foster and recognize a new Syrian government and create a framework for relations once the hostilities have subsided.
War as defined
Clausewitz defines war as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will, specifically defining force as physical force. A struggle or competition between opposing forces or for a particular end.” Clausewitz outlines war as a form of control, and power is necessary to wage war, these factors must be included in a comprehensive description of war. Clausewitz argues that a new proposed comprehensive definition of war follows: War is a deliberate use of power meant to reduce or eliminate an enemy’s source of power in order to produce a favorable change in the opposition’s control structure (governance and policy).
However, political aims, and the actual process of carrying out policies, are a way to govern and therefore control.Clausewitz states that “Strategy is the use of an engagement for the purpose of war. Clausewitz confines his definition of strategy to wars objectives, but does state that “It used to be the custom to settle strategy in the capita and this works only if the government stays close to the army. Clausewitz even describes war as a game of chance, specifically referring to it as a game of cards. Therefore, the dichotomy that Clausewitz’s presents is this: If war is a game of chance. Clausewitz contends that war is merely a continuation of policy by other means. If you consider that policy is the method of control, then his statement is partially correct.
Clausewitz views statecraft as a by product of War he sees war a method or a tool for the initation of statecraft. One can Clausewitz’s trinity as a simplistic relationship between the people, the armed forces and the government, with scant regard for the subtle trinity that lies beneath this. Consequently, he regards ‘trinitarian’ warfare based on his revisionist model as only one type of historical warfare and therefore Clausewitz’s theories are, if not obsolete, then at least incapable of explaining the full spectrum of warfare either past or present. His argument hinges principally on a consideration of ‘low-intensity conflicts’ (LICs), which he believes to constitute the bulk of contemporary conflicts
Offense vs Defense
The Offense-defense theory was created by Robert Jervi. This theory has been two different variants, ie being the threat variant. The threat variant states that the greater the security threat a states faces the more aggressive they should become. The fundamental idea is the “states seek security and clash because their goals and actions threaten others security. The search and desire for security is a primary reason for wars and weapon proliferation. War is more likely when conquest is easy less likely when conquest is hard states fear conquest and aggress o avert it. The sub variant is fear violence against their citizens and aggresses to avert it. The second variant is called the opportunity variant which simply establishes the premises that the more easily a state can conquer the more aggressive they will become. A state will seize what its power will allow and an empire will grow a contract as its power rises and falls.
As the offense grows stronger, war is more likely to result in either the total victory or total defeat of a state’s army, and less likely to yield stalemate or small changes in territorial holdings. This means that offensive advantages make war less safe for leaders interested in retaining power in a capital city. When defense dominates, leaders can prosecute war “with little fear of being deposed or otherwise subjected by a conquering army. Robert Jervis argued that technological, geographical, and political factors that render offensive operations less costly and more effective tend to make security competition fiercer and wars more likely. This is significant to US national security because we have based our security plan solely on the basis of strength thus we armed ourselves with weapons and technology that gives us an offensive advantage. We do not defend our home territory we instead move with aggressive offensive tactical strategy that allows us to establish air, ground and sea dominance. We developed this tactic during WWII and have perfected it over the last six decades. This was apparent in the second Gulf war and in the Bosnian war. US forces established Air superiority using strikes by aircraft, cruise missiles strikes. The US uses its navy to support land and air missions and use ground forces to capture and maintain strategic outpost.
Non Interventionism vs. Interventionism
Internal sources base their opposition two factors. The first factor is exporting democracy they argue that countries citizens are the only ones who can promote democracy. The desire for and struggle for has to come from within. Christopher Coyne establishes that cooperation and self governance is a habit. Citizens volunteer cooperation around liberal democratic institutions as well as self sustaining. Cone stress the point that without independent development constant coercion and intervention will be needed i.e “nation building”. This position of intervention is simply motivated not mainly by the desire to spread democracy but on behalf of more self-interested objectives. Sometimes the motivating force is national interest, and promoting democracy is how policymakers sell the war-and subsequent occupation- to the American public.
The second factor is that those who support nonintervention also base their arguments that the promotion of democracy add, that democracies are not necessarily peaceful in their relations with other kinds of political systems. Owens argues that democratic peace is vulnerable in three areas: Still, they insist that sovereign stable democracies have never waged war with each other in the modern international system. “The first it contains two inherent ambiguities, democracy is immeasurable, democracy is undefined and lastly democratic peace lacks a convincing theoretical foundation (Owen). The ability to conjugate democracy will determine the effectiveness of democratic peace. Democracy is more likely to emerge in countries whose neighbors are democratic, presumably due to the cross-border exchanges and peer-to-peer learning that close proximity allows between nations.
External sources and regional stability
Propositions argue that the peace between democracies is based on shared democratic norms or political institutions. The relationship of relative peace among democracies is a result of some features of democracy; and it is not caused exclusively by economic or geopolitical characteristics of the state. External sources argue in support a semi pluralist and semi globalist position. Pluralism is created on a different set assumptions than a realistic form of government in pluralism we see that this form uses a multiple bodies working cohesively to produce policy rather than one solitary entity. No one body actually rules yet they rule by consensus of the cooperative bodies. In globalism there are three fundamental assumptions: The first is that the origins of relations between democratic nations exist only in a global context. The second assumption is all international relations between democratic nations are viewed from historical context, and last coalitions between democratic nations focus on the mechanism of domination. When examining exporting democracy, one cannot help but draw the conclusion that organizations such as the United Nations, World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the infamous International Atomic Energy Agency. Under the primary assumption the “big picture” ideology is paramount and primary to the approach to actual governance. The idea that the parts are less important to the whole is the mission and policy of exporting democracy. This assumption makes no room for nationalism or protectionism.
Using Leverage vs. International Trade to promote stability
Leverage does not work in the long term promotion and sustainment of democracy. Leverage is used to target external exposure and is defined by non interventionist like Coyne also argue that the method in which the promotion of democracy occurs is a paramount as the motivation, and can yield more counterproductive results to a nation state. Goldsmith argues that the use of leverage or “gun barrel” diplomacy or “military interventionism” is the proposed policy of nonintervention and free trade does not work in the case of failed states. On page 12 of "Making the World Safe for Partial Democracy? Questioning the Premises of Democracy Promotion" Arthur Goldsmith states that the relative absence of pluralistic political systems in the Greater Middle East thus also works against the emergence of additional institutionally consistent democratic regimes across that region (Arthur).
The US is in no position to intervene a civil war yet t must do so..... The window for that passed in 2010. The willingness for the international community to take action passed in January after President Obama drew a "Red Line".. Assad crossed it and we tried to act as though he had not. He called our bluff as he is know and the difference is we don't have the political capital domestic of internationally to do a thing and Im not sure if we really want too. A strike will do nothing but make us choose a side . We should have done something 3 yeas ago . If you want jihadist pouring in to Syria to train only to carry out ops in Europe and the US thens strike. A better question is who would run Syria the Islamist yeah thats exactly what Turkey Israel, Iraq, and Jordan wants. The United States will without doubt force the Arab League to pressure the UN Security Council which in tern will draw the Russians and Chinese to act. The US will in accordance France neutralize the SCUD long range missiles and allow French forces to secure critical chemical sites.