U.S. 'Watchdog' of $51 billion Afghan reconstruction fund lacks electronic filing system

Feel no shame if you had to read the above headline twice, because after spotting this finding in a performance assessment of the so-called “watchdog” group of the Afghanistan reconstruction program, I had to assay the bloody thing three times myself for fear I had happened upon an Onion pasquinade.

Unfortunately, it is true – the people in charge of monitoring how $51 billion of taxpayer funds are being spent in Afghanistan lack the most basic processes and tools that are typically required to track anything effectively.

The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), a department whose raison d'être is to conduct audits and investigations of reconstruction programs to detect and prevent waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer dollars, received a failing grade by the council of government auditors in a newly released SIGAR quality assessment. Essentially an audit of the auditors, the blistering report pointed out some of the most fundamental of deficiencies and according to the AP:

The review found the Afghanistan reconstruction inspector general did not train investigators in use of firearms and deadly force, did not even have a policy on firearms, and lacked an electronic filing system to collect important information — including data to measure investigators' performance.

Considering Afghanistan’s notorious yet certainly well-warranted reputation for corruption along with reports that people like Ahmed Wali Karzai have embezzled hundreds of millions of dollars of foreign aid, it’s a tad concerning that the very group assigned to track the $51 billion committed to Afghan reconstruction since 2001 (an endowment, incidentally, that shall reach $71 billion next year) - does not sustain an electronic filing system. According to the report:

Prior to late November 2009, files were practically maintained in raw form in Afghanistan. In November 2009, a simple but generally effective and efficient case management system was developed at SIGAR’s headquarters. Though no policy was put in place at the time, a practice did develop which sufficiently centralized information management functions. The most debilitating variable in this regard noted by the peer review team, and shared by SIGAR management, is the lack of an electronic file maintenance system. The team noted that SIGAR management is aggressively pursuing the identification of such a system, and information management issues are likely to diminish rapidly following adoption and deployment.

The problem was not so much that the policies were poor or subpar, the larger overarching concern was their non-existence. What did exist were facsimiles of another country's policies because SIGAR apparently took the SIGIR manual (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction) and had it mass-produced by Kinko's. The least those personnel executing this firecracker of an idea could have done is modify the logos on the documents to match the insignia of our new host nation:

In sum and substance, there were nearly no official investigative policies and procedures in place prior to March 2010 and, therefore, no investigative activities in compliance therewith. Policies and procedures found in the “SIGAR Agent Manual” were almost entirely verbatim copies of policies and procedures borrowed from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (hereafter SIGIR). Many of these borrowed policies and procedures bore watermarks (evidently as received from SIGIR) indicating they were in draft form. Policies not coming from the SIGIR manual were largely formulated and formally adopted in the weeks immediately preceding the Quality Assessment Review (QAR) and were virtual mirrors of the QAR standards which lacked implementation processes.

Other weaknesses included a lack of training programs for investigators and there were no clear quality standards for conducting investigations. SIGAR was not monitoring the quality of its work, was inconsistent in following its own audit plan and, in about half its reports, failed to clearly state their objective.

The auditors asked Attorney General Eric Holder to consider suspending or rescinding SIGAR’s law enforcement powers. Holder will determine whether SIGAR will be stripped of its investigative powers, such as the power to make arrests, issue warrants, carry firearms, etc.

Major General Arnold Fields, USMC (ret), who was appointed the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction in July of 2008, was the chief of staff of the Iraq Reconstruction effort from August 2004 to October 2005 where he coordinated the execution of $18 billion of U.S. appropriated funds. So, there were signs from jump street that this department would have problems.

Stuart Bowen, the current head of SIGIR, estimated that between 2003 and 2008 approximately $3 billion had been wasted in Iraq as a result of mismanagement or outright corruption. This statistic is worthy of mention for several reasons not the least of which being that not only was Fields a part of the aforesaid mismanagement of reconstruction funds in Iraq but if you asked Fields how much has been mismanaged in Afghanistan within the last year the General would probably answer with the thousand-yard stare because he would not know. And Fields certainly wouldn’t go scrambling to get his hands on reports that summarize any meaningful numbers because that would entail extracting data from disparate systems and at the very least somewhere along the line would necessitate a filing system of the electronic variety.

Many congressional leaders felt the retired two-star General was not cut out for the watchdog role in the first place and began to suspect as much when they began comparing him to his Iraq counterpart who produced 14 reports in its first year while SIGAR produced only two. And the two reports SIGAR did present were deemed substandard because they didn’t dig deep enough and they neglected projects that were thought to be more ripe for corruption and misuse.

A former departmental inspector general who knows Fields explained in a Time magazine article last year that Fields might have too much of a military mindset for civilian oversight:

"I like Arnie Fields, I knew him from Iraq [where Fields worked for 14 months until October 2005 for the U.S. embassy in Baghdad as the chief of staff of the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office] but he comes from the military, and military IG mind-sets are very different from the departmental IGs. The military IGs are about being a support and help — and sort of the eyes and ears of the commander within the unit. Departmental IG is about waste, fraud and abuse, stewarding taxpayer dollars, and I am not sure he has moved fully from the former to the latter."

One has to be a bulldog as an inspector general and be willing to send people to jail, like Stuart Bowen has, and some doubt Fields has that brazenness within. Another retired military man close to Fields thought it was not a good role for Fields to take on personality-wise: “I know him very well. He is a helluva nice guy [but] he is painfully shy and desperately anxious to please — it's a total misfit.”

Last December three senators - Claire McCaskill, D-MO, Susan Collins, R-ME, and Tom Coburn, R-OK - sent President Obama a letter that said SIGAR lacked “leadership and focus at a time when aggressive, independent oversight is more important than ever.”

Perhaps a watchdog group is needed to oversee the watchdog group. Whatever the solution, the crucial point is if  these dollars are not more intently watched the brothers Karzai will not hesitate to rob the American people blind.  Or should I say continue to rob them so.

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