In a surprising turn of events, it was announced that the U.S. will not be signing onto the current draft of the proposed EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Citing that the current draft as worded is too restrictive, Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, said during a January 12th breakfast that it was clear from the beginning that the Administration was not going along with the Code. While the current draft has not been rejected outright, according to another government official the Code could be used as a basis for another international agreement.
This announcement is in stark contrast to suggestions by the Administration that the Code was on a fast-track for signing. At a meeting of the FAA’s Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) Space Transportation Operations Working Group (STOWG) on August 4, 2011, Richard Buenneke, senior advisor for space policy for the US Department of State, updated the STOWG on the review of the Code and noted that the Code was under review by the Department of Defense to determine how the Code might impact United States military operations in particular its space operations and security. He further elaborated that the United States was interested in the Code, but would not sign the document in 2011. Any intentions to sign onto the Code in 2012 were left in limbo when the U.S. announced later in 2011 that it would refrain from signing the Code until an undetermined time.
The first draft of the Code was published by the EU in 2008. A revised draft was made public in September 2010. Among its other provisions, the Code urges states to desist from actions that could damage or destroy other satellites or interfere with their communications, as well as minimizing the risk of collisions, and limiting the creation of orbital space debris. The preamble of the Code sets out the goal to form a set of best practices aimed at ensuring security in outer space that could become a useful complement to international space law.
Although the Code was championed by the European Council and found support with Canada and Japan and initially the United States, other nations such as Russia, China, India and Brazil have distanced themselves from it. India in particular raised concerns about the Code. Specifically India was concerned that the Code was not a legally-binding instrument, that it replicated existing domestic policies of nations considering it, that the EU did not consult with the Asian-Pacific nations when drafting the Code, that the Code was too ambiguous and that the Code's effectiveness would be weakened if it was administered by the EU. China objected to the Code's insistence that states who adopt it must share information on their domestic national space policies, including objectives for security and defense related activities. China also took the position that matters relating to orbital space debris should not be included in the Code.
U.S. concerns over the Code stem from within the Department of Defense whereby it might restrict the scope of future operations in outer space. There were also concerns among Republicans lawmakers in Congress that signing onto the Code might give away too much in terms of U.S. national security. These concerns were aggravated by the view that the U.S. should take custody of the Code from the EU and modify it to address its security interests. There was further concern that the U.S. as one of the chief space-faring nations did not have an ownership interest in the Code, which prompted the view that the U.S. should take over custody of the Code not only to address its own national security concerns, but also to promote it to other nations. However, the prospect of surrendering the Code to the U.S. did not go over well with the EU, and despite this the U.S. believes that an international code of conduct for space activities should be implemented, although when and what form it will take is unknown.
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