A number of recent events leads one to a simple conclusion: the United States alliance system is broken. What I mean is the United States is unable to incentivize the type of behavior for its allies that is consistent with its policy objectives. In fact, it usually incentivizes the exact opposite behavior. While this has often, and especially recently, lead the U.S. to criticize allies, few if any have even directly acknowledged the larger problem at hand.
In a widely circulated article on U.S.-Pakistani relations after bin Laden’s death, terrorism expert Lawrence Wright wrote, “The Pakistani Army and the I.S.I. were in the looking-for-bin-Laden business, and if they found him they’d be out of business.” Wright’s observation was absolutely correct. Moreover, whether to retain its strategic importance to the United States or pursue its self perceived (short-sighted) interests, all evidence suggests that it continues to pursue similar policies.
For instance, while furious that the United States refused to share the intelligence regarding bin Laden, the Washington Post reports that the United States has recently been more forthcoming in sharing intelligence on militants’ whereabouts. The result has been that militants relocate soon after the Pakistani security and intelligence services obtain this information.
The one shortcoming in Wright’s observation is he applies it to Pakistan exclusively. Elsewhere across the world, however, U.S. allies engage in similar (if less blatant and offensive) activities.
Take our partnership with President Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan. Since the Bonn conference in 2001, the huge influx of money into Afghanistan has allowed Karzai government officials to amass enormous personal fortunes and buy the loyalty of important Afghan powerbrokers. These same officials, however, have been all too happy to allow the Western forces to perform the overwhelming majority of the basic services governments are tasked with. Instead of being the reliable partner government that counterinsurgency requires, most agree that the Karzai government is one of the largest factors fueling the insurgency.
This shouldn’t come as a surprise as the Karzai administration has every incentive to keep the Western forces engaged in Afghanistan. Effectively governing would be antithesis to this goal. The United States has helped reinforce this point to Karzai at every turn by redoubling its commitment each time the situation deteriorated further. Thus, incompetence rules supreme.
Though less extreme, the same general trend has befuddled U.S. relations with NATO. Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. officials have repeatedly pressed their European allies to assume a greater role in their own security. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made news on Friday for his harsh lashing of NATO Allies’ miniscule defense spending (despite the attention from the press, this was far from the first time Gates made this criticism). While Gates frustration is understandable, it is at least partially misplaced because, while constantly demanding more from its European allies, the U.S. has been quick to pledge its unconditional support to maintaining the lion’s share of the burden of the alliance. Is it any wonder that European politicians have focused on domestic issues reassured that their security was accounted for by the U.S.? Increasing their defense budgets would be quite an odd decision given that it’s the most likely way to have the U.S. reduce its own contributions. What politician prefers to devote large chunks of the government budget to defense when its domestic issues that win elections?
Certainly not Japan whose alliance with the U.S. has danced to the tune of the very same drum. As WWII became the Cold War, Japanese leaders aptly recognized their country’s strategic value to the United States. In what became known as the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan readily agreed to allow the United States to provide for its external defense. Freed from the burden of defense, Japanese leaders aggressively pursued economic growth.
Before too long, Japan’s economy hadn’t just recovered from the war but also prospered. As Japan’s wealth accumulated, however, successive U.S. administrations pressured them to take on a bigger role in their security. These pleas fell on deaf ears, however- save for the few instances when Japanese officials became truly alarmed that America’s patience was wearing thin. During these “crises,” Japan would offer minuscule concessions, such as contributing to the costs of basing U.S. troops in their country.
Change only began after the Cold War when China’s power was ascending while the U.S. was harboring a lasting grudge over Japan’s refusal to provide troops to the first Gulf War effort. By then, however, the Japanese officials had grown so inept that effective leadership remained elusive, as best demonstrated by their failure to muster a response to the decade long financial crisis of the 1990’s. While Japan’s economy finally improved, the leadership vacuum mostly hasn’t, as the response to the recent natural and nuclear disasters made all too clear.
The United States should not return to isolationism, if such a thing is even possible in current times. The benefits the United States accumulates through some policies, such as its current role in NATO, may make pursuing them well worth the cost. Yet these are questions to be debated. Should we decide the status quo is the most preferable option, than we should stop insisting otherwise. If, on the other hand, we continue to have the same objectives as we now profess, then we need to realign our policies to achieve these.
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