When one hears the phrase, The Few, the Proud, the Marines! images fill the mind of brave men and women who follow in the footsteps of their forbearers to protect America. When played by the President’s own, the Marine Band, patriotic goosebumps break out on one’s arms as the notes of the Marine Hymn fill the air. It is hard to image such a magnificent group once stood in harm’s way of being dismantled.
Such was the case between 1943 and 1947. After giving their best on the beaches of Normandy and elsewhere during World War II, the United States Marine Corps now faced the chopping block. During the debate between the Army and Navy, the Marine Corps was now being treated like an unwelcome red-headed stepchild.
February 23, 1945, Marine Lt. General H. M. Smith stood alongside Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal to watch as the American flag was raised atop Mount Suribachi. The event deeply moved the SecNav’s heart. He turned to the general and stated, “The raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years.”
With the surrender of Japan, the war sword went into the sheath. One month later, however, the bureaucratic knives came out and the situation for the Marines did a drastic ‘180’ as the Corps was thrown into a fight for its very survival.
Following World War II, calls went out to reorganize the nation’s armed forces. The dismal lack of preparedness which revealed itself after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor now had people talking about the need to reorganize the military during the post-war period. The unification bill passed by the Senate in 1947 failed to provide necessary safeguards for the Corps' missions. “This bill [S. 2044] gives the War Department a free hand in accomplishing its expressed desire to reduce the Marine Corps to a position of military insignificance.” Had the House of Representatives also passed the bill, it would have spelled the end of the United State Marine Corps.
The process began on November 2, 1943 when Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall presented a proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding post-war unification. Appalled at America’s lack of preparedness prior to World War II, Marshall wrote, “As sick as any (nation) was the United States of America. We had no field army. There were the bare skeletons of three and one half divisions scattered in small pieces throughout the United States. It was impossible to train even those few troops as divisions because motor transport and other facilities were lacking and funds for adequate maneuvers were not appropriated. The Air Force consisted of a few partially equipped squadrons serving continental United States, Panama, Hawaii and the Philippines; their planes were largely obsolescent and could have hardly survived a single day's aerial combat. We lacked modern arms and equipment. When President Roosevelt proclaimed on September 8, 1939 that a limited emergency for the United States we were in terms of available strength not even a third rate military power.”
Marshall had no desire to return the military to the pre-World War II status quo. The U.S. Navy in 1939 was the third largest in the world and spent more money on one battleship than was shelled out to the Army for its entire budget. That same year, the U.S. Army rated seventeenth in size, in line behind Yugoslavia. Marshall felt the inequality of the budget process played a major role in the number of lives lost by the Army as a result of being forced to build up for mobilization.
Marshall’s unification plan drew a line in the sand which created inter-service struggles. These struggles served to pit Army against Navy, Army against Marines and Navy against Marines. It boiled down to the fact the Marine Corps was faced with having to do battle with the Army and the War Department.
One would ask, “Why the struggle? Is it not the goal of each branch of the military to protect the United States; thus making the playing field equal?” Yes, and no. As to protecting the United States, the answer is ‘Yes’; with regard to the playing field being equal – ‘No’. Lt. Gen. Victor Krulak, a key participant during this struggle explained things this way:
“In time of peace the armed services compete for dollars, in time of war they compete for military tasks and material priority. We find ourselves in competition all the time. Add to this the leavening of pride in your uniform and your service and you can see at once that there are the ingredients of a constant conflict. Now this conflict need not take virulent form, but when dollars are hard to get or the tasks are subject of great competition, it can become virulent as it has in the past.”
The bitter attitude the Army now showed towards the Marines during reorganization had its roots in World War I. In 1916, a proposal was sent by the Army General Staff to the joint Army-Navy Board. This proposal required any mixed contingent group of Army and Marine troops be commanded exclusively by the Army. The Army considered the Marine officers ‘ipso facto’ and less fitted for high command. The effect the comment had on the morale of the Marine officers will be left to the imagination of the reader. Thankfully the proposal later died an appropriate death.
During World War I, the Marines comprised a portion of the American Expeditionary Force. When the Marines were highlighted in an article received at Belleau Wood, the headline read, "OUR MARINES ATTACK--Gain Mile at Veiully," Army officers seethed over the one-sided publicity. The Chicago Daily Tribune did nothing to help the situation with their headline, "Marines Win Hot Battle—Sweep Enemy from Heights." The praises for the Marines were unceasing. Every time success was achieved, the Marines were inundated with loud praise, while the Army troops which made up a part of the same Division received no recognition at all for their efforts.
Add to this the fact General Pershing’s operations officer during World War I, George C. Marshall, rubbed additional salt into the wound with his hatred of the Marines. He told wartime Chief of Naval Operation, Ernest J. King; "I am going to see that Marines never win another war."
The Army was not the only participant in this attitude tug-of-war. The Marines did a little salting of their own during the Smith vs. Smith controversy. Marine Major General Holland M. Smith, commander of ground forces in Saipan, recommended that Army Major General Ralph C. Smith, commander of the Army's 27th Division be relieved of command. Holland believed Ralph lacked aggressiveness.
Lt. Gen. Robert C. Richardson, Admiral Nimitz's senior Army commander in the Central Pacific, added fuel to the fire of the already volatile situation when he convened a board to review whether or not the relief of Ralph Smith was warranted. Richardson had previously expressed publicly his low opinion of the Marine officers' ability to handle units above the Division level. Rumor had it when Marshall read Richardson's report; he angrily vowed he would never permit another soldier to serve under Marine command.
A group of Marine officers, collectively known as the Chowder Society, now entered into this fracas, and by doing so put their careers on the line. They helped to defeat the proposed legislation, plus a number of the officers assisted with drafting the National Security Act of 1947, the legislation that spells out Marine Corps roles and missions even today.
The challenge faced by the Chowder Society was immense. A way needed to be found by which to defend the existence of the Marine Corps without appearing close-minded. The group was also forced to learn – quickly – the art of political lobbying. Standing before them were formidable foes, seething for victory on their side. Numbered among the heavyweights were President Harry S. Truman, a former Army artillery officer during World War I; Army Chief of Staff General Dwight D. Eisenhower; the War Department and on some occasions, the Department of the Navy.
The small, loose-knit group was led by Brig. Gen. Gerald Carthrae Thomas. Additional members included Medal of Honor recipient Brig. Gen. Merritt A. Edson, Col. Robert E. Hogaboom, Col. James E. Kerr, Col. Merrill B. Twining, Lt. Col. Robert D. Heinl, Lt. Col. James D. Hittle, Lt. Col. E.H. Hurst, Lt. Col. Victor Krulak, Lt. Col. James C. Murray, Lt. Col. DeWolf Schatzel, Lt. Col. Samuel R. Shaw, Maj. Jonas M. Platt, and Marine Corps Reserve officers Russell Blandford, Arthur Hansen, Lyford Hutchins, and William McCahill – truly “the few.”
Shortly after Christmas 1945, General Thomas managed to obtain copies of documents from meetings held by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These would comprise part of what was later called the Series of 1478 JCS Papers.
In one document, the Navy appeared willing to make a sacrificial lamb of the Marine Corps in return for preserving naval aviation. In two others, JCS 1478/10 and 1478/11, the attack on the Marine Corps was direct. Army Air Force Gen. Carl Spaatz referred to the Marine Corps' amphibious operations of World War II as “patently an incursion into the roles of both the Army and the Air Force.” He recommended “the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available, and lightly armed units no larger than a regiment.”
Not to be left out, Army Chief of Staff General Dwight Eisenhower continued the attack. He proposed future use of the Marine Corps be relegated to the role of “initially bridging the gap between the sailor on the ship and the soldier on the land.” He echoed Spaatz’s sentiments about Marine units not exceeding a regiment in size without the need to appreciably expand the size in time of war.
Since the documents were marked “Top Secret,” even though the Marine Corps had access to the papers, they could not use the information in their defense. According to Krulak, “… blunt and brutal though they were, [the documents] proved to be a blessing in disguise, for they removed all doubt of the fate of the Corps as planned by the Army.”
Though the name ‘Chowder Society’ was taken from the popular Barnaby syndicated comic strip, there was nothing comical in reference to what the group accomplished. They can be credited for having saved the Marines Corps, while being put in the position of having to overcome hostility from fellow Marines who failed to understand or appreciate their work. Even more important, they also preserved the Constitution’s provision of civilian oversight of the military.
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