Writing for Huffpost Religion, Rabbi Alana Suskin has argued that with all its history of human rights abuses, religion is still a better basis for human rights than secularism. I disagree.
To begin with, she addresses the claim that "religious people are a sort of automation for God's whim:"
While I can't speak for all faiths, the answer is clearly, "No." Within Jewish tradition there are clear precedents of arguing with God... In the Jewish tradition, starting in the Torah, there is a strong current of approbation for the faithful Jew who challenges God.
Ignoring the slightly pompous insinuation that Jewish tradition is better than those other more dogmatic religions, we need to recognize that this "answer" doesn't address the accusation. We atheists do not argue that religious people become unthinking executors of God's will. So... even if the Rabbi is correct, it's not really pertinent.
The argument against religious moral foundations is that the lack of an empirical "reality check" allows believers to alter their ethics towards whatever evil they desire. Because the appeal to revelation defies and even contradicts empiricism, there is no way to effectively argue against a religious person who is convinced that evil is actually good. It's not that believers are unthinking. It's that when they do think, their ultimate loyalty is to a "higher authority," not empirical reality.
Suskin next moves to a criticism of secular moral philosophy:
Secular morality hasn't any more to do with reason -- and perhaps less -- than those of the religious person. Each and every one of us lives in a society that determines our feelings of what is "natural," "right" and "rational." These cultural biases are difficult to examine because they are like water to a fish -- so ubiquitous and so pervasive, we simply do not notice them. Are the norms of one's society,which are so deeply embedded within us that they feel "natural," a compass toward what is right and good?
Her first statement is objectively false. In highlighting the logistical problems of secular moral theorists' attempts to describe an "ultimate" morality, she has ignored the elephant in the room. Science has given us a clear understanding of morality. And what it has told us is this: Morality is not an "ultimate" prescription of what to do or not to do. It is an evolutionary patchwork of prosocial and antisocial tendencies which work relatively well on a macro level, but cannot prescribe the perfect action in every individual situation.
The Rabbi is correct. Secularism cannot prescribe one cultural norm which will work for all people. But in being correct, she has missed the boat. The presumption that there is one "ultimate" cultural norm is a religious one, not a scientific one. She is presuming that we ought to be able to prescribe one morality that will work for everybody. In effect, she's assumed religion's moral model and then awarded it the prize for not being scientific.
Religion offers us a place to stand and examine the cultures in which we live. When we live and breathe the ways of our faith, it gives us a compass by which to measure societal norms as separate from ourselves.
Secularism offers us a place to stand and examine the culture in which we live. When we live and breath the ways of our observations of empirical reality, it gives us a compass by which to measure societal norms as separate from ourselves.
In contrast, examining the beliefs of one's society without chalking them up to what is "natural" is like trying to rebuild a boat while it is sailing.
I'm sorry... what?
Perhaps that is why it was people of faith who led the fight for universal suffrage in the U.S., why Gandhi is revered for his nonviolent revolt against the British in India, and why the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. is a hero to people of all colors throughout the world for his stand to unionize African-Americans and support their fight for dignity and civil rights.
Um... historical fact check much? Actually, the most vehement opponents of suffrage and race equality in history have also been religious. So I don't think the existence of a minority of dissidents who challenged religious tradition is a good argument for the ultimate goodness of religion.
Finally, if God commanded (for example) a faithful Jew to do something immoral, would that person do so? If, in general, the Judge of the earth does do justly, then if a command seems unjust, we must think deeply about whether the command is actually immoral. If we conclude that it is, then we must also ask if we have misunderstood it. And indeed, we find that the history of Jewish law, is not just the text as written in the scrolls of the Torah, but rather is a development of a body of law that responds to history via those scrolls, constantly asking: Is this right? Is this just?
In other words, the good Rabbi is recommending that we not use our religious convictions as the ultimate judge of morality. Instead, we should ask ourselves whether our religion is right or just. In arguing for religion's superior moral foundation, she's recommended that we transcend purely religious convictions with empirical reasoning. How ironic.
Religious practice is based on the assumption that God desires the just and the good. Thus, suggesting that the religious are bound to do whatever God says even if God commands us to do something immoral makes no sense.
Religious practice is based on the assumption that God's conception of the just and the good transcends human understanding. In so assuming, it removes morality from empiricism and creates ultimate subjectivity. This is in contrast to empirical morality, which has as its only criteria the objective consequences of actions. We secularists judge right and wrong by how our actions effect those around us. The religious add a new dimension in which such consequences can (and often are) rendered superfluous in contrast to "deeper" spiritual commitments.
Far more powerful than choosing to guard human rights, the religious have an obligation to protect them.
With all due respect, Rabbi, come back to me when religion shows any empirical signs of actually living up to this alleged obligation.














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