Afghanistan's Korengal: The Valley of Death (Adam Ferguson for TIME)
There’s an old saying in the military: “amateurs study strategy, and professionals study logistics,” that has been attributed to General Omar Bradley, but it’s a maxim that's been preached by the likes of Napoleon, Helmuth von Moltke, and Carl von Clausewitz. Regardless the source, the truth is that supply chain management is one of the issues that can make or break Obama’s latest war plan, because nothing presents logistical nightmares like trying to jam 30,000 U.S. troops into a country like Afghanistan - in accelerated fashion.
Undersecretary of Defense Ashton B. Carter underlined this reality: “Next to Antarctica, Afghanistan is probably the most incommodious place to be trying to fight a war. It’s landlocked, rugged, the road network is much thinner than Iraq and it has fewer airports.”
Adm. Michael Mullen, chairmen of the Joint Chief of Staff echoed this sentiment last week, saying that the logistical challenges of supporting the 30,000-troop surge in Afghanistan will be "significantly greater than Iraq.”
Yet, one wonders why the issue of logistics hasn’t been put under a microscope like all of the other concerns during the recent Senate and House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs committees. This is a question that's been at the forefront of Melvin A. Goodman's mind, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, and 24-year veteran of the CIA's intelligence directorate, who wrote in the Baltimore Sun recently:
In most wartime situations, the equipment and supplies, which the military refers to as "beans, bullets and black oil" (in layman's terms, food, ammo and fuel), arrive by sea to the war zone. Because Afghanistan is landlocked, U.S. aid will have to be sent to Karachi, Pakistan, then trucked through Pakistan across the Khyber Pass into the war zone.
This is a serious and dangerous trek, exacerbated by insurgent attacks along the way. The Central Intelligence Agency has been bribing insurgent groups, including the Taliban, to desist from attacking these convoys. Nevertheless, U.S. military supplies have been lost to both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. The Soviet military had similar problems in the 1980s, when mujahedeen forces frequently closed the Salang Tunnel, which bypassed the Hindu Kush and linked north and south Afghanistan.
One of the biggest differences is that unlike Iraq, which had Kuwait, Afghanistan has no staging area. Not to mention Afghanistan lacks any comparable road system and lacks large air bases. Most roads are in fact donkey trails that are very familiar to the Taliban and not suitable for mechanized U.S. forces, and the bridges that do exist are mostly made of mud. The country has some of the highest mountains in the world, and only five passes are available to get supplies into Afghanistan by land.
Mr. Goodman concludes:
It is long past time for the Congress to pursue all of the logistical issues; until then, the debate about deadlines, drawdowns and exit strategy will have little meaning.
However, according to Air Force Gen. Duncan J. McNabb of U.S. Transportation Command (Transcom), the U.S. military logisticians are up for the challenge and will be able to handle the demands being placed on it. Although they had transferred 21,000 service members earlier in the year, winter will make the effort much more challenging.
About 50% of cargo and supplies is brought in through the main supply route that runs through Pakistan from the port of Karachi. Another 30% uses the Northern Distribution Route, which is a series of railroad routes running from northern Europe and the Black Sea, and the final 20% comes by air.
Defense Logistics Agency Director Navy Vice Adm. Alan Thompson attests that the wheels have been churning and DLA’s supply chain is ready to absorb the shocks to the system. The Defense Supply Center Philadelphia – which provides food, construction material, medical items, clothing and individual equipment – is already working with local subsistence prime vendors to provide additional fresh fruit and vegetable deliveries, and are also arranging to increase the production of items like lumber and housing, which will be wanted commodities during the initial surge.
Defense Supply Center Richmond, Va. Is working to boost helicopter support that is one of the most critical means for getting supplies into the troops, because Afghanistan’s archaic roads and steep terrain make it difficult to move equipment.
General McNabb told Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the U.S. Central Command commander, and Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan, “that our job is to make sure we give you lots of options, and that we’re going to get the stuff through.”
And McNabb emphasized that Transcom has the assets needed to make it happen: “If I have to bring this stuff all in by air, it will be a lot more expensive,” he said. “But if we need to do that, we can, and that’s our ace in the hole.”
Currently Transcom officials are working with U.S. Central Command and with U.S. Joint Forces Command to work out the scheduling of the move. But, according to McNabb the key to success isn’t really getting the forces and supplies to the destination: “Right now, the transportation and movement is not the long pole in the tent; getting those bases built and ready to receive the forces is."
Related and Recent Articles
Afghanistan snapshots: war, protest and civilian casualties (slideshow)
Barack Obama & The Rise of Metrosexual Neoconservatism
Flight of the Osprey: the controversial aircraft's debut in Afghanistan (Photo Essay)
Soviet General: U.S. doomed to repeat history in Afghanistan
Obama's Afghanistan speech triggers bipolar global reaction
Pakistan more critical than Afghanistan to U.S. security strategy
Afghanistan stabilization may depend on Indo-Pakistani reconciliation
Comments