Fred Zain worked as a "forensic expert" in West Virginia for 13 years. This was followed by a 3 year stint at the San Antonio, Texas crime laboratory as chief serologist. While the amount of time he worked in forensic science is impressive, his record is tainted by the fact that the test results were consistently and routinely compromised by his own failure to comply with generally accepted standards of the day. He consistently provided prosecutors and law enforcement officers with results that supported their theory of the case - even when the science didn't support it.
A subsequent investigation of Zain’s actions found the following:
"The acts of misconduct on the part of Zain included
(1) overstating the strength of results;
(2) overstating the frequency of genetic matches on individual pieces of evidence;
(3) misreporting the frequency of genetic matches on multiple pieces of evidence;
(4) reporting that multiple items had been tested, when only a single item had been tested;
(5) reporting inconclusive results as conclusive;
(6) repeatedly altering laboratory records;
(7) grouping results to create the erroneous impression that genetic markers had been obtained from all samples tested;
(8) failing to report conflicting results;
(9) failing to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting results;
(10) implying a match with a suspect when testing supported only a match with the victim; and
(11) reporting scientifically impossible or improbable results." (Footnote omitted).
In the Matter of an Investigation of the West Virginia State Police Crime Laboratory, Serology Division, (WV. 1993) http://www.truthinjustice.org/zainreport.htm
One might reasonably ask, "How on earth could this have happened?" According to the same Supreme Court decision, an audit performed by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLAD) made findings about the culture of the crime lab that may have contributed to this behavior, including the following:
"(1) no written documentation of testing methodology;
(2) no written quality assurance program;
(3) no written internal or external auditing procedures;
(4) no routine proficiency testing of laboratory technicians;
(5) no technical review of work product;
(6) no written documentation of instrument maintenance and calibration;
(7) no written testing procedures manual;
(8) failure to follow generally-accepted scientific testing standards with respect to certain tests;
(9) inadequate record-keeping; and
(10) failure to conduct collateral testing."
Id.
Such a thorough list of the failures of both the scientist and the crime lab should have been heeded as a call to arms to prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, law enforcement, and scientists alike. Unfortunately, the lessons we could have learned from the Fred Zain case have remained unlearned. The Houston Crime Lab scandal could have been a wake up call in 2002 - but it wasn't. As such, we are today reading about the failures of the San Fransisco Crime Lab, failures that could have been avoided had the lab learned the lessons the ASCLAD findings offered up in 1993.
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