Accusations of Turkey exporting to Iran almost 1,000 materials with "nuclear applications" have been declared by Germany. Allegations of Iran establishing "front companies" in Istanbul are believed to have been shipped from that very same port back to Iran. Using evasion techniques and illicit business affairs, Iran has a history of getting around the sanctions. Military history shows how the army's mission changes with the involvement in espionage as part of their daily routine.
Thanks to, 1) Mr. Jonathan Schanzer; former terrorism finance analyst for the US Treasury Department, who is now the Vice President for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, 2) Dr. Emanuele Ottolenghi, Senior Fellow for the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and 3) Dr. Michael Rubin, who is a former Pentagon Advisor, for supplying us with COMINT and HUMINT data for ALU scholars to analyze and make predictions for the future of preventing this travesty to International Law and to maintain international peace. Analysis of a classified nature has been removed and archived by the above parties, leaving only raw data for determination.
Every round of sanctions has been evaded masterfully by Iran, forcing the US to identify the front companies and continue to sanction them and any country helping them. Iranian smugglers were arrested after German and Turkish officials found out their plot of transferring nuclear goods from India to Iran. Raids were conducted by the German and Turkish officials on materials with nuclear applications that were obtained in Germany and India and transported to the Mitech Company in Iran through Turkey by an Iranian national, Hossein Tanideh (he was captured in Turkey earlier this year). Tanideh's dealings were sent from Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (German branch of Interpol) to their counterpart in Turkey about Tanideh's dealings resulting in him being arrested. Tanideh's activities were traced back to Iranian front companies by the German authorities (tied to several business owners who were exporting to Iran). Documents were seized in Istanbul as the result of a search by the IDI.
Materials with nuclear applications were sent to Mitech in Iran from Germany and India being disguised as plumbing parts and fixtures from Tanideh and one of his associates. On many occasions the documents for 91 materials with nuclear applications were sent from Germany to Turkey before going to Iran. On other occasions 856 nuclear items were shipped via many points from India to Turkey and then to Iran.
Made in Europe dual use technology for it's nuclear weapons program can still be purchased by Iran despite six years of sanctions. The European continent is still full of many front companies operating as legitimate businesses. Iranian companies are increasing in Turkey where they can get export licenses to the NATO member state easily. Eluding sanctions with Turkey's help, the European authorities need to stop traffic and demand more zeal from Turkey, since there are over 3,000 Iranian companies registered in that country. Turkish officials may be allowing quietly the shipments to move forward.
Business ties are in constant expansion between Turkey and Iran. January saw 28 Iranian business firms established in Turkey, ranking just behind German investors. Under allegations of Western sanctions evasion aid for Iran, Halkbank had "oil for gold" transactions amounting to 60 tons of gold in exchange for Iranian crude oil. Ships are being traded to Iran from Turkey in exchange for oil.
Allegations of Turkey funding the terrorist group Hamas, might indicate a large problem of terrorism within the country which must be watched for a nuclear-export scheme. It has been alleged that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is doing these front companies. Front companies are run for legitimate reasons by the economic wing of the Revolutionary Guards. Working in conjunction with the Turks they are able to access lots of dual use technology that could never be imported directly by Iran (very hard to keep track of). The Turkish government sees the Obama administration's friendship as proof that they can get away with it.
Alu scholars suggest, 1) the exit points at the ports are going to be monitored, 2) move, if not check the movements of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, 3) design the financial software to track the movements in cypherspace (expand the financial analyst's role, 4) utilize the techniques of cypher warfare to freeze assets, etc., 5) Iran may be using terrorist organizations to proliferate nuclear applications materials (Hamas, PKK, PJAK, etc.), 6) use tracking codes on the nuclear applications materials (increase the list of material distributed worldwide, and 7) there is a possibility that the work will have to done in the countries involved without the knowledge of their law enforcement.