Fast-track to failure

"...In response, Washington (once again) turned the other cheek, seeking only mild punishment for North Korea's violation of existing U.N. resolutions.  American officials have also urged the DPRK to return to the Six Party nuclear talks, which have been stalled for months.  

 [snip]

Not surprisingly, Pyongyang was undeterred.  The missile test went off as scheduled on April 5th, but a satellite never reached orbit.  Intelligence analysts report that the TD-2's third stage failed, although its unclear if the missile actually carried a satellite payload.  Many experts remain convinced that the launch was nothing more than a missile test.  

Of course, North Korea did more that restart its nuclear efforts.  Earlier this week, the DPRK conducted its second, underground nuclear test, a blast in the 10-20 kiloton range.  That's roughly the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II, and demonstrates that Pyongyang has completely mastered the nuclear weapons cycle.  North Korea's first nuclear test (in 2006) was a dud, raising questions about the reliability of Kim's nuclear technology.  

To be fair, Ambassador Bolton deserves credit for predicting the recent test, noting that the military and scientific imperatives made it all-but-inevitable.  We thought the next nuclear test would be later this year, but clearly, Kim Jong-il is on an accelerated timetable.  

Consider the events that have followed the nuclear blast.  The hours that followed saw a series of short-range missile launches, affirming  North Korea's ability to build nuclear weapons and (eventually) mate them to various delivery platforms.   And, if that's not enough, Pyongyang has announced that it is no longer bound by the armistice that ended the Korean war, and has threatened to attack allied vessels that try to inspect North Korean merchant ships.  

The reaction from Washington?  Nothing but sharply-worded statements, pleas for U.N. action and invitations for North Korea to return to the bargaining table.  No wonder Kim Jong-il is feeling his oats.  

In fact, our "evolving" policy toward Pyongyang is rather remarkable, given the recent, dangerous turn of events in northeastern Asia.  In less than two months, North Korea has demonstrated its ability to launch a crude ICBM, detonated a nuclear weapon that will (one day) be carried by that missile, and promised additional provocations unless the U.S., South Korea and Japan play ball with Kim's regime.  Put another way, Washington and its allies better cough up more aid--and avoid new sanctions--or the DPRK will raise the ante again.  

The Obama Administration seems to believe that Pyongyang has already played its trump card with Monday's nuclear test.  At some point, the thinking goes, North Korea will be desperate for food and fuel and meekly return to negotiations.  That will allow everyone to forget about the recent unpleasantness, and get back to the diplomatic " Rope-a-Dope" that passes for bargaining with North Korea. 

Unfortunately, there are a few problems with that theory.  Truth is, Mr. Kim can create more havoc, exacerbating the crisis that now engulfs the Korean peninsula.  The crab fishing season is now underway along the Northern Limit Line (the maritime extension of the DMZ), an area that saw pitched battles between DPRK and South Korean gunboats a few years ago.  Given the current tensions in Korea, the potential for new battles is growing.  How would Mr. Obama respond to a naval "war" that quickly spreads to land?  

Or, how would the commander-in-chief react if North Korean MiGs or surface-to-air missiles begin firing on U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan, or south of the DMZ?  Would he order attacks on the DPRK missile sites, or beg the U.N. to take action?  And, what about a repeat of Pyongyang's commando attack on the South Korean presidential mansion (the Blue House) in the 1970s?  Or the terrorist bombings in the 80s that brought down a RIK airliner, killing hundreds of passengers, or a decapitation strike against South Korean leaders during a state visit to Burma?  All of these options remain a part of Kim Jong-il's playbook, and history demonstrates that the North Korean leader is not afraid to raise the stakes, in pursuit of his goals.  

Carried to their extreme, Kim's plans could (ultimately) include a general attack against South Korea, though most "experts" have long discounted that possibility.  Still, that scenario cannot be completely ruled out.  Sixty percent of the North Korean Army is located within 60 miles of the DMZ, meaning that Kim Jong-il could launch a limited invasion with virtually no intelligence warning.  Did we mention that he now has nukes?  

Against this deteriorating backdrop, how should the U.S. respond?  While the time for diplomatic carrots and U.N. resolutions has clearly passed, Mr. Obama remains wedded to that approach, with little regard for wider, long-term  consequences.  Consider the examples of South Korea and Japan.  Over the past three months, both have been threatened by their enemy's long-range missiles, and now that same regime has detonated a nuclear weapon. 

That leaves Tokyo and Seoul with a sobering choice.  Remain under the American umbrella (which Washington appears reluctant to use), or consider building their own nukes.  With their advanced technological and industrial bases, both Tokyo and Seoul could have nuclear weapons in a little over a year, a development that would likely spur all-out arms race in the region.   And rest assured, the nuclear option is being quietly discussed in both capitals, as confidence in American (read" the Obama Administration) sinks like a rock.          

At the very least, this should be an interesting summer on the Korean peninsula.  Borrowing John Bolton's crystal ball, we can easily envision naval clashes between North and South Korea, and American involvement is almost assured.  Ditto for some sort of ambush involving a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea.  Beyond that, the situation grows even dicier.    

Clearly, no one wants another Korean War, but there are steps the Obama Administration should be taking now, to deter Pyongyang's aggression.  For starters, how about re-imposing some of the financial sanctions that (among other things) froze the assets of North Korean leaders stashed in a Macau bank.  The amount of the money was rather small, but it got the attention of Kim Jong-il.  Moreover, it spurred a rare stretch of "good" behavior from the DPRK, until the U.S. released the assets.  

Additionally, Washington should press ahead with naval exercises involving South Korea vessels along the Northern Limit Line, as a show of resolve against Pyongyang.   Potential attacks by DPRK vessels should bring an immediate response by both navies, aimed at neutralizing the maritime threat.    On the political front, Mr. Obama needs to lean on China--hard.  Not only can Beijing put additional pressure on Pyongyang, it can help in more practical ways, too. 

At the top of that list is barring over-flights and landings by transports that routinely ferry arms to Iran and Syria.  Deprived of that aerial route--and with allied warships stopping North Korean merchant vessels--Pyongyang will feel the pressure rather quickly and reconsider its actions. 

Regrettably, there are no indications that the Obama Administration is prepared to adopt--and maintain--a tougher line against North Korea.  Indeed, the president's policies for dealing with the DPRK are on a fast track to failure, following the precedent set by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush--with one exception.  Neither Mr. Clinton nor Mr. Bush had to deal with a North Korean regime that was nuclear-capable.  Now, Mr. Obama is facing one with nukes, but he has no realistic plan for handling the situation, beyond myopic diplomacy.