Critical debate brewing: counter-insurgency vs counter-terrorism

US Marines at dusk in Afghanistan (AP Photo) 

President Obama's firing of Gen. McChrystal and reassignment of General Petraeus last week had one unintended result: a resumption of the debate between two markedly different strategies for combating terrorism: counter-terrorism vs counter-insurgency.

Counter-insurgency is the President's avowed approach, and that of Gen. Petraeus, who has codified the strategy as military doctrine.

Counter-insurgency encompasses nation building and involves winning the hearts and minds of the populace.

As a strategy, it failed miserably in Vietnam, but supposedly succeeded brilliantly, at last, in Iraq, under the stewardship of Gen. Petraeus, now back in charge in Afghanistan, intending to implement a plan both he and Gen. McCrystal have admitted could take a decade to accomplish.

A countervailing view regarding Iraq--that we succeeded, tenuously, with regime change there, just that and nothing more--has not gained much currency.
 

Afghan soldier walks by burning fuel truck (AP Photo) 

Counter-terrorism, Vice President Biden's preferred strategy, is a simpler approach, requiring fewer troops, and less risk to those troops, relying, instead, on good ground intelligence and the willingness to use special ops and predator drones without undue reservation.

Counter-terrorism, replete with collateral damage, is not a strategy likely to win the hearts and minds of the populace.

Two other factors complicate matters in Afghanistan: President Obama's self-imposed deadline to begin drawing down troops in July 2011, and the failure of counter-insurgency (COIN) to work anywhere in Afghanistan during nine years of war.

The recent offensive in Marja was hailed as a test of COIN, complete with a surge of troops and a 'government in a box'.

General McChrystal termed the results a 'bleeding wound' shortly before being fired.

A recent House subcommittee hearing revealed troubling aspects concerning conditions in Afghanistan, particularly in Kandahar Province, the announced location of our next major offensive.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has created a protection racket in Afghanistan that would 'make Tony Soprano proud,' according to Congressman John Tierney (D-MA), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs.

By outsourcing security for our military supply chain in Afghanistan to questionable local contractors, including warlords, the DOD has 'fueled a vast protection racket run by a shadowy network of warlords, strongmen, commanders, and corrupt Afghan officials...' according to Congressman Tierney.

This arrangement has 'fueled warlordism, extortion, corruption, and maybe even funded the enemy,' Rep. Tierney said.

The system in place now forces trucking contractors to employ private security armies or pay bribes to the Warlords who control them.

All of which begs the question: how far along can COIN efforts be if you can't secure your own vital supply lines?
 

Harmid Karzai (AP Photo) 

This brings into stark relief the President's July 2011 draw down--what can he possibly hope to accomplish by then?

Surely not nation-building, the long route advocated by both Generals McChrystal and Petraeus.

Look for an evolving change of strategy.

It is reasonable to speculate that all we can hope to accomplish in a short amount of time is to leave Harmid Karzai in a strong enough position to win a war with the Taliban, thereby forcing them to compromise.

The operative plan, stated or not, seems to be to weaken the Taliban substantially in the coming months.

If we can eliminate Al Qaeda in Afghanistan on our way out, so much the better for Karzai and us.

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John Signoroello can be contacted by email at siexaminer@yahoo.com