Skip to main content
  1. Life
  2. Society & Culture
  3. Social Issues

Chess Match:How the US - Russian Global Chess Game Will Shape the Global Stage

See also

“Multi-polarity” in foreign policy: The Fragmentation of the Traditional Spheres of Interest

Multi-polarity is inseparably linked with the idea of the "balance power". The very reemergence of this concept in the Mid 90’s was the reaction of global community to the consolidation and emergence of a lone US homogeny. The complex phenomenon that we see today is a result of a shift. Regional powers such as Turkey, Russia, China has changed the landscape and as a result they seek to dominate their perceived sphere of influence. Russia for seeks the economic and military success sought accomplished by China in the last 25 years. The Russian Federation understands that it must transition to free market economy to maintain it domestic integrity and international aspirations. The modern Russian Federation it finds itself torn between its strong nationalistic core and its continuance of a free market economy. The Russian Federation has long mastered this position of unitary actor during its days ruled by the Soviet Party. This is authoritative in nature do the fact any deviation can and will be enforced by the authoritarian function. The Russian Federation goal is to emerge from the 1990’s with a quasi-free market economy where Russia is an exporter of goods and services other than their oil and military weapons. This will come with very strong regulation from its authoritarian government seeing as Russia does not want to lose social or fiscal control over its state. Capitalism has been the goal of the state since the days of Oligarchs and Russian Revolution, so it is with no surprise that the Kremlin is guarded to the idea of free market polices.

Post Soviet identity and Multi-polarity

In Russia: A Short History by Professor Abraham Ascher explains the era of Khrushchev’s political philosophy took advantage of improved relations with the U.S. by ordering a reduction of one-third in the size of Soviet armed forces, alleging that advanced weapons would make up for the lost troops. Khrushchev’s goal was to transition the Soviet Union through a Post Stalin Era, he sought not to end communism but to conduct the Soviet State in a reformist manner, thus moving away from the crimes of Stalin towards a state that would be run by nationalistic muscle. He did not do this without political motive he sensed that the unmasking of "Crimes of Stalin" would give immeasurable political capital with the party and the people. His ultimate goal was to continue the dominance of the Soviet Union without the state of terror, will maintain the Soviet nostalgia of the Revolution.
Understanding the traditional Spheres of Interest

As a theory, balance of power predicts that rapid changes in international power and status—especially attempts by one state to conquer a region—will provoke counterbalancing actions. For this reason, the balancing process helps to maintain the stability of relations between states. A balance of power system functions most effectively when alliances are fluid, when they are easily formed or broken on the basis of expediency, regardless of values, religion, history, or form of government. Occasionally a single state plays a balancer role, shifting its support to oppose whatever state or alliance is strongest. A weakness of the balance of power concept is the difficulty of measuring power.
The restructuring of the global environment is the main task of the 21st Century the fundamental question facing policy hawks is what will become the structural unit of the new system , replacing the nation state which no longer serves the function. The idea being that the realism is dead. The very notion that a nation state can pull all players out of chaos thus creating homogeny. To Understand Multi-polarity and Fragmentation one must understand traditional framework of Power. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union the traditional balancers of the International spheres of interest where shift to the United States.

Man, the State, and War, Waltz points out that the internal organization of states is the key to understanding war and peace. Removing the defects of states would establish the basis for peace. The Russians have long mastered this position of unitary actor during its days ruled by the Soviet Party. In the Russian Federation all information is filtered through the Kremlin to the office of Presidency. This is authoritative in nature do the fact any deviation can and will be enforced by the authoritarian function. One can access by observing Russian foreign policy is that the interest must and will be engineered to regain its position of influence once held by the late Soviet Union.
Waltz on page 123 of Man, the State, and War abandons the liberal democratic theory from reliance upon improvement within separate states to acceptance of the need for organization among them. What makes Russia unique is that it establishes this view based not only on the current domestic Russian borders, but also on its neighbors that were until 1990 part of the Soviet Union and the greater Caucus region. Their idea of an open society, markets and media is limited and sometimes even prohibited when in conflict the progress or mission of the state. This nationalistic goal reemergence is not goal of any party such the “Soviet Party “ rather the collective goal of the Russian people and government .
Then Waltz follows up page 83 of Man, the State, and War, Waltz by establishing that the use of internal defects to explain external acts of a state can take many forms. This most clear by observing Russian Federation’s goal is to emerge from the 1990’s with a quasi free market economy where Russia is an exporter of goods and services other than there oil and military weapons. This will come with very strong regulation from its authoritarian government. Russia does not want to lose social or fiscal control over its state. Capitalism has been the enemy of the state since the days of Oligarchs and Russian Revolution, so it is with no surprise that the Kremlin is guarded to the idea of free market polices.

The Russian End Game : Interpreting the Mind of the Vladimir Putin :

Much like Khrushchev and Yeltsin. Putin was shaped by the era in which he ruled. Tasked with bringing economic and foreign policy reform to a struggling and internationally irrelevant Russia. Experts describes Putin as “ critical of past practices of over extending Russia’s foreign policy resources. “They follow up with describing Putin as pragmatic and full of self-concentration. One can firmly established that Putin unlike Gorbachev was not eager to replicate Western social democratic or liberal values. Putin is quoted by noted Russian Political Scientist Tsygankov as saying that Russia would never become a" 2nd edition of the U.S or Great Britain". Putin’s strong and focused foreign policy seeks to build alliances within its region to counter China, the US and EU. The Russian Federation under the stern hand of Vladimir Putin has mastered this position of unitary actor dating back to its days ruled by the Soviet Party and the revolution. Under Putin's Russian Federation all information is filtered through the Kremlin to the office of Presidency of Vladimir Putin. This is authoritative in nature do the fact any deviation can and will be enforced by the authoritarian function. Russia is still coming to grips with its "Political Insecurity" and diminished position both economically and military. It seeks to maintain it's international self-esteem by dominating the development of the developing world. Communism failed and from it sprang the modern Chinese economy and military not to mention the rise of Turkey and expansion of NATO. The Russian Federation feels boxed in and contained. It feels confined to its Balkan corner and that it has little and at best diminished foreign influence past its UN Security Council chair and like a fighter past its prime it picks any fight it can to remain a factor.
Putin emphasizes Russia’s desire to have constructive relations with all parts of the world, from the United States to China, Latin America to Southeast Asia, and avoids threatening retaliation in response to actions he criticizes (including NATO’s missile defense plans), both the tone and theme of his comments represent a throwback to the hard line speech he gave to the Munich Security Conference in 2007. That is how the article will likely resonate within Western governments.

His mind appears to be principally on three things: what he sees as the principal threat to Russian interests—although not necessarily framed as a threat to Russian security. His second focus is on positioning Russia in a global setting where the West remains important, but power is shifting toward the Asia-Pacific. 
But it is his third concern that seems to be central: namely, a preoccupation with gaining economic advantage in a turbulent global economy–a world in which the European economic anchor for Russia’s external economic relations is in deep trouble, and the Asia-Pacific beckons as an economic opportunity, but one that Russia is not well-placed to seize.
“It has nothing in common with democracy, of course,” he added. “Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force in international relations — military force.”
“Primarily the United States has overstepped its national borders, and in every area,” said Mr. Putin, who increasingly has tried to re-establish Russia’s once broad Soviet-era influence, using Russia’s natural resources as leverage and defending nations at odds with the United States, including Iran.
American military actions, which he termed “unilateral” and “illegitimate,” also “have not been able to resolve any matters at all,” and, he said, have created only more instability and danger.
“They bring us to the abyss of one conflict after another,” he said. “Political solutions are becoming impossible.”

The United States Power Play and they will Counter Russia's Reemergence

The United States must take a multidimensional approach not pursuing discrete security, trade, or human rights policies but a foreign policy, which combines all of these integral components. At the same time, the U.S. cannot divorce its international policy from its broader regional policies in Europe and Asia, or from its global strategies. The United States has suffered greatly in Eastern Europe because of a widespread perception that it cannot pursue more than one interest at a time. Some argue that Washington cares only about political development, accusing it of backing, even staging, “colored revolutions.” Others believe that the U.S. cares only about military basing and logistics, accusing Washington of prioritizing the war in Afghanistan above every other objective.This latter perception, in particular, has been exacerbated by the frequency of visits by the commander of U.S. Central Command while other U.S. visitors of similar stature are so rare. Meanwhile, there are, undeniably, tangible links between U.S. interests in Eastern Europe and its surrounding regions. Inconsistent linkages and precarious balancing with other policy agendas highlights the need for a much more coordinated execution of strategy within the U.S. government. The first decade of the twenty-first century saw China, Russia, and the United States all experiencing renewed interest in Eastern Europe , for different reasons and in pursuit of different objective. Russia has largely recovered from the Soviet collapse and sought to reassert itself in the region. The creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has been a theater in which Russia has recast itself as a leader among nations, as the organization is based on the NATO model. Russia' interests have been largely economic until recent , as it has invested heavily in the development of the Central Asian nations without demanding political reforms in return, as the United States often does. Not to be overlooked are the exploits of the local leaders themselves, as they have often skillfully played the great powers off of one another to gain special concessions. Old school political maneuvering in international relations is not a thing of the past, as this compelling case study demonstrates, and oftentimes the remotest parts of the world can be theaters political and ideological contests with high stakes.

Advertisement