Battling Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Recently Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger have taken several steps to support their joint fight against AQIM.  AQIM has been greatly reduced in capability in the past years but are now deeply involved in smuggling, drug running and occasional terrorist attacks--a change in focus but not intent. 

AQIM is a group named for their location in North Africa.  It evolved from the Algerian militant group, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC). GSPC formed in 1998 as an outgrowth of the once-powerful and extremely violent Groupe Islamique Armée (GIA). GIA’s popularity declined significantly following a series of massacres in which it killed thousands of Algerian civilians.  

AQIM finances its operations by drug running and carries out attacks against the Algerian military and also kidnaps Western tourists in an effort to weaken and ultimately overthrow the Algerian government, which it seeks to replace with Islamic rule based on a “pure” interpretation of the Quran. In 2007, AQIM attempted to assassinate Algerian President Bouteflika. AQIM aims to specifically focus attacks on Algerian, French and American targets. It is reported that the organization sent North African insurgents to Iraq to fight American and coalition forces as suicide bombers and foot soldiers. The Algerian military proudly points to the reduction of GSPC/AQIM from about 25,000 members to only about 750.  

Recently AQIM took credit for detonating a bomb against a parked military vehicle, killing two soldiers and wounding three others. The attack occurred about 50 miles east of Algiers.  The attack before that in Algeria was two weeks earlier. The time interval between attacks plus the low risk nature of the attacks reinforce the Algerian claim that this branch of al Qaida is weak and declining.  A terrorist group that only has enough strength to attack once in a two weeks and then only detonate a small bomb against a parked vehicle is barely scraping by.  It has been reduced to criminal behavior to demonstrate that it is still around.  This week at least one person died in a bomb attack against the security staff at a Canadian firm in Algeria.  The attack against the construction and engineering firm SNC Lavallin took place in Algeria's Tizi Ouzou region—60 miles east of Algiers. Reportedly four people were injured in the attack.  To date AQIM has not taken credit for the attack.  As noted previously AQIM’s major effort has been the taking of hostages and attacks against isolated and vulnerable security outposts. The fact that this attack was against a foreign firm may suggests change AQIM’s targeting strategy.  However, a single attack is insufficient evidence on which to base an assessment.  It probably should be cause for increased vigilance by foreign companies operating in Algeria.

The difficulty for AQIM in Algiers may in fact be the police presence.  As one enters or leaves the city during rush hours he finds Gendararms or police along the highways every several hundred meters.  There are police check points at some major intersections which add security but also definitely contribute to the continual snarl that is traffic.  At many of these check points the police have hand held bomb detectors the size of a pistol. 

Kidnappings of foreigners have become more frequent in West Africa's Sahara-Sahel region (Sahel is the name of the southern Sahara region that borders Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) over the last year, with hostages usually ending up in the hands of AQIM.  This activity prompted the military in the region to be sufficiently concerned to have taken significant actions:

• The four states military chiefs of staff met in Tamanrasset (in southern Algeria) to create a joint military command there.  They hope to be able to co-ordinate efforts against AQIM.  The gathering coincided with new developments in the case of seven foreigners, including five French nationals, kidnapped in Niger on 16 September.Mali and France are in talks about the French military taking action to free the hostages, but currently there are no French forces stationed in Mali and only France can make such a military decision to intervene. 
• Additionally, the intelligence chiefs of the four countries will create a joint intelligence center in Algiers, The center's purpose is to collect information on terrorism in the region and make the data available to the Sahel's, military operational center based in Tamanrasset. The Tamanrasset center is composed of senior military field officers, while the Algiers center is made up of intelligence officers. 
• Additionally, US AFRICOM has been in discussions with the four countries and sponsored a symposium at its headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany to discuss the AQIM threat and to encourage regional cooperation.
• There are reports that US Special Forces and their Algerian counterparts are chasing AQIM and other terrorists in the Algerian portion of the Sahel.   

Converse to the cooperation noted there is some continuing tension in the fight against AQIM between Algeria and Morocco fueled, in part, by Algeria's 30 years of support for the Polisaro front--a group that seeks (and has in the past fought for) an independent state in Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara.  Despite whispers coming from the Moroccan government and pro-government press, of cooperation between AQIM and the Polisario Front, collusion has never been credibly proven and recent reports provide reason to believe it may not be true at all. 

The challenge against AQIM is exemplified by recent activities in Morocco.  Morocco recently reported dismantling a drug-trafficking network with branches in Latin America, Europe and Africa. Moroccon police are reported to have arrested 34 alleged drug runners and seized large quantities of money, cocaine, cannabis and tear gas. The investigation revealed that the drugs entered Morocco from Mali. The group arrested is suspected of links to AQIM.  Reportedly the drugs arrive from Latin America – and more specifically, Colombia and Venezuela – to be stored in the northern part of Mali, where terrorist cells are particularly active.  The terrorists provide transport across the deserts of Mali and Algeria to the Moroccan border, with some of it sold in the domestic market and the remainder exported to Europe. 

The present AQIM threat and efforts to deal with it are of concern.  What is your evaluation?