Assessing Ozzie Guillen, 2004-present

AP photo/Charles Rex Arbogast

When Ozzie Guillen was hired six years ago to be the next manager of the White Sox, nobody could have expected the kind of success the White Sox have had under somebody who never had managed a major-league team before. Guillen has guided the White Sox to a 512-461 record in his six years on the job, with four winning seasons, two division titles, two 90-win seasons, and, of course, a World Series championship.

Of course, with Guillen, the on-the-field stuff isn't the whole story. Every year, he manages to rub somebody the wrong way, and as a result, every year people wonder if Guillen's next off-color outburst will cost him his job.

But, for better or for worse, Guillen isn't getting fired anytime soon. He's far from a perfect manager, but he's also proved to be one of the most successful managers in franchise history to this point.

Obviously, as somebody who has closely followed the White Sox for all of Guillen's tenure as manager, I'm a little bit biased when it comes to evaluating Guillen. That's where Chris Jaffe of The Hardball Times comes in to this article.

Jaffe was gracious enough to send me excerpts from his upcoming book, Evaluating Baseball's Managers that is due out in early 2010. One of those well-researched excerpts was on Ozzie Guillen, so from here on out, I'm going to take a look at what Jaffe had to say about Guillen and then add in my own comments.

Before I begin, though, I do have to note that Jaffe's research does not cover the 2009 season. With that in mind, here are some of the things Jaffe notes about Guillen (all block quotes are from Jaffe's work on Guillen):

1. He doesn't heavily rely on his bullpen.

He relies on his bullpen less than any other 21st century manager. Only five AL bullpens in history have averaged less than an inning per relief appearance: Guillen managed three.

Guillen hasn't been blessed with a lot of good bullpens during his six years as manager. The 2004, 2006, 2007, and, to a far lesser extent, 2009 bullpens have all struggled, leading Guillen to try to squeeze as much as he can out of his starters before going to his relief pitching.

Granted, that Guillen's bullpens don't average a inning per appearance isn't necessarily indicative of trust in starting pitching. Of the 12 left-handed relievers who have appeared in 25 or more games under Guillen, only two (Matt Thornton '09 and Neal Cotts '04) have averaged over an inning per appearance.

So unless a left-hander is a long reliever (as Cotts was in 2004) or flat-out dominant (as Thornton was in 2009), Guillen is likely to use him in a more situational role.

As a result of using left-handers mostly against left-handed batters, Guillen will frequently use his right-handers to get less than three outs. Guillen's main right-handed setup men over the years have been Cliff Politte (2004, 2005), David Riske (2006), Mike MacDougal (2006, 2007), Ryan Bukvich (2007), Ehren Wassermann (2007), Octavio Dotel (2008, 2009), Scott Linebrink (2008, 2009), and Tony Pena (2009).

Of those pitchers, only four averaged an inning or more per appearance: Riske '06, MacDougal '06 Dotel '09, and Pena '09.

That being said, Guillen certainly relies on his starting pitching. Since 2004, only seven teams have had three or more starters with 200+ innings pitched—and three of those were managed by Guillen (2005, 2007, 2008). Only in 2004 did Guillen not allow multiple starters to throw 200 or more innings.

So what's the lesson in all of this? Guillen will ride his starters as long as he can before yielding to the bullpen. And when he does yield to the bullpen, he's more likely to use relievers in situational lefty/righty roles than just giving his relievers a full inning of work.

2. Guillen and Kenny Williams have good communication and a similar strategy.

Further strengthening his position, Guillen possesses a strong working relationship with GM Kenny Williams. A story from Guillen’s rookie season reveals how this partnership helps Guillen. Veteran reliever Mike Jackson was unhappy with how Guillen used him. When an irked Guillen reported to Williams that one of his pitchers was causing problems, the GM had a simple solution. He did not want to know the man’s name. Instead, Williams said Guillen should inform the pitcher to clean out his locker – he was through with the club. Then Williams wanted Guillen to tell the entire team what Williams had just told him, including how Williams did not even know the man’s name in order to make sure they got the message not to complain about the manager. Only then did Williams learn the newly unemployed’s identity.

If Guillen wants a player off the team, chances are he'll be off the team. Brandon McCarthy, Nick Swisher, Javier Vazquez, and Brian Anderson are the most prominent examples of this influence—remember, after the White Sox were eliminated in 2008, Williams went up to Swisher and told him to be ready for next year.

About a month later Swisher was off the team, traded to the Yankees for pennies on the dollar. And not surprisingly, Guillen's dislike of Swisher caught some headlines early in the '09 season.

While players in Guillen's doghouse often find themselves playing elsewhere, Williams and Guillen work together to bring in players who they both mutually like. As a result, the White Sox are in a never-ending search for speed and athleticism.

That strategy has worked (Carlos Lee for Scott Podsednik and Luis Vizcaino in '05, the signing of Alexei Ramirez), it has also backfired (Darin Erstad, Jerry Owens). Sometimes, it seems like the White Sox value athletic ability over baseball ability, which is why the Juan Pierre trade is somewhat disconcerting.

This quest for athleticism and stolen bases goes back to Guillen's days as a player. He never was close to being a power hitter—instead, he was a speedy, defensive-minded shortstop with a career-best OPS of .666.

The White Sox have tried to portray their style of play under Guillen as "Ozzieball," that is, bunting, stealing bases, and offense that isn't predicated on home runs. A quick look at the team's home run totals reveals something else, though: under Guillen, the White Sox have hit 200 or more home runs four times. In the two years the team did not hit 200+ home runs, they finished below .500.

So while Guillen often laments the Earl Weaver-style offense his team has, it's been successful for the six years he's been the team's manager.

3. Guillen is volatile, but it's calculated.

Perhaps the most important element of Guillen’s authority is his personality. His often profane utterances indicate a key character trait: he does not worry about ruffling feathers. If he is upset about something, he will make it known. Guillen does not operate out of fear of dangers. Living on the balls of your feet rather than your heels creates an innate sense of authority. Players know that he will confront them if he wants to, just as they know the GM, owner, the media and most of the fans support him. These elements bolstered Guillen’s standing before winning the World Series. Obviously, capturing Chicago’s first world title in 87 [sic] years further strengthened his position. Guillen possesses as much security as any manager can wish for, and most can only dream of.

Guillen doesn't have outbursts to just have outbursts. Every time he rips a player, manager, team, or columnist, it's with the backing of the team's upper management. And as a result, Guillen's personality gives him a great position of authority within the organization.

His outward intensity is the exact opposite of Jerry Manuel's calm, collected personality that didn't make it seem like Manuel was all that authoritative. There's far more accountability under Guillen, and part of that has to stem from his personality. Jaffe adds this about Guillen's authority:

Authority is good only if used appropriately, and Guillen uses his clout to create and enforce expectations for his players. His dumping of closer Shingo Takatsu illustrates this point. Though the Japanese import provided quality work as closer in 2004, finishing second in the Rookie of the Year Award voting, he started 2005 terribly. A month into the season, Guillen demoted him from the closer role, despite the lack of a proven replacement. Three months later the Sox waived Takatsu outright, in what Guillen described as the hardest decision he ever helped make. It did not matter how good Takatsu was last year, or even that Guillen personally liked him – a player had to help the team win.

So even if a player is one of Guillen's guys, he still has to perform up to a winning standard to keep his job. It'll be interesting to see how that applies to Juan Pierre this year—something tells me that Guillen won't do anything if Pierre's on-base sits in the .320 range, though.

So those are the three main points I picked from Jaffe's writeup on Guillen. From reading the rest of the excerpts he sent me, Jaffe's Evaluating Baseball Managers is well-researched and well-written. Perhaps most interesting is his work on dead ball era managers, including Charlie Comiskey (which Jim reviewed over at Sox Machine).

Evaluating Baseball Managers can be pre-ordered from McFarland's website here. I'll leave you with my favorite part of what Jaffe sent me:

Guillen is the closest thing we have these days to Billy Martin. Guillen is not as extreme as Martin (no one is) but they have similar tendencies. They only care about winning, have no interest in second place, and combine a ruthless pursuit of victory with a touch of humanity for their players. Both make their teams play as well as possible.