US combat operations in Iraq outlasted the most pessimistic projections at the outset of the 2003 invasion. Even as those operations wind down, the tempo is increasing in Afghanistan, where US forces committed since soon after the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, remain heavily engaged. Until recently, logistics support for warfighters in both theaters have relied heavily on the provisions of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract awarded only a few months after 9/11 and the subsequent ballooning of US overseas deployments.
In a case of you got to war with the contracts you have, not the ones you’d like to have, the Army found itself with a logistics support program that by many accounts was unsuited to the tasks at hand. The LOGCAP III contract the US Army Sustainment Command awarded to KBR (Houston, TX) in December 2001 became the largest service contract in Army history to date with over $32 billion allocated on over 150 task orders. By contrast, its precursor, LOGCAP II, awarded to DynCorp (Falls Church, VA), had amounted to approximately $102 million over its five-year run. While KBR can point with pride to its many accomplishments and successes in responding to LOGAP III’s unexpected demands, allegations of waste and fraud have dogged the contractor.
The Army has not washed its hands of the matter and has uncovered examples of its own culpability in LOGCAP deficiencies, particularly with regard to the specification and authoring of task orders. In the May-June issue of Army Logistician, Colonel Karen E. LeDoux, a former commander of Combined Joint Task Force 7’s LOGCAP Support Unit Forward in Iraq, wrote: “In the two major findings of a 2004 Government Accountability Office audit of LOGCAP operations in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom were that the Department of Defense did not comply fully with guidance on identification of contracting requirements early in the planning process and that the LOGCAP contractor was not adequately involved in the planning process.”
More specifically, in the July-August 2009 issue of the same publication, Colonel Scott S. Haraburda, lead logistics support officer in the LOGCAP-Kuwait office, and his colleagues pointed out that most of the irregularities on the Army side stemmed from the actions of people with relatively little training or background in government contracting. Many of the problems involved soldiers who did not really understand contract law.
With lessons learned in pocket, the US Army Sustainment Command essentially went back to the drawing board to write the specifications for LOGCAP IV. Unlike its predecessors, LOGCAP IV was awarded to three teams of contractors – led by Fluor (Irving, TX), DynCorp, and KBR, respectively – that would have the opportunity to compete for each task order. The Army awarded these co-called performance contracts. in June 2007. Performance contractors compete for individual task orders, fostering a competitive situation designed to control costs and enhance quality. Services include supply operations, field operations, engineering and construction, communication networks, transportation and cargo, facilities maintenance and repair. It awarded a separate administrative contract to Serco (Hook, Hampshire, UK) in February 2007. With three potential performance contract leads on hand, the Army hopes to expand the pool of logistics talent at its disposal while improving cost-effectiveness through competition. Moreover, the burden of increasing staff to handle unexpected contingencies will be borne by three teams rather than just one.
New Program, New Faces
In addition to getting a new approach to contracting, as of January 2011 LOGCAP has a new executive director: Tommy L. Marks. A member of the Senior Executive Service, a corps of federal executives appointed to key leadership positions just below the level of Presidential appointees, Marks comes with 32 years of experience in contracts operations, logistics management, administration of multi-million dollar contracts, and improving operational efficiencies and organizational development. He spent 24 years of active military service planning and directing organizations in aviation, logistics, and maintenance operations, human resources, equal opportunity programs, educational services programs, contracts operations and physical security management. Marks has previous LOGCAP experience in the capacity of a Program Manager-Forward and Senior Military Operational Analyst in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.
Now at the helm of LOGCAP, Marks intends to bring his experience to bear on improving what he There is no question of the Army lengthening its tail: It’s not going to happen. Reducing the resources combat units devote to logistics has been a goal of LOGCAP since its inception in 1985. Contractors are now a permanent part of the logistics landscape. However, Marks is clear that this situation remains an opportunity to improve warfighter support, not a burden or wrong turn.
“LOGCAP is a worldwide program,” Marks said. “Having three contracting teams available gives us the flexibility to support the worldwide mission. Each prime can bid on task orders on an individual basis as best fits their capabilities.”
The transition from LOGCAP III to LOGCAP IV came at a fortunate period from a planning standpoint. The drawdown in Iraq was already under way and a surge of forces into Afghanistan was foreseen, if not yet official policy. “Timing is everything,” Marks said. “LOGCAP IV comes at a much better point from the standpoint of operations tempo than did LOGCAP III.”
Interestingly, Marks said that planners undertaking the drawdown from Iraq were able to draw on experience learned from the closure of military bases in the US as the Pentagon sought to reduce costs through consolidation. Each base closure requires the evaluation, classification and movement of equipment and property. The experience enabled more effective cost projections, estimates of logistics requirements, and more accurate timetables. According to the Army Material Command, US forces in Afghanistan have received 40 percent of its surge equipment directly from Iraq. This is equipment that did not have to be cycled through or shipped directly from the US or Europe. It also didn’t have to be purchased again.
“The experience we gained from base closures is directly applicable to the surge into Afghanistan, particularly with regard to equipment and property” Marks said.
Perhaps more importantly, the Pentagon is using its experience from the conduct of LOGCAP III to improve the effectiveness of personnel. According to Army Sustainment Command public affairs, the Defense Contract Management Agency has taken steps to increase its LOGCAP personnel assigned to the Southwest Asia theater levels by 11 percent, from 228 to 253. The most significant change in the requirement fill is the addition of 13 fire specialists to be assigned theater-wide and nine quality assurance specialists and property administrators earmarked specifically to the LOCAP III to LOGCAP IV transition in Afghanistan. The DCMA also plans to embed and more formally integrate its personnel into both Army contracting officer representative orientation training and Army pre-deployment exercises, increase DCMA participation in service-sponsored exercises that incorporate LOGCAP, and to participate in select joint training and exercises. All of these steps are being taken to rectify some of the deficiencies in staffing levels under LOGCAP III with the goal of improving contracting expertise available to units in theater.
Marks emphasizes that the Army is taking a much more hands-on approach to LOGCAP than in the past. Not only are there more people assigned to support the writing of unit requirements and communicating these to contractors, the rules and procedures for each are more clearly defined.
“One problem we face is that units rotate, contractors do not,” Marks said. In the past, this has meant a brand new learning curve for to new units entering the theater. Such units may or may not have officers with LOGCAP experience and essentially have to rely heavily on the contractor to interpret and even to define requirements. Under LOGCAP III, this is where much of the waste and even fraud could be found. Soldiers that were assigned to logistics were not necessarily specifically trained in the nuances of working with contractors. These days, a trained LOGCAP support officer is assigned to every brigade-size unit who can write requirements in conformance with a well-understood standard.
Standards are also useful on the oversight side of the ledger. Contractor performance is being measured by the Defense Contract Management Agency and Defense Contract Audit Agency in accordance with pre-established performance standards.
Marks said that in terms of procedures, all logistics requirements are generated by the mission: “First of all, can the requirement be satisfied organically? If not, can they be satisfied by a sister unit? If not, can they be supplied through our agreements with the host nation? If not, there’s LOGCAP.”
Moreover, the Army Sustainment Command is working with contractors to develop a standard table of deliverable support services available under LOGCAP. Marks said is so-called “Matrix of Services” is a great tool for helping units define their requirements according to actual deliverables and assisting contractors in working to those requirements according to their capabilities. It also helps establish a sense of continuity in the relationship between units and support contractors. Such relationships don’t have to developed from scratch every time a new unit rotates into the theater.
Afghanistan is a particularly challenging theater to rotate into. U.S. forces, often operating out of austere forward operating bases (FOBs), must contend with temperature extremes and rugged terrain. There are at present 133 FOBs in Afghanistan divided into to two areas of responsibility. Logistics support for each area of responsibility is currently under the auspices of a separate LOGCAP IV task order, with additional task orders awarded or pending for future FOB expansion. Providing logistics support for combat operations in such a far-flung, often inhospitable theater is a daunting task to fill. Marks is confident that LOGCAP IV provides the method for warfighters and contractors to accomplish their respective missions.
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