Commentary - Alexandros Petersen: Why are Russian bombers over Guam?

These patrols, not seen for 15 years, came in the midst of similar Russian bomber flights to Scotland and over the North Pole. That is after Russia claimed the North Pole, and its vast reserves of oil, natural gas, diamonds and other precious metals, in late June.

This was followed by a confusing incident in which a Russian aircraft apparently fired a dud missile at a Georgian radar station, all in the context of Russia’s withdrawal from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and its vocal opposition to U.S. missile defense plans.

Such actions highlight a reality not sufficiently understood in the West; that after 1991, while Moscow’s power was no longer manifested in the Soviet empire, Russia inherited the vast majority of that superpower’s assets: capabilities, industries and institutions.

The utility of those assets was blunted during the reforms and chaos of the 1990s, but now, under Vladimir Putin, they are being restored to their former glory, and in some cases are even being made stronger than during the Soviet period.

A good example is the Federal Security Service, the FSB, the successor of the Soviet KGB. Putin, a former KGB officer, has elevated the FSB to new heights as Russia’s foremost institution.

Whereas in the Soviet period, the power of the KGB was checked somewhat by the parallel structure of the Communist Party, contemporary Russia has no equivalent domestic power structure to compete with the FSB.

Russia today, with less than half of the population of the Soviet Union, still has approximately the same amount of security and intelligence operatives. That number, estimated at about 400,000, can be compared with the 100,000 employed by the U.S., a country with twice the population of Russia. This development is important because it highlights a broader trend under Putin: the “securitization” of Russia.

Securitization is not only meant in the sense that the security services, like the FSB, have been greatly strengthened, or the renewed emphasis in Russian society on the strength of the state, but that the vast majority of key government officials are security officials — FSB, former FSB, former KGB.

This significantly affects the nature of Russian foreign policy decision-making. The worldview of security officials is one of mistrust and calculation. The communist ideology that at least informed Soviet foreign policy has been supplanted by old-fashioned realist thinking: The balance of power, spheres of influence, a zero-sum chess game across Eurasia, the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is this worldview that manifests itself in nuclear bomber patrols, the abrogation of treaties and the intimidation of neighboring states.

What is the West to do? Neither Europe nor the U.S. can afford to ignore Russian actions, as those very same actions are partly ploys for attracting attention. But, though Europe is overly dependent on Russian energy supplies, and the U.S. can benefit from Russia’s cooperation in fighting terrorism and addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, both would do well to draw some red lines with respect to Russia’s activities. Such assertions need only be made verbally, but they should be made clearly.

Why should Moscow listen? Not only does Russia depend on Europe as a market for its fuels, but the U.S. could easily be much more critical and vocal about Russia’s human rights record, not to mention its assertive international posture.

The coming year will see both American and Russian presidential elections. Putin’s hand-picked successor will likely continue his legacy. Whether Putin serves as prime minister, with a caretaker president, or a more powerful figure in Putin’s coterie is allowed to take control, we should expect Putinesque leadership.

President Bush’s successor, on the other hand, may well engender a significant shift in Western approaches to Russian eccentricities.

Alexandros Petersen is a visiting fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.