Commentary - Sean Singer: This bomb is a dud

On Aug. 6, 1945, just nine days after the Senate ratified the United Nations Charter, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima — joining a weapon and an institution in the most unlikely of marriages. Even more peculiar, however, is that even after the union’s diamond anniversary Joseph Cirincione refuses to quit the honeymoon.

In his new book, “Bomb Scare,” Cirincione stubbornly embraces an old-fashioned approach to nuclear proliferation, touting a plan that would “hearken back to the early Truman proposals that coupled weapons elimination with strict, verified enforcement of nonproliferation.”

Astonishingly, he hawks such a plan despite some rather significant changes to the geopolitical landscape in the last 60 years. However, “Bomb Scare” ’s anachronism is only the beginning of its problems.

The Truman-era proposal in question is the Baruch Plan, put forward by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bernard Baruch in June 1946. Baruch’s main contributions to the original plan, authored by Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal, were swift, certain and enforceable penalties for non-proliferation cheaters. Needless to say, with these safeguards against Russian contravention in place, the proposal was dead on arrival at the Security Council.

Yet in Cirincione’s narrative, the Baruch Plan rests on hallowed ground and is thus illustrative of his inability to acknowledge that international actors frequently have competing interests and don’t always want to play nice.

When it comes to present challenges, specifically North Korea and Iran undermining the non-proliferation regime, the author is vocal on ends but relatively mute on means. “If the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran can be checked, the prospects for halting and reversing proliferation globally improve dramatically. If they are not checked, then they may start a momentum that tips neighboring countries over the nuclear edge”, he writes. Not exactly ground-breaking stuff.

Cirincione’s strategy for checking Iran follows historical examples, like South Africa emerging from apartheid, Brazil and Argentina shedding military juntas for democracy and Libya re-integrating into the international community. Are these historical examples blueprints for handling an aspiring regional power in Tehran?

The United States will have to offer carrots to the Islamic Republic as part of any negotiation. What might they be? “Iran’s leaders will want some assurances that there is a process under way that can remove what they see as potential threats from their neighbors, including Israel,” Cirincione argues.

Will Sunni Pakistan — which harbors suspicions of Shi’a Iran — relinquish its nuclear weapons to satisfy the Islamic Republic’s preconditions, while recently legitimized nuclear India sits to its east? Doubtful.

And is it realistic to expect Israeli nuclear disarmament to assuage the Islamic Republic’s security concerns? Last I checked, Ehud Olmert was not calling for Iran to be wiped off the map. Not that denuclearizing these countries — or any others — is an unworthy goal, but these noteworthy inconveniences seem to elude Cirincione.

Bolstering anti-nuclear efforts as a whole — not just vis-à-vis the Iranian regime — is a good approach, one that would include securing nuclear material (especially in Russia), nuclear powers destroying superfluous weapons stockpiles, reforming the fuel cycle and reinforcing the existing taboo on the use of nuclear weapons (On this the author is right).

But Cirincione ignores how a potential shift away from the Westphalian system could impact counter-proliferation efforts. Good intentions alone don’t make good foreign policy.

There is little new or original in “Bomb Scare,” as evidenced by his frequent direct quotation of other experts. His voice never clearly emerges, his words oftentimes framing a debate without offering any definitive judgment or opinion.

Even on important points, such as Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace program and the Reagan military buildup’s impact on the Soviet decline, the author doesn’t take clear stances and fails to establish an adequate historical context for his own policy recommendations.

When America takes its seat at the nuclear negotiating table, it will have to make sacrifices to prevent further proliferation — sacrifices that won’t even guarantee success — producing a scenario less rosy than the internationalist amicable reconciliation that Cirincione describes.

Sean R. Singer is an apprentice editor at The National Interest.