Raj Purohit: Bush’s evisceration of U.S. and U.K.’s ‘special relationship’ over 200 years

Less known, however, is that the decline is severely impacting a favored and strategic ally of the United States — the United Kingdom — putting the “special relationship” under considerable strain.

Furthermore, the geopolitical implications of the Middle East crisis now threaten to completely eviscerate the relationship.

Because the Bush administration has repeatedly failed to maintain this relationship, it is time that policymakers acknowledge the harm done to this critical alliance and commit to reviving it.

Reviving the relationship became more urgent with Prime Minister Tony Blair’s announcement that he will be stepping down within a year; his declining popularity is largely blamed on his perceived one-sided relationship with Mr. Bush.

Acknowledging the harm done to the relationship is no small task. The list of British policy grievances with the Bush administration is long and serious.

The time before the Iraq war witnessed the Bush administration’s initial estrangement from the U.K. Engagement with Britain was becoming unidirectional and beginning to undermine U.S.-U.K. relations. In response, the U.K. tried to convince the U.S. to take a more moderate position on issues like the International Criminal Court, invariably failed in doing so and then subsequently sought to bridge the gap between Washington and the European Union.

The invasion of Iraq, however, became the defining chapter of the U.S.-U.K. relationship post-Sept. 11. While Britain’s prime minister can claim a few victories during this period, including U.S. engagement with the United Nations, there is no doubt that the Blair regime suffered mightily at home for supporting a deeply unpopular Bush administration. The troubled aftermath in Iraq only hardened views in Britain. Britons felt Blair was making a significant strategic error in supporting an administration that was blatantly uninterested in a two-way relationship and making grievous errors in judgment.

Last year, as Iraq imploded, Blair convened the G-8 at Glenn Eagles and staked his legacy on securing U.S. backing for action on climate change and debt relief. The British public and policy elites seemed convinced they would witness a restoration of the special relationship. Presumably, Bush would let his friend Blair take the lead on these important issues and support him completely. On the contrary, Blair left with an agreement that could not remotely be spun as a victory. Yet again, the unilateral motivations of the Bush administration ignored the opportunity to bolster a critical global relationship.

This year saw further unilateralism. The president’s polite dismissal of Blair’s top legal advisor, when he recommended Guantanamo’s closure, made front-page news in the U.K. Again, questions were raised as to the benefits of the special relationship and British support of the Iraq occupation. Polls reflected this growing dissatisfaction: A June 2006 Populus for The Times poll showed that the number of Britons who agreed that “it is important for Britain’s long-term security that we have a close and special relationship with the U.S.” fell from 71 percent in April to 58 percent. Additionally, 65 percent stated a belief that “Britain’s future lies more with Europe than America,” with a near equal number of Britons, roughly 62 percent, stating that “if Gordon Brown takes over as prime minister, he should be much less close to President Bush than Tony Blair has been.” This statistic makes sober reading when juxtaposed with the imminent transition to a Brown-led United Kingdom.

It seems that the British, from policy makers to the public, have had enough. From the Foreign Office to the Cabinet to the broad public, there seems to be consensus that the special relationship is a one-way street harming British interests. A broad sweep of articles coupled with more anecdotal evidence indicates that the Bush administration has completely eviscerated the relationship. That the U.S. and U.K are working together is solely because Tony Blair is the prime minister.

Policymakers in Washington should be very worried by this data. For while it is, perhaps, too much to hope that the current administration will change course, those seeking to craft a bipartisan foreign policy for the 21st century would do well to place revival of the relationship on their to-do list.

More than the specifics, however, the revival of the relationship requires that the U.S. recognize that any close relationship requires give and take and that both parties must be willing to put parochial interests on the backburner for the greater good.